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ABSTRACT
This study employs a historical/critical approach to
analyze the response of the Clinton Administration to the
Haiti situation during 1993.

The relationship between

contemporary presidential crisis communication and the
agenda-setting and agenda-extension functions of the press
is especially considered.

Specifically,

this study employs

a frame analysis which compares the frame generated by the
Clinton Administration with that used by the press,
represented by New York Times and the Washington P o s t .

The

importance of this study lies in its timeliness; President
Clinton is the first atomic-age President not to have the
Cold War meta-narrative to use in legitimating
international crises.

Prior studies in presidential crisis

rhetoric found that the President receives broad and
consistent support during times of crisis.

This study

found that the press advanced an oppositional frame that
stressed a domestic focus, while the frame used by the
Clinton Administration stressed a foreign policy focus.
The frames were found to limit the options of the Clinton
Administration when dealing with the Haitian crisis,
during the most crucial time of the crisis.

even

Thus this

study discovered evidence that President/press interaction
during times of crisis have changed since the ending of the
Cold War.

viii

INTRODUCTION
In October 1991, President Jean Bertrand Aristide of
Haiti was forcefully removed from office following a

c o u p

d'6tat led by Haiti's military leader, General Raoul
Cedras.

In response to this event, George Bush issued

Executive Order 12775, which officially elevated the
situation in Haiti to the level of a "national emergency"
for the United States.

The Bush Administration immediately

called for economic sanctions,
United Nations
States

(OAS)

and in cooperation with the

(U.N.) and the Organization of American

initiated an embargo that would last

throughout Bush's term as President.
In January 1993, Bill Clinton

was sworn in

President and inherited Bush's Haitian
his candidacy,

Clinton had derided

Administration's policy on Haiti.

as

policy. Throughout

the Bush
Yet upon taking office

Clinton essentially left Bush's policies in place,

made

them his own, and modified them in the ensuing months.

The

press did not let this apparent campaign reversal go
unnoticed.

Throughout 1993, the situation in Haiti

remained unstable, and several key events occurred to which
the President and the press responded.
1993,
dead.

the freighter Neptune sank,

On 19 February

leaving over 800 Haitians

On 13 March 1993, the Haitian military arrested a

soldier after he had been granted political asylum by the
United States.

On 15 March 1993 President Aristide visited
1

2

President Clinton in Washington.

On 3 July 1993, the

Haitian leaders signed the Governors Island agreement that
set a specific time for President Aristide's return to
Haiti.

Finally, on 11 October 1993, U.S. and Canadian

military engineers and trainers were not allowed to land in
Port-au-Prince.
Although these events prompted criticism of the
Clinton Administration,

they were also used by the Clinton

Administration to justify increased action.

The press

focus was primarily upon the legal battle ensuing over the
constitutionality of the Clinton Administration's
repatriation policy,
refugees.

and upon the general plight of Haitian

The Administration's focus was bifurcated:

one,

the return of President Aristide and democracy to Haiti;
and two, the prevention of a humanitarian tragedy in the
form of a massive refugee flotilla from Haiti.

These

competing foci produced different discourses about Haiti
and the broad divergence of the contending frames through
which the President and the press viewed the situation even
after significant action had been taken by the chief
executive.

Therefore,

this study employs a comparative

frame analysis to answer the following questions:

one,

how

did the Clinton Administration frame the situation in
Haiti; two, how did the press,
Clinton,

responding to President

frame the situation; and three, at what time,

if

3

at all, did these frames converge to present a unified
contextual whole?
Rationale for Investigation
This study seeks to better understand the interaction
of press and presidential discourse in the context of
crisis formation.

With the Cold War arguably over,

President Clinton is the first atomic-age President unable
to draw upon the Cold War meta-narrative.

This raises the

issue of how a President can now frame an international
event as a crisis.

In the past it would have been

relatively easy for an American President to use Haiti as a
stalking horse for the Soviet Union, thereby justifying
almost any level of action/involvement.

In the post-Cold

War environment President Clinton appeared unable to do
this.

He seemed to have lost the authority of unilateral

definition,

and his assessments were constantly scrutinized

and challenged by the national media.
pages will suggest,

As the following

this study occurs at a crucial period

in the history of presidential studies.

The very nature of

how Presidents must now frame international events has
changed with the demise of the Soviet Union.

Thus this

study examines the beginning of the creation of a new and
more dialogical method of legitimating international
crises.

4

Definition of Crisis
Many speech communication researchers view crises as
rhetorical creations of the executive branch of government.
Although the declaration of crisis may be unilateral,

all

subsequent discourse is both coded and rule-governed.
Theodore Windt argued that a crisis is announced by the
President as such,

and that the situation demands that he

"act decisively."1

By announcing the crisis the President

asks for his decision to be supported,
what should be done.

not for debate upon

According to Windt,

so long as the

crisis is not one of a military attack upon the United
States,

it is to be considered a political event

"rhetorically created by the president.

. . ."J

However,

the President is not free to do as he pleases when
discursively responding to a crisis.
options are limited by "precedent,
expediency."1

His rhetorical

tradition,

and

The discourse of crisis is shaped by the

political culture that authorizes it.
Jim A. Kuypers, Marilyn J. Young,

and Michael K.

Launer argued that international crisis situations may
begin with no stable means for interpreting the discursive
surroundings,

and that one of the purposes of presidential

utterances is the creation of a stable contextual frame
from which to interpret the event.4

As Windt suggested,

presidential speeches announcing a crisis "begin with an
assertion of the President's control of the facts of the

situation and an acknowledgement that the New Facts which
occasion the speech constitute a New Situation— a crisis
for the United States.H*
Windt suggested three basic lines of arguments that
distinguish presidential crisis rhetoric from other types
of presidential utterances.6

First, there is the

obligatory statement of facts.

Second,

there is the

establishment of a "melodrama" between good
evil

(traditionally the Soviets).

Third,

(the U.S.)

and

the policy

announced by the President and the asked for support are
framed as moral acts.

Although this structure may hold

true for post-World War II Presidents up to Bush, President
Clinton was unable to frame his responses to crises in this
manner due to ending of the Cold War.

The "Evil Empire,"

as Ronald Reagan put it, no longer exists.

So, how to

frame crisis situations?
Outside of military attack, the situation does not
create the crisis,

the President's response does.

President's perception of the situation,

The

and the rhetoric

he uses to describe it, have the potential to elevate the
situation to the status of crisis.

D. Ray Heisey argued

that the President must build certain images of the
"enemy," or must make links with values embedded within
American culture and history if he is successfully to
mitigate a crisis.7

In short,

"leader[s] must find the

acceptable images of political reality suitable for his/her

6

people.Since

the dawn of the atomic-age,

all Presidents

have been able to call upon the topos of good
States)

vs. evil

(the Soviet Union).

(the United

Yet with culmination

of the Cold War the Soviet Union is (at least at this
writing)

in financial and social ruins: the "Evil Empire"

is no more.

The destruction of the Soviet Union meant the

concomitant destruction of the Cold War meta-narrative.
This is politically unfortunate for Clinton; he must
respond to potential crisis situations without the benefit
of this action legitimating meta-narrative; and,

if we

grant Windt's stages of presidential crisis rhetoric as
necessary criteria,

it follows that President Clinton will

be unable to define a crisis unilaterally,

at least without

first redefining how four generations of Americans view the
enemy.
The Agenda-Setting and Aaenda-Extension Functions of the
Press
Scholars of mass communication are not certain whether
to call Agenda-Setting a function,
hypothesis.4

Its relevance here,

a theory,

or a

regardless of its status,

is to help explain how the press interacts with
presidential discourse during crisis situations.

Bernard

C. Cohen made an early observation that the press "may not
be very successful in telling its readers what to think,
but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what
to think about."111
accurate,

If Cohen's statement is accepted as

then it behooves us to consider presidential

7

crisis rhetoric in relation to the press,
press represents public opinion,

not because the

but because it is a good

indication of the issues and ideas that informed voters and
opinion leaders will be talking about.
will be aware of the issues,

Thus the President

ideas, and responses that

circulate in the press; not because they represent popular
opinion,

but because they are a good indicator of that

which still needs to be addressed in his policy,

or that he

should be talking about.
Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw argued that
voters learn about an issue "in direct proportion" to the
attention given that issue by the press; voters tend to
share what the media defined as important."

Further,

they

asserted that the mass media provide voters with the "major
primary sources of national political

information."12

This

is commensurate with the results of a study by Sheldon
Gilberg,

Chaim Eyal, Maxwell E. McCombs and D. Nichols

which concluded that the press has the potential to set our
government's agenda, even at the highest levels."

Michael

B. Salwen suggested that policy makers "will address issues
only when these issues are perceived as crises by the
publ i c .1,14
Viewed as a Fourth Estate,

the mass media shapes not

only what the public "perceives" as "political reality,"
but also how political elites understand what voters and
opinion leaders are thinking about.

Thus a conversation

8

develops among 'the press,

its sources, and the public

audience that determines "what is accepted as the public
agenda."14
Gilberg et al asserted that the President is in a
"strategic position to influence the agenda" of the press
because he is the major source of news at the national
level.16

Although their study found that the press had a

significant influence upon President Carter's second State
of the Union address,

they were unable to determine whether

Carter's address influenced subsequent press issues.
However,

a subsequent study by McCombs,

Gilbert and Eyal

found evidence of "presidential influence on subsequent
press coverage."17

The implications of this for the study

of presidential crisis rhetoric should be clear,
particularly in light of the degree to which the public
rely upon the press for information,
and international events.

especially national

These "unobtrusive issues" are

not part of an individual's common experience,

therefore

the "news media exercise a near monopoly as sources of
information and orientation."1*
surely knows more,

Although the President

the media tell him what we. the public,

know.
Agenda-extension occurs when the media move beyond the
strict reporting of facts, and it is to this concern that
we now turn.

During the decade of the eighties, mass media

and communication researchers using agenda-setting theory

9

began to discover an evaluative component to media news.
They postulated that the media do more than tell us what to
think about, they also tell us how to think about i t .
These studies suggested another aspect of agenda-setting as
it relates to the public evaluation of Presidents; this
aspect is described as "priming."

These studies also

suggested a germane issue for this study; they postulated
that media provide the contextual cues "by which to
evaluate the subject matter" under consideration.|y

In

short, the media often "frame" an issue so that it will be
interpreted in a specific manner.
Framing involves the relationship between qualitative
aspects of news coverage— contextual cues— and how the
public interprets the news.

William Gamson asserted that a

"frame is a central organizing idea for making sense of
relevant events and suggesting what is at issue."20

Facts

remain neutral until framed, thus how the press frames an
issue or event invariably affects public understanding of
that issue or event.

Indeed, Gamson argued that facts

"take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or
story line that organizes them and gives them coherence,
selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring
o t h e r s ."2I
Method
I answer my previously stated research questions
through a comparative framing analysis of the Clinton

Administration's public discursive responses to the Haiti
situation during 1993.
York Times

The Washington Post and the New

(as papers of record) will be used to provide

the press response to the event.

There are three specific

questions this study answers: one,

how did the Clinton

Administration frame the situation in Haiti; two, how did
the press,

responding to President Clinton,

situation; and three,

at what time,

frame the

if at all, did these

frames converge to present a unified contextual whole?
Specifically,

I trace the press/President conversations

revolving around President Clinton's formal,
statements about Haiti.
composed of six chapters.

public

The remainder of this study is
Chapter two is a review of

relevant literature on presidential crisis rhetoric.
Chapter three is a review of relevant literature on agenda
setting and agenda-extension theory.
outline of this study's method.

Chapter four is an

Chapter five is the

analysis of relevant texts from January 1993 through June
1993.

Chapter six is the analysis of relevant texts from

July 1993 through December 1993.

Chapter seven concludes

this study with a discussion of this study's findings and
the implications for future studies in presidential crisis
rhetoric.
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PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS RHETORIC: REVIEW OF
RELEVANT LITERATUT*^
This chapter reviews the scholarly literature most
relevant for this study.

The categories reviewed are: one,

studies of the origin of Cold War rhetoric; and two,
studies of presidential crisis rhetoric
and inventional properties).

(the definitional

In addition,

this chapter

discusses the meaning and significance of these studies for
the present work.

Thus,

it discusses the chief

methodological and theoretical issues in presidential
crisis rhetoric.

In particular,

it considers the Cold War

itself as a meta-narrative and framing device for
presidential crisis rhetoric.

Conversely it discusses the

changes in the inventional stature of such rhetoric as a
result of the end of the Cold War.

Finally,

it reviews the

limitations of the scholarly literature and the ways in
which the present study may extend our knowledge of
presidential communication.
Studies in the Origin of the Cold War
The Cold War meta-narrative1 has permeated into every
corner of U.S.

foreign policy decisions.

inventional resources,
L. Ivie,

Its power,

predate the Cold War itself.

its
Robert

in "Images of Savagery in American Justifications

for War," pointed out that there existed prior to the
ending of the Cold War a "contest of force vs.
irrationality vs. rationality,
[that permeates)

freedom,

and aggression vs. defense

the substance and style of the call-to13

14

arms throughout American history.”2

Cold War rhetoric

draws upon this tradition; thus, Presidents have been able
to construct arguments appealing for public support using
the values and cultural myths felt deeply by the American
people.

Usually this strategy involved the indirect

construction of an image of the enemy through the use of
contrasting references:

the enemy as "coercive,

irrational,

and aggressive," attempting to "subjugate a freedom-loving,
rational,

and pacific victim.”1

For example,

the

opposition of force vs. freedom is exemplified by President
Johnson's 28 July 1965 news conference concerning American
involvement with Vietnam.

Johnson stated:

we insist and we will always insist that the
people of South Viet-Nam [sic] shall have the
right of choice, the right to shape their own
destiny in free elections in the South or
throughout all viet-Nam under international
supervision, and they shall not have any
government imposed upon them by force and terror
so long as we can prevent it.4
Although just one example,

the history of how Presidents

characterize the enemies of the United States,

argues Ivie,

is replete with such references.
In Political C o m munication. Craig Allen Smith has
written on the genesis of Cold War rhetoric.

He suggested

that Cold War rhetoric developed from three separate lines
of foreign policy thought arising immediately after World
War II.'

The first is a rhetoric of cooperation.

Some

politicians "envisioned a world of good and peaceful
nations subject to . . . wars caused by . . . outlaws like

15

Hitler and wars caused by conflicting interests."6

These

politicians envisioned many of the world's future conflicts
being avoided through the establishment of an international
peace keeping force.

The second type of rhetoric is a

rhetoric of red fascism.

Politicians operating from this

perspective "explained Soviet expansion with the rhetoric
used previously to explain German and Italian fascists."7
Consequently,

the Soviets were cast in the light of a

totalitarian police state that was bent upon world
conquest.

Having just experienced almost a decade of this

type of rhetoric,

the American public was well familiar

with the arguments and characterizations used.

The third

type of rhetoric is a rhetoric of power p o l i t i c s .

This

rhetoric rejected the "cooperationist and red fascist
notions of moral and immoral nations.

...

[It instead]

depicted Soviet expansion as a powerful nation filling a
power vacuum.""

These three rhetorical strategies were

combined in the Truman Doctrine.
this new policy,

with the announcement of

an American foreign policy of containment

was established that has carried the country into the
1990s.
It is a well known American cultural fact that,
following World War II, a forty-five year Cold War ensued;
with each passing year the collective weight of superpower
experiences made it easier for Presidents to construct
foreign policy arguments and take action while concurrently

making it more difficult to break the cycle.
Medhurst,

Martin J.

in "Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach,

commented upon the force that such experience has for
American Presidents.

Since the end of World War II,

Soviet-American political interactions have comprised an
ever growing history from which politicians of both sides
have drawn arguments, described situations, and predicted
the outcomes of Superpower struggles.

As Medhurst stated,

history "'teaches' us how to negotiate with the Soviets.
Past 'lessons' constrain the form such negotiations may
take."*'

Medhurst illustrated the enormous dimensions of

the Cold War meta-narrative:
Cold War, like its "hot" counterpart, is a
contest.
It is a contest between competing
systems as represented, for example, by the
Soviet Union and the United States.
The currency of Cold War combat . . . is
rhetorical discourse: discourse intentionally
designed to achieve a particular goal with one o
more specific audience.
Cold War weapons are
words, images, symbolic actions, and, on
occasion, physical actions undertaken by covert
means. Hl
In "Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of Cold War
'Idealists,'" Robert L. Ivie suggested that the primary
inventional resource of Cold War rhetoric lay in its
"prevailing image of the Soviet threat."11

He summed well

in "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A
Framework of Criticism" how Cold War rhetoric was used by
the U.S. government to characterize the Soviet Union:

"The

nation's adversary is characterized as a mortal threat to

17

freedom, a germ infecting the body politic,
the liberty of humankind,

a plague upon

and a barbarian intent upon

destroying civilization."12
Studies of Presidential Crisis Rhetoric
Serious research on presidential crisis rhetoric began
with the work of Theodore O. Windt,

especially after the

197 3 publication of "The Presidency and Speeches on
International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past."1'
Since then,

crisis rhetoric research has been characterized

by epistemic controversies over the definition of the term
"crisis rhetoric," and the relationship between objective
situation and rhetorical construction in the birth of a
crisis.
Just what is crisis rhetoric,
Amos Kiewe,

however?

According to

in The Modern Presidency and Crisis R h e t o r i c ,

crises involve the perception of "immediacy and urgency,"
as well as the public expectation of "strong leadership
qualities."14

Many rhetorical critics view crises largely

or wholly as rhetorical creations.

Windt,

for instance,

argued that a crisis is announced by the President as such,
and that the situation demands that he "act decisively."1'
By announcing the crisis the President asks for his
decision to be supported,
be done.

not for debate upon what should

Thus, crisis rhetoric is a rhetoric that excludes

discussion.

It reserves epistemic questions for the

President alone.

According to Windt,

so long as the crisis
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is not one of a military attack upon the United States,

it

is to be considered a "political event rhetorically created
by the President.

. . .1,16

However, the President is not

free to do as he pleases when discursively responding to a
crisis.

His rhetorical options are limited by "precedent,

tradition,

and expediency."17

Windt has suggested three basic lines of arguments
that distinguish presidential crisis rhetoric from other
types of presidential utterances.1*
obligatory statement of facts.

First,

Second, there is the

establishment of a "melodrama" between good
evil

there is the

(traditionally the Soviets).

{the U.S.)

and

Third, the policy

announced by the President and the asked for support are
framed as moral acts.

In the sense that these can be

framed as normative acts, they are then what everybody
already believes to be true.
arguments,

In announcing these lines of

Windt relied upon an analysis of Kennedy's

response to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba and upon
Nixon's announcement to send American and South Vietnamese
forces into Cambodia.
I follow this general
study.

line of reasoning in this

My principal focus is upon those rhetorical

resources— sites,

epistemic status,

suppression of various

political voices--available for crisis formation and how
those forces interact with a particular President's
approach to dealing with crises in the post-Cold War world.
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The constructed nature of presidential crisis rhetoric is
thus stressed in this study.

As Amos Kiewe suggested,

crisis rhetoric "occurs when the President chooses to speak
on an issue of critical dimensions, whether to promote or
to minimize the perception of a crisis."19

In short, a

crisis— except in cases of military attacks--are initiated
when the President chooses to address a situation as a
crisis.

It can be argued that Presidents would want to

control the definitions of crises; when others first do so,
then Presidents may try to downplay the significance.
This, too, points to the constructed nature of crisis
situations.
Some scholars have argued that crisis responses are
not constrained by previous utterances to the same degree;
hence, the degree of construction by the President varies
from crisis to crisis.

Indeed, the basic elements in any

rhetorical situation--exigence,

audience,

and constraints—

act in such a manner to necessitate a variable range of
responses from the rhetor;

in this case,

announcing a crisis situation.20
Kuypers,

the President

For example,

Jim A.

Marilyn J. Young, and Michael K. Launer,

in "Of

Mighty Mice and Meek Men: Contextual Reconstruction of the
Shootdown of Iran Air 655," argued for understanding crises
as situationally bound,

and as such delimited by context

(the discursive and material surroundings)

acting upon

text, and text upon context, within a limited period of
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time.31

This is to say, an interanimation of text and

context occurs.

From this point of view,

argue Kuypers et

a l . text and context are naturally interacting and evolving
elements within any rhetorical situation.

Indeed,

these

researchers found that crisis situations involve a rather
violent mix of text/context interaction,

often with a

demand for quick interpretation from the public.

This view

supports a reading of crises that views an exigence as
highly unstable and mutable.

Thus a conception of a

rhetorical situation as presupposing a fixed nature or
interpretive pattern— a genre perhaps— is discarded for a
more fluid understanding of situational constraints.21

One

of the major findings of Kuypers et al suggested that
international crisis situations may begin with no stable
means for interpreting the discursive surroundings,

and

that one of the purposes of the presidential text is the
creation of a stable contextual frame through which to
understand the event.
The invention of a stable contextual frame may take
some period of time, yet it is the most important criterion
for a "fitting response" to the situation.

As Windt

asserted, presidential speeches announcing a crisis "begin
with an assertion of the President's control of the facts
of the situation and an acknowledgement that the New Facts
which occasion the speech constitute a New Situation— a
crisis for the United States."21

Yet this is not to say
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that the first utterances of the President create the
crisis,

nor that it establishes a stable frame.

First

utterances are first characterizations; they set the tone.
As Windt argued in Presidents and P r otesters, situations
•'rarely create crises.

Rather,

Presidents'

perceptions of

situations and the rhetoric used to describe them mark
events as crises."24

Marilyn J. Young,

in "When the shoe

is on the Other Foot: The Reagan Administration's Treatment
of the Shootdown of Iran Air 655," extended this line of
thought further by suggesting that as utterances interact
with context and antecedent texts,
situation may occur.

a stability within the

As the stability increases,

the

President will experience both increased freedom to pursue
the present course of action and increased limits upon what
other options he may enact.
Some scholars have argued that a President's initial
response is the most crucial factor in the genesis of
rhetorical crises.

This response may provide the

definition of the event.

In his study,

"Corrupt Rhetoric:

President Ford and the Mavaouez Affair," Dan F. Hahn
examined the Ford administration's initial and subsequent
descriptions of the Mavaauez affair.

Hahn argued that the

Administration's descriptions acted to define the event in
a way that legitimated U.S. actions by shutting out any
other views of the event.
according to Hahn,

The terminology used by Ford,

"was corrupted by a false description of
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the situation."2'

For example,

by describing the capture

of the Havaauez by the Cambodians as an act of "piracy,"
even though the ship was within the territorial waters of
Cambodia,

the Ford administration was offering a specific

interpretation of the act.

This definition,

offered by the Ford administration,
actions;

in this case, U.S.

and others

acted to justify future

forces attacking Cambodian

soldiers in order to recapture the vessel.

Hahn found

evidence for the interpretive power of the President's
initial statements:
[The] president's definition . . . provides the
"terministic screen" through which the population
views the event, while at the same time providing
him with a "terministic compulsion" to follow the
implications of the terminology to their logical
conclusions.2t>
Ford's initial utterances on the taking of the Havaauez by
the Cambodian government set the stage for future actions.
By calling it "piracy" Ford legitimated certain actions
while he delimited other options--negotiated compromise,
for instance: the U.S. does not negotiate with pirates.
This view of the President's role in defining the
situation is commensurate with that expressed by David C.
Klope in "Defusing a Foreign Policy Crisis: Myth and
Victimage in Reagan's 1983 Lebanon/Grenada Address,"

Klope

argued that the major function of the President's response
to a perceived crisis is to redefine the situation in terms
that the public can understand or identify with.
asserted that the manner in which this

He
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identification/redefinition occurs is often through
"configuring the situation in terms of socially-sanctioned
myths."27

By analyzing Ronald Reagan's response to the

Beirut bombing and the invasion of Grenada,

Klope

discovered that both crises were actually the negative
public perception of the events,

and thus the President was

forced to respond in an attempt to mitigate this negative
perception.

Reagan used socially accepted American myths

to ground his response and ameliorate the ambiguity.
Reagan was thus able to bring order to the previously
disordered events.
Generic Classifications of Crisis Rhetoric
The constructed nature of international crisis
situations is agreed upon by most scholars of presidential
crisis rhetoric.2K

However,

upon the constructed nature,

even though scholars may agree
they are not in agreement upon

the types of responses that a President makes when
responding to the perception of a crisis.

Thus many

studies explore a topology of presidential responses.
instance,

For

in "Consummatory Versus Justificatory Crisis

Rhetoric," Richard A. Cherwitz and Kenneth S. Zagacki
viewed crises as purposeful rhetorical constructions:
"events become crises,
situational exigencies,

not because of unique sets of
but by virtue of discourse used to

describe them."217 They saw rhetoric as playing a
"paramount role in defining,

shaping and responding to
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international crises."*0

in short, discourse is both

constrained by and frames the response to the situation.
In their analysis of presidential responses to five crises,
Cherwitz and Zagacki provided an example of a typological
study by distinguishing between consummatory and
justificatory responses.
A consummatory response is marked by discourse that
initially constitutes the government's official reply to a
perceived crisis event.

As examples of consummatory

replies Cherwitz and Zagacki used Reagan's response to the
Soviet shootdown of KAL 007 and Jimmy Carter's reply to the
seizure of American hostages in Iran.

They posited that

consummatory discourse is "circumspect," and stresses the
importance of proceeding with "caution" and "patience."11
This type of discourse calls for the perpetrators to carry
out certain

(U.S. prescribed)

actions to close the crisis.

Consummatory discourse is illocutionary in nature;
demands,

it

it seeks to effect a change or induce action.

Justificatory discourse,

on the other hand,

is discourse

that is part of a larger, overt military retaliation by the
U.S.

Cherwitz and Zagacki provided for examples Lyndon

Johnson's statement after the Gulf of Tonkin retaliation,
John Kennedy's statement after the deployment of Soviet
missiles on Cuba,

and Gerald Ford's response to the seizure

of the U.S.S. Hav a a u e z .

In each of these cases the

President justified U.S. action taken in response to the
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act of a foreign power.
discourse as a whole,

These responses,

and justificatory

are characterized by their

irrevocable nature; they are "direct and decisive," and
announce concrete,

definitive military action taken in

response to the actions of foreign nations.32
According to Cherwitz and Zagacki,

both types of

discourse are epideictic in nature; they seek to identify
and blame adversaries,
actions.

However,

while concurrently praising U.S.

consummatory discourse takes on forensic

elements since it makes "considerable and concerted efforts
. . . to present a prima facie case for [the perpetrator's]
guilt to the American public and the world.

. . ."H

Justificatory discourse is deliberative in nature:

the

"official military responses of the U.S. government

. . .

are explicated and defended."34
Not all writers agree with the conception of crisis as
rhetorically constructed.

In "The Function of Epideictic

and Deliberative Strategies in Presidential Crisis
Rhetoric," Bonnie J. Dow drew a distinction between crises
as a result of events and crises as a result of
presidential definition.

Dow differentiated between

presidential crisis rhetoric designed to provide communal
understanding

(epideictic)

gaining policy approval

and that rhetoric designed for

(deliberative).

The former is that

which responds to events, and the latter is that which
creates or justifies events.

Dow argued that epideictic
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responses function to prevent disparate interpretations of
the situation and to "promote continuity,
feeling,

restore communal

and . . . reconcile the audience to a new

situa t i o n .",s

Deliberative strategies,

on the other hand,

are those used to demonstrate that the policy being enacted
in response to a crisis is "expedient,

reasoned and

p r u d e n t ."w
Limitations
There is an underlying tension within the above
studies and others that have crisis rhetoric as their
controlling principle.

Carole Blair and Davis W. Houck,

in

"Richard Nixon and the Personalization of Crisis," have
characterized two major weaknesses in the present state of
research in presidential crisis rhetoric.

They suggested

that many crisis rhetoric studies fall into one of two
camps of "ambivalences."

These ambivalences concern the

generic quality or the situatedness of the rhetoric under
consideration.,7

Blair and Houck asserted that many

studies often make generic claims and then undermine those
very claims.

Furthermore,

these studies often attempt not

to draw the line between a crisis and non-crisis event.
They cited studies by Pratt, Windt, Cherwitz and Zagacki,
and Dow as example of generic ambivalence.

Drawing upon

the work of Thomas C. Conley, Blair and Houck stated that
"the particularity of rhetorical events renders their
containment in generic categories problematic."1K
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The other view of crisis rhetoric concerns its
situated character,

and that many critics seem to want to

delimit the scope of inquiry to international situations
only.

Richard A. Cherwitz39 and Klope were cited here.

The ambiguous nature of "situatedness" concerns rhetorical
situation as opposed to rhetorical invention.

Two problems

emerge when crisis rhetoric is viewed as related to
situation.

First, crisis rhetoric may be applicable to

"circumstance other than international discord" ;4t> and
second,

"motivation for 'crisis rhetoric'

[may be] more

closely related to . . . presidents' desire to maintain
political popularity than to the international events
themselves."41

Likewise,

two problems emerge when crisis

rhetoric is viewed as rhetorical invention.

First,

Presidents may be viewed as constructing a crisis.

As

Cherwitz stated,

"presidential discourse may construct an

image of crisis,

often regardless of the situational

characteristics spawning such discourse."43

The second

problem concerns presidential utterances that respond to a
"pre-existing crisis."

Blair and Houck cited Dow's

analysis of Reagan's response to the shootdown of KAL 007
as providing an example of this type of situation.
main concern then,

The

is between viewing crisis rhetoric as

constructing the perception of crisis and crisis rhetoric
viewed as a response to an event already perceived by some
as a crisis.41
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Blair and Houck argued that the distinction cannot be
proven,

nor is it a necessary distinction to understand the

nature of crisis rhetoric.

They put forward a conception

of genre that necessitates a rethinking of how we view
crisis rhetoric.
Rosemarin,

Following the literary critic Adena

Blair and Houck suggested that genre should be

viewed as a classifying statement,

not as a class of

discourse:
The critic posits a genre characterization as
hypothetical, reads a particular work in terms of
that characterization, and concludes with claims
about what that work "is like" when it is read in
terms of the hypothesized genre.44
The purpose is insight, not classification.

It is a top-

down approach that emphasizes the "recontextualization of
the speech" in order to elicit insight.4S

In short,

Blair

and Houck would have critics of crisis rhetoric ask,

"What

is the speech like if it is read as a crisis speech?"46
This approach,

however,

even while seeming to skirt the

genre and situatedness issues, does lead to other abuses.
It encourages the removal of rhetoric from the realm of the
world in which it is practiced,

and views it as a stable

entity susceptible to outside imposition of theoretical
schemata .47
Yet even those studies attempting a more practical
grounding of the theory used in a particular analysis may
fall into the trap of over-determinizing their typologies.
For example,

Dow cited the shootdown of KAL 007 as an
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example of President Reagan using epideictic crisis
rhetoric in response to an event "already seen as serious,
even critical.

. . ."4*

Yet with this interpretation we

theoretically retrogress to a view of rhetorical situations
being deterministic.

Dow argued that the Reagan

Administration's response to the shootdown is epideictic
because there was press coverage prior to the
Administration's response; this coverage therefore acts to
frame the event as a crisis before the President can
respond.

Yet Secretary of State G. Schultz responded to

the shootdown on 1 September 1983, only hours after the
event, and President Reagan issued a statement the same day
stating the shootdown was an "appalling and wanton misdeed
. . . inexplicable to civilized people everywhere."41*
These utterances helped to initially set the tone for the
Administration's response,

well before the press made it an

issue, or even had reported it.

Indeed, the Reagan

Administration used the shootdown to create a c r i s i s ; and
the excoriation of the Soviet Union was the focus; the loss
of American lives was not an issue for the Administration
as Dow maintains.

Thus, classificatory schema— epideictic,

deliberative— may have over-determined the event to the
point that interactions of text and context were
overlooked.
Many of the studies reviewed in this chapter have
elements that support Windt's contention about the nature
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of presidential crisis rhetoric.
Cherwitz and Zagacki; and Klope,

Although some
for example)

(Dow;

have argued

from a limited, micro-analysis and have sought to identify
generic elements,50 they have also pointed to the
discursively constructed nature of presidential crises.
For example: Klope found that crises are based in part upon
negative public perception of events; the President must
then respond in order to reconstruct this perception.
Cherwitz and Zagacki contended that crisis rhetoric is
either consummatory or justificatory, yet regardless of
which is used to classify the discourse,

crisis rhetoric is

both constrained by and is a response to the situation;
frames it as a crisis.

it

Kiewe argued that a crisis is

constructed as a true crisis by the President's response to
an event.

Dow argued that presidential crisis rhetoric is

of two types: that responding to events
that which creates or justifies events
However,

(epideictic)

and

(deliberative).

some of these studies suggest disturbing

contradictions due to micro-managing theoretical
constraints pertaining to the examination of presidential
responses to a particular crisis.
employed— epideictic,
consummatory,

deliberative,

By listing strategies
justificatory,

etc.— some researchers have maximized the

theoretical discrimination of situational constraints
have,

in fact,

been guilty of over-determinizing the

rhetorical situation;

i.e.,

they have imposed a

(they
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theoretically generated and rigid framework upon a fluid
event).

A case in point concerning the theoretical

contradictions occurs when we examine the generic
classifications espoused by Dow and cherwitz and Zagacki
when examining Reagan's response to the Soviet shootdown of
KAL 007.
Cherwitz and Zagacki labeled Reagan's response to the
shootdown of KAL 007 as "consummatory."

This type of

discourse demands an action from the adversaries in order
to bring the crisis to a close.

It is epideictic because

it identifies and blames adversaries while concurrently
praising U.S. actions.

It is forensic because it presents

a case to the public for accepting the President's
definition of the situation and to approve the action
taken.

Dow, on the other hand,

labeled Reagan's response

to the shootdown of KAL 007 as "epideictic."

For Dow,

this

type of discourse is designed to provide communal
understanding of an event.

It is a response to an event

already perceived bv the public as a c r i s i s .

Micro-

managing definitions led these two studies of the same
event to come to two oppositional conclusions.

Although it

has previously been mentioned that Dow is grossly mistaken
in her chronology of events, the point remains:
theoretically driven analyses lead to over-determination of
the situational elements.

Although the above theoretical

"types" were constructed for the purpose of analysis,

the
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above authors have supposed a stable and knowledgeable
public audience and that there exists a finite set of
rhetorical functions corresponding to their constructed
types.

This could lead to a limited view of the range of

possible communication practices.
Public Knowledge as Resource and Constraint
A more useful approach appears in the literature on
public knowledge.
Superpowers:

Young and Launer,

in "KAL 007 and the

An International Argument," defined public

knowledge as "the accumulated wisdom of the people" that
"serves as the authoritative ground for political
discourse.

In an atmosphere of crisis, the public would

rely upon this "accumulated knowledge to define the
situation.

. . ."H

Lloyd Bitzer,

in "Rhetoric and Public

Knowledge," defined a public as a group of persons "united
in interests,
As a public,

aspirations,

traditions,

and experiences."''

these people possess "a fund of truths,

principles and values which could only characterize a
public.These

attributes may include "principles of

public life to which we submit as conditions of living
together;

shared interests and aspirations

. . . [and] the

accumulated wisdom proffered by our cultural pasts.""
Such may be called public knowledge.

The public and its

knowledge act to authorize discourse emanating from rhetors
who are acting as spokeperson for the public;
the President.

in our case,

Although authorization is not always
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needed, many acts occur within a crisis context,
require authorization,

and thus

for "authorization is needed when a

proposed act or message might seriously affect the well
being of others . . .
represent,

or when a person or group claims to

or stand in for, another person or group."46

Reagan's response to the KAL 007 shootdown does
provides insight into the historical/cultural significance
of public knowledge.

In "Reagan and Mitterrand Respond to

International Crisis:

Creating Versus Transcending

Appearances," D. Ray Heisey argued that presidential
responses to crises are culturally based and historically
mandated.”

Heisey asserted that the President must build

certain images of the "enemy," or must make links with
values embedded within American culture and history if he
is to successfully mitigate a crisis.

In short,

"leader[s]

must find the acceptable images of political reality
suitable for his/her people.,,',,
Atomic Age,

all Presidents have been able to call upon the

topos of good
Union).

Since the dawn of the

(the United States) vs. evil

(the Soviet

Yet with the culmination of the Cold War the

Soviet Union is in financial and social ruins:

the "evil

empire," as Ronald Reagan put it,

With the

is no more.

destruction of the Soviet Union comes the concomitant
destruction of the Cold War meta-narrative.4y

This is

politically unfortunate for Clinton; he must respond to

potential crisis situations without the benefit of this
action legitimating meta-narrative.
Mark A. Pollock,

in "The Battle for the Past: George

Bush and the Gulf Crisis," examined George Bush's rhetoric
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

and provides some

insight into the beginnings of post-Cold War crisis
rhetoric.60

Although Pollock believed the study of crises

to be a generic endeavor,

he did provide insight into the

effects of history upon the inventional resources used by
the President.

Although Pollock did not state that his

study emphasizes that Bush was operating in the post-Cold
War era,

it nevertheless provided us with an example of the

move away from constructing crises in the manner described
by windt.

Pollock wrote that Bush
quickly characterized the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait as constituting a new and critical
situation . . . .
He made repeated references to
his efforts to build an international consensus
against Iraq.
This stress on a search for a
peaceful solution fits the pattern of contrasting
American good will with the actions provoking the
crisis.
[This also] framed the crisis as a clear
moral issue, transcending the interests of
particular nations.
[However,] the collapse of
the Soviet bloc precluded Bush's use of an
ideological call to arms against communism as a
way to transform the crisis into an ideological
conflict between good and evil.61

Bush was able to frame the event successfully because
he was able to develop an "augmented historical
narrative,,w that drew upon pre-World War II visions of the
enemy.

In this case, argued Pollock,

Bush drew upon

America's collective memory about 1938 Munich.

The residue

of the Cold War meta-narrative and this vision legitimated
decisive military action.

Pollock rightly pointed out that

the 1938 Munich agreement has "great symbolic power"
because it is a historical event that has assumed a
rhetorical character.

In "Rhetorical Histories and Arms

Negotiations," Thomas Kane described such transformation as
rhetorical events.

A rhetorical event is an historical

event that has become rhetorical because it
either violates or affirms in some dramatic way
those things a culture believes about itself as a
collective public.
[It becomes] meaningful less
from what really happened than [from] the
collective set of assumptions and perceptions . .
. that have been handed down from previous
discourse, arguments, experiences and
interpretations. . . .*’
Young and Launer have provided additional insight into
this area.

They argued that crisis may be immediate,

as

with the shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007, or they
may slowly evolve, presenting rhetors with the opportunity
to respond to the budding rhetorical situation.64
short,

In

they have developed a more subtle analysis than the

"either/or" categorizations of Dow, and Cherwitz and
Zagacki.

They have also provided insight into the relation

of the presidential message and the American public:
In clear cases of crisis, the context— and,
hence, the [president's] reaction— is less
ambiguous.
When national interests are not so
directly involved, however, the context is more
dubious and conflicting perceptions may weaken
the parameters of the rhetorical situation.
In
these instances, the public seeks additional
guidance.*'

Furthermore,

when the public seeks additional information

from the President,
provided,

seemingly demands it, and it is

the overall situation again changes.

For with

each new round of information disclosures the amount and
primacy of information that constitutes public knowledge
changes,

and with this change comes a change in context.

A

crisis atmosphere disrupts the usual stability of public
knowledge; a state of "flux" ensues.

The epistemic status

of crisis,

by its very transitional nature,

generates new

knowledge;

it subverts or contests old knowledge about the

situation
Extensions by Present Study
With the Cold War arguably over,

it seems that

President Clinton is the first atomic-age President who
cannot draw upon the continuing Cold War to support his
foreign policy actions.

The means available to the

President for framing an international event as important
are no longer obvious.

The Cold War has been a common

component of American culture since the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine in 1947.

Throughout the years following

World War II, each President has used the inventional
resources of this word oriented contest in order to justify
foreign policy decisions.

As Robert L. Scott has written,

standing "up to the USSR has been a mainstay in the conduct
of U.S.

foreign affairs since the end of World War II."67

Yet standing up to the Soviets is not the only concern.
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Presidents of the U.S. have stood up in a specific manner.
Their discourse against the Soviets has had a distinct
quality,

and its nature has permeated U.S.

for the past forty-five years.
"U.S.

foreign policy

Scott pointed out that

foreign policy generally has been monitored by the

rhetoric of the Cold War."6*
A transformation in Superpower Cold War rhetoric began
shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev launched his policies of
perestroika and a l a s t n o s t .

As the Soviets seemed to move

away from the depiction of the enemy that America was
accustomed to, President "Reagan was able . . .

to preserve

domestic unity largely because he transferred the evil
empire imagery from Russia to Nicaragua,
Iran."M

Libya, and

If we follow this line of reasoning,

then Bush

may be seen as having worked with the residue of the Cold
War imagery in his foreign policy actions, most notably,
the Panama invasion and Operation Desert storm.

Thus the

meta-narrative of the Cold War was carried into the 1990s,
but it was beginning to unravel.
office,

By the time Clinton took

the Cold War meta-narrative was no more.

This study seeks to identify some of the resources
that may be used by the President to frame an international
event as a crisis situation in the post-Cold War world.
Theoretically speaking,

the American public views an

international event as important whenever the President is
able to frame it as a crisis.

Thus, the rhetoric a

President employs to address and create crises is different
than that used to address non-crisis situations.
Kiewe states,

As Amos

crisis rhetoric "is distinct from non-crisis

rhetoric to the extent that it characterizes a unique and
dynamic p r o c e s s ."70
Although the studies thus far reviewed suggest
interesting strategies for classifying presidential crisis
rhetoric,

their most trenchant contribution comes from

their implied support for an interpretation of crises as
rhetorical constructions.

Windt's components of crisis

formation are illustrative of this view,

yet his structure

is premised upon the Cold War meta-narrative— some level of
melodrama must be initiated in order for crisis rhetoric to
work.

The above mentioned studies support this contention

as well.

This study, however,

advances the proposition

that the Soviets are not necessary for the creation of a
melodrama that capitalizes upon the topos of good versus
evil.

The Soviets have been used conveniently for the past

45 years to fill the "evil" half of the oppositionally
structured mythic form,

"good versus evil."

All that is

necessary for this form to work is something to fill the
"evil" role.

As Pollock stated, the "enemy need not be

communism--fascism served as well in World War II.

But in

communism's absence, an ideological substitute must be
found."71

Bush successfully did this during the Gulf
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Vet Clinton was not successful with Haiti
of his foreign policy crises; e.g., Somalia,
North K o r e a } .

(or with any

Bosnia, and

So, something other than an event and the

President's response must account for a successful crisis
formation.

As Martin J. Medhurst argued in "Eisenhower,

Little Rock, and the Rhetoric of Crisis," crisis rhetoric
is different with each President;

it is, indeed, part of a

President's rhetorical biography.71

Medhurst argued for

the examination of crisis rhetoric as part of the
President's rhetorical biography; thus the discourse moves
away from a generic classification to a more personal
investigation.

Indeed, Medhurst put forth a powerful

argument that Presidents develop their own normative
response to a crisis situation.
have had a well developed,

Eisenhower was shown to

five step strategy:

one, he

attempted to prevent situations from maturing into crises;
two,

if a crisis developed,

he consulted widely; three, he

waited for crises to peak before acting;
waiting,
action,

four, while

he told "opponents" that he was ready to take
but conveyed that there was still time to

negotiate; and five, when it was time to act, he did so
with overwhelming force.

Medhurst persuasively argued:

crises, by definition, bring into play matters of
personal values, political philosophy, strategic
theory, and psychological predisposition, not to
mention the peculiar exigencies of the historical
m o m e n t .74
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In "An Analysis of Three Crisis Speeches," James W.
Pratt examined the crisis rhetoric of Presidents
Eisenhower,

Kennedy,

and Johnson and found that the three

Presidents used a variety of strategies in responding to
the crises.

This lends support for this study's view of

crises as defying generic classification;

furthermore,

Pratt's inquiry suggested presidential style is a factor in
the handling of crises:
[It] appears that the speaking characteristics of
the president involved and the specific nature
for the crisis setting combine to determine the
type of speech which will result and that this
contention is more important than the simple
presence or absence of the crisis.7'
This study take the position that the study of
presidential crisis rhetoric should not primarily approach
an event as an example of crisis

(Cherwitz and Zagacki), or

examine a speech/text through a genre of crisis
H o u c k ) , or suggest a situation is a crisis

(Blair and

(Dow).

Rather

this study suggests that researchers would be more
productive of knowledge by examining the interplay of
various texts and contexts that act to alter the situation
and public perception of the situation.

Thus,

criticism of

presidential crisis rhetoric should be a blend of
discursive and material conditions.

Questions that might

be asked are many.

For example: How are the perceptions of

crises formulated?

How are contexts/situations developed

so that a "fitting" utterance may be created to
successfully bring a crisis to resolution?
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We must now consider the initial situation,
President's response,

and presidential style.

the

These three

elements are conveyed to the public via the press,

thus it

follows that we should ask what role the printed press
plays in crisis development.

It seems logical that the

press plays a considerable role in disseminating the
message of the President to the American public and
international audiences.

It is also true that Presidents

"can depend on tremendous public support for whatever
policy they pursue in situations they deem 'critica1.'"7ft
Yet Clinton was unable to marshal this support,

even though

he continually stressed the importance of the situation in
Haiti.
press,

Since the public receives its information from the
it follows that the role of the press in the

development of this crisis needs to be examined.
role,

What

if any, did the press play in keeping a crisis from

formulating in Haiti?
Although the structure suggested by Windt may hold
true for post-World War II Presidents up to Bush,

President

Clinton is unable to frame his responses to crises in this
manner due to ending of the Cold War.
longer exists.

The "Evil Empire" no

In its absence exists an inventional vacuum

where once existed the Cold War meta-narrative;

Presidents

must now rethink ways of framing their crisis responses.
This study asserts that in this time of flux. President
Clinton will have been unable to frame successfully his
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utterances about Haiti in such a manner that the public and
the press accepted it as true.
the President's response,

Thus the press will report

but in the post-Cold War

confusion advance its own conception of the situation.
This study thus contributes to the literature concerning
presidential crisis rhetoric in three ways.

First,

it

advances a little studied notion of crisis rhetoric as an
interanimation of text and context within situational
constraints.

Second,

it examines crisis rhetoric occurring

in the wake of the Cold War.

Finally,

it examines the role

of the printed press in presidential crisis rhetoric.
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AGENDA-BETTING AND AGENDA-EXTEN8XON:
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Because presidential communication is mediated
communication for the vast majority of American citizens,
any study of presidential discourse must deal with the
media.

The print media have long functioned as

presidential conduit,
Accordingly,

interpreter,

and adversary.

this chapter examines the relevant research

literature concerning the role of the press in American
democracy,

and the agenda-setting and agenda-extension

functions of the press in contemporary presidential
politics.

The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of

the meaning of this research for the present study.
The Role of Print Media in a Democracy
The Press "takes on the form and coloration of the
social and political structures within which it operates
. . [and]

.

it reflects a system of social control whereby

the relations of individuals and institutions are
adjusted.*"

For America,

this claim has come to mean a

free and democratic press, a press concerned with
democratic ideals.

Originally,

operated quite differently.
a small,

the press in America

Early American newspapers were

cottage affair that actually began as a sideline

for printers.

The largest papers in the country were read

by a few thousand people at most, and this was the norm
until the rise of the penny papers in the 1830s.

These

early presses did not need to be objective in the sense
50
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that we use the term today,

for they had a limited,

partisan audience of readers: Whigs, Democrats,
Republicans,

French, German, etc.

Even at the onset of the

20th century the presses were not entirely objective.
Joseph Pulitzer made his fame and fortune on
sensationalistic stories printed using yellow headlines;
today we call this type of reporting yellow journalism.
Too, William Randolph Hearst competed with Pulit 2 er for
readership.

He took a strong stand concerning

American/Spanish relations that eventually helped "inform*'
the citizenry that we needed to go to war after the U . S . S .
Maine blew up.
The late 19th and early 20th century papers were
primarily weekly editions; the major source of news was
still local and face to face.

These papers, however,

reflected the viewpoint of individual owners,
contemporary objective viewpoint.

still

not a

For example,

Benjamin

Flowers published the A r e n a . a weekly protest magazine;
Samuel McClure published McClure's M a g a z i n e .

These and

other weekly papers and magazines were

used to

attention to certain social conditions

that existed

country at that time.
not often exist.
sold papers.

call
in the

In short, objective reporting did

The purpose was sensational stories that

Neil Postman called attention to

of the media in this country.

Postman

this facet

posited that the

real business of newspapers is entertainment,

not real news
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for citizens.

He argued that the dominant culture which

the papers reflect is not democracy but capitalism,

and

that the news is a product in the entertainment industry in
competition for the entertainment dollar with magazines,
television,

fast food, toys, sports, etc.2

Today, the press in America is viewed as having
operated under a Libertarian perspective,
which grew out of the Enlightenment.

a perspective

Humans were viewed as

rational, enlightened beings who could discern between
truth and falsehood.

The press was conceived as "a partner

in the search for t r u t h .” and was used to provide the
public with the necessary information to "make up their own
minds as to policy."’

This position stressed minimal or no

government control, and it is through this perspective that
we have come to view the press as a Fourth Estate in this
country.

The primary characteristic of this perspective is

one that rests upon a concept of language as a transparent
vehicle of thought.

With the first concerns over press

ownership--influence by the source or control by the
source— we find a concomitant weakening of libertarian
theory.
Social Responsibility Theory
We see the concerns about source control emerge by the
mid-1920s,

when the media of this country had come to be

dominated by a few wealthy and powerful people.

This may

in part be explained through economic necessity,

yet the
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potential for abuses remain.

Shortly after World War II,

the Commission on Freedom of the Press, the so-called
Hutchins Commission,

took up the issue of press ownership

and responsibility.

The report of the commission,

entitled

"A Free and Responsible Press,'* represented the growing
trend in American media toward a theory and practice of the
press advocating social responsibility.

The basic premise

of the commission was that "the power and near monopoly
position of the media impose on them an obligation to be
socially responsible.
commission's report,

. . ."4

The idea behind the

according to Louis Day,

underpins a

contemporary notion of social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y T h i s

idea

is summed by Theodore Peterson:
Freedom carries concomitant obligations; and the
press, which enjoys a privileged position under
our government, is obliged to be responsible to
society for carrying out certain essential
functions of mass communication in contemporary
society.*
It is to this responsibility that we now turn.
"The public's right to know" is a common phrase today.
It represents the perspective underpinning the social
responsibility theory of the media.

It demonstrates the

strong movement away from Libertarian theory in that it
underscores the common person's right to know and the
editor's moral responsibility to ensure that the
requirements for the public's knowing occur.

There are six

basic functions of the press under social responsibility
theory:

one, provide service to the political system by
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providing information,

discussion,

and debate; two, help to

enlighten the general public so that it might self-govern;
three, act as a defender of civil rights by assuming a role
as government watchdog;

four,

act as a conduit through

which the economic sector might be served by bringing
together buyers and sellers through advertisements;

five,

provide entertainment; and six, maintain financial
independence so that reporting will not be influenced by
special interests.7
Whereas Libertarian theory rests upon a negative
conception of liberty and press freedom

("freedom from";

that is, freedom from government control and censorship),
social responsibility theory rests upon a positive notion
of liberty and freedom of the press:

"freedom for"

"achieving the goals defined by its ethical sense and
society's needs.

. . .

The Commission's report and

subsequent emendations speak to the complex interplay of
three aspects of contemporary media:

one,

communication

technology; two, economic pressures; and three,
change.

societal

Social responsibility theory attempts to come to

grips with the problems of the press by taking into account
all three of these important considerations.
Practically speaking,

freedom for achieving certain

societal goals necessitates that certain requirements be
set for those who make up the media in this country.
Commission,

anticipating this need,

The

listed these standards
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for press performance.
truthful,

comprehensive,

First, the press must provide "a
and intelligent account of the

day's events in a context which gives them meaning.
Second, the press must serve as a "forum for the exchange
of comment and criticism.1,10

Third, the press must project

"a representative picture of the constituent groups in
society."11

Fourth, the press must assume responsibility

for "the presentation and clarification of the goals and
values of the society" in which it operates.12

Finally,

the press must provide "full access to the day's
intelligence.”11

It is the first of these responsibilities

that I intend to highlight when discussing agenda-setting
th e o r y .
The above accoutrements of social responsibility
theory underpin the functions of the press as defined by
communication and political science scholars.

Doris A.

Graber has maintained that there exist four basic functions
of the press: one, surveillance; two,
three,

interpretation;

socialization; and four, manipulation.

Surveillance

corresponds to the "information and news providing function
of mass communication."14

Interpretation corresponds to

what Dominic A. Infante, Andrew S. Rancer,
Womack have called correlation,
interpret,

and Deanna F.

"how the mass media select,

and criticize the information they present to

the public.1"'

Socialization "involves the learning of

basic values and orientations that prepare individuals to
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fit into their cultural milieu."16

Finally,

manipulation

refers to "the deliberate manipulation of the political
process."17

This final function reported by Graber

corresponds to what Infante et al called mobilization:

"the

ability of the media to promote national interests and
certain behaviors,

especially during times of national

crisis.
Yet Graber's conception of manipulation is more
complicated than that espoused by Infante et a l .

It posits

that the media maintians an agenda; her conception suggests
an active role for the media in shaping the news.
Manipulation,

for Graber,

involves two distinct forms.

The

first of these involves writing "stories that expose
misconduct in government and produce reforms."1'' The
second involves presenting "sensational information that
attracts large media audiences and enhances profits."71’

I

am primarily concerned with the first of these in this
study.

By deciding what needs to be changed or fixed in

our society,

the press has distinctly moved away from a

traditional notion of objective news reporting.

However,

this mode of operating stills falls within the realm of
social responsibility theory.

We must remember,

however,

that the "mass media are an important influence on politics
because they regularly and rapidly present politically
crucial information to huge audiences."21

Like Graber,

maintain that agenda-setting/building is a "widely used

I
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strategy for manipulating politics.
thought is kept paramount,

. . ."22

If this

then we must examine the agenda-

setting role of the press.
The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press
Scholars of mass communication are not certain whether
to call agenda-setting a function,
hypothesis.23

a theory, or a

Whatever its true designation,

al pointed out,

as Infante et

"the concept has received considerable

attention from mass communication theorists.,,M
a theory,

Indeed, as

it affirms that the media "do have a great deal

of influence" upon political decision making,

and that the

media are especially influential in telling the general
population what to think about.23
regardless of its status,

Its relevance here,

is to help explain how the press

interacts with presidential discourse during crisis
situations.

Bernard C. Cohen made an early observation

that the press "may not be very successful in telling its
readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful
telling its readers what to think about."26

in

Agenda-setting

researchers following Cohen have used similar phraseology
to describe the agenda-setting function of the press.
In "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,"
Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw found that voters
learn about an issue "in direct proportion" to the
attention given that issue by the press.27

The question

central to their study was whether or not the key issues in
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a political campaign,

as reported by the general public,

correlated with actual media content.

They found that

voters tended to share what the media defined as important.
Moreover,

they asserted that the mass media provide voters

with the "major primary sources of national political
information."2*

This is commensurate with the results of a

study by Sheldon Gilbert,

Chaim Eyal, Maxwell E. McCombs

and D. Nichols that asserted that the press has the
potential to set our government's agenda,
highest levels.2'* Michael B. Salwen,
Public opinion:

even at the

in "News Media and

Benign Agenda-Setters?

Opinion Molders?

Or Simply Irrelevant?," took the above position to the
extreme,

and suggested that policy makers "will address

issues only when these issues are perceived as crises by
the p u b l i c . H o w e v e r ,

if everyday issues can be elevated

to the status of major importance by frequency of
occurrence in the media, then how much more important the
role of the press becomes when examining those events the
President deems as crisis even t s .

If Cohen's assertion of

the power of the media to establish the relevance of
particular issues and thus control the width of public
discussion,

if not the content,

is true,

then it behooves

scholars to consider presidential crisis rhetoric in
relation to the press,
public opinion,

not because the press represents

but because it is a good indication of the

issues and ideas that informed voters and opinion leaders
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will be talking about.
of the issues,
press;

Thus, the President will be aware

ideas, and responses that circulate in the

not because they represent popular opinion,

but

because they are a good indicator of that which still needs
to be addressed in his policy,

or which he should be

talking about.51
The contribution of the press in this regard are
highlighted by McCombs and Shaw in "Agenda-Setting and the
Political Process":
As a Fourth Estate, the press is an independent
force whose dialogue with other elements of
society produces the agenda of issues considered
by political elites and voters.
Witness the
major role of the elite press as a source of
information among major decision makers.
Through
its winnowing of the day's happenings to find the
major events, concerns, and issues, the press
inadvertently plays an agenda-setting influence
role.52
Thus it follows that the mass media shape not only what the
public "perceives" as "political reality," but also how
political elites understand what voters and opinion leaders
are thinking aboutbetween the press,

A relationship therefore develops
its sources,

and the public audience

that determines "what is accepted as the public agenda.""
Moreover,
News,

Roy L. Behr and Shanto Iyengar,

in "Television

Real-World Cues, and Changes in the Public Agenda,"

provided us with evidence that suggests this relationship
is unidirectional; that is to say, press content affects
public concern,

but public concern does not affect that

which the news focuses upon.54
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Gilbert et al in "The State of the Union Address and
the Press Agenda," asserted that the President is in a
"strategic position to influence the agenda" of the press
because he is the major source of news at the national
level.”

However, they found that the press had a

significant influence upon President Carter's second state
of the Union address,

but could not determine if Carter's

address influenced subsequent press issues.
Notwithstanding,

a subsequent study by McCombs and Gilbert,

"News Influence on Our Pictures of the World," found
evidence of "presidential influence on subsequent press
coverage" of an event.1*

The implications of this for the

study of presidential crisis rhetoric suggests that the
President does have an influence upon the content of news
items,

but that the press may also influence the issues the

President discusses and how they are discussed.

These

influences take on more importance when we consider the
degree to which the public rely upon the press for
information,

especially national and international events.

These "unobtrusive issues"

(i.e., not affecting the day to

day community involvement)

are not part of an individual's

common experience, therefore the "news media exercise a
near monopoly as sources of information and orientation."’'
Although the President surely knows more,
him what we. the public, k n o w .

the media tell
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From Agenda-Setting to Agenda-Extension:
Consideration of Priming and Framing
The basic theme expressed by the studies listed above
is cogently summed by Judith F. Trent and Robert V.
Friedenburg:

"the media set public priorities just by

paying attention to some issues while ignoring others.
They determine what issues are important and in this way
play an important role in structuring our social
reality."3*

Yet the media also move beyond the strict

reporting of facts, and it is to this concern that we now
turn.

During the decade of the eighties, mass media and

communication researchers using agenda-setting theory began
to discover an evaluative component to media news.

They

postulated that the media do more than tell us what to
think about, they also tell us how to think about i t .
These studies suggested another aspect of agenda-setting as
it relates to the public evaluation of Presidents; this
aspect is described as "priming."

These studies also

suggested a germane issue for this study; they postulated
that media provide the contextual cues "by which to
evaluate the subject matter" under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I n
short,

the media often "frame" an issue so that it will be

interpreted in a specific manner.
According to Graber, this type of "manipulative
journalism raises philosophical,

ethical,

and news policy

questions."*11 This manipulative aspect to media functions
is called agenda-building by Graber.

Graber defined
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agenda-building as the "process whereby news stories
influence how people perceive and evaluate issues and
policies."41

This clearly moves beyond agenda-se t t i n g .

involves the influencing of public opinion.

It

I call it

agenda-extension to distinguish it from the agenda-building
theory discussed by Michael B. Salwen, as well as Roger W.
Cobb and Charles L. Elder.42

Anne Johnston has written

that recent work in agenda-setting research has uncovered
this agenda-extension process.41
"primed" to evaluate,

The public becomes

the President for example,

well he handles the issue covered by the press.
the press covers an issue,

by how
The more

the more the public will

evaluate the President's success or failure in relation to
the content of media coverage.

The public,

"primed" to "evaluate the president . . .
success in dealing with this issue."44

then,

become

by his apparent

Another way the

media participate in policy making is through muckraking.
Journalists try to focus the public eye upon those aspects
of society that,

in the journalists's opinion,

need change.

It is a "sensational exposes of corruption usually
involving high status individuals."45

The press may also

"manipulate the political scene by creating a climate for
political action."4*

It is at this point that agenda-

extension helps to explain the influence of the press in
policy making.
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In "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public
Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting,

Priming,

and Framing,"

Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon have studied the effects of
network news coverage during the Gulf War that provides an
example of the differences among agenda-setting,
and framing.

priming,

They defined priming as the "ability of news

programs to affect the criteria by which political leaders
are judged."47

Specifically,

priming involves the

correlation among patterns of news coverage and the manner
in which the public evaluates the performance of
politicians.
performance,

These effects are strongest in the area of
and weakest in the area of affecting judgment

on personality.

This aspect of news coverage is intimately

linked with agenda-setting because the "more prominent an
issue in the national information stream,
weight in political judgments."44

the greater its

In analyzing the news

coverage of the Gulf War, Iyengar and Simon found that the
"amount of coverage accorded to the Gulf's situation and
the proportion of respondents nominating it as the nation's
most important problem were highly correlated"
setting)

(agenda-

In terms of the role that priming played they

found foreign policy "performance assessments tended to
override economic assessments in their impact on . . .
ratings of George Bush during the Gulf crisis.

. . .,,su

These findings are significant in that they show
dramatic shifts in the criteria used to evaluate the

President during times of crisis and increased coverage of
an event.

Before the Gulf crisis, Americans were

overwhelmingly concerned with domestic issues

(the economy

and c r i m e ) ; after the Gulf War Americans evaluated
President Bush more with general foreign policy
considerations than with his domestic performance.

These

findings lend support to the studies on crisis rhetoric
discussed in the previous chapter by highlighting the
relationship between issues the President announces as
important and the perceived importance of those
issues/events the American people think are important.
Iyengar and Simon spoke to this point:

"Print and broadcast

news coverage of world events involving the use of U.S.
military force have propagated the world view and policy
preferences of the incumbent administrations."51

This may

in part be due to the lack of available information from
sources other than the Administration during crisis events,
but Iyengar and Simon suggested that this practice "of
'official7 journalism . . . ensures that the public's and
the Presidents'

understanding of . . , international crisis

would be congruent."52
According to Iyengar and Kinder,
the Eye: TV News,

in "More than Meets

Priming, and Public Evaluations of the

President," priming works because "by calling attention to
some aspects of national life while ignoring others,
network news programs determine the standards by which
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presidents are judged."*1

Iyengar and Kinder drew from

basic psychological theory to explain how this works.
argued that public attention is highly selective.
addition,

They

In

the public relies upon information that is most

easily accessible.

Judgments about political matters,

the performance of a President,

or

is in part due to what

standards come to individuals' minds,

but are also due to

those "considerations that are,

for whatever reason and

however briefly,

In terms of presidential

performance,

accessible,'*44

news coverage that implies a President's

responsibility for a problem at the national

level

encourages viewers to attach more importance to his
performance on that particular problem when evaluating his
overall performance as President.

Iyengar and Kinder

suggested that this "effect appears to be stronger for
problems that are relative newcomers to the American
political agenda, problems for which the public's
understanding is still in formation."”

Thus in situations

of crisis, where public knowledge is in flux and pre
knowledge is constantly being injected into the public's
evaluative consciousness,
considerable.
increases,

the effects of priming could be

As the public's need for information

and media provide focused coverage upon a

particular event,

evaluation of the President's performance

during the event comes under greater scrutiny than is
otherwise expected.

During the Cold War Presidents were
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able to frame an event using the Cold War meta-narrative.
Since Clinton is unable to use the narrative to give events
coherence,

salience,

and direction,

he may experience

greater difficulty in framing at a time when media power is
undiminished.
Framing
Johnston stated that news stories not only provide
their audiences with the important subjects to think about,
but they also provide "contextual cues or frames in which
to evaluate those s u b j e c t s . I s s u e s
by station managers,

producers,

the story of the issue.

are often "framed"

or editors by how they tell

This type of agenda-extension was

found to be operating during the Watergate Hearings.

In

"The Media and Watergate," Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang
demonstrated that agenda-extension begins when media gate
keepers decide to publish a particular s t o r y . A l t h o u g h
this is the first step in all news reporting,

the move

toward agenda-extension occurs when a second step is taken,
the decision concerning how much attention to give to the
story.

As pointed out by Graber,

it is at this "point

where ordinary agenda-setting activities can most readily
turn into deliberate agenda-building

[agenda-extension]

By continually focusing upon an issue, the media may thrust
it into the forefront of national thought.
point when an issue emerges,
crucially

important.

And, at the

its media context becomes

Lang and Lang noted that the
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Watergate coverage was first put into the framework of the
election campaign,

thus leading the public to think of it

as part and parcel of partisan politics.

But as soon as

the media switched contextual frames, moving from the
framework of the 1972 presidential campaign to the
framework of continual Washington corruption,

the Nation

became o b s e s s e d .
In their analysis of the Gulf war coverage,

Iyengar

and Simon provided an example of framing effects.
[CJontent data (showing that network news
coverage was preoccupied with military affairs
and highly event oriented) and survey data are
coupled to show that respondents reporting higher
rates of exposure to television news expressed
greater support for a military as opposed to a
diplomatic response to the crisis, because the
news media framed the events in the Gulf
episodically as a series of military actions.1'''
Framing thus involves the relationship between qualitative
aspects of news coverage— contextual cues— and how the
public interprets the news.

In "News as Framing:

Comments

on Graber," William Gamson asserted that a "frame is a
central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events
and suggesting what is at issue."60
remain neutral until framed.

He noted that facts

Indeed, Gamson argued that

facts "take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame
or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence,
selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring
others."ftl
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Although it can be successfully argued that providing
contextual cues for interpretation is a necessary part of
media responsibility,
partisan context,

when the media place its own,

over that of the people or government the

potential for public manipulation increases.

Graber,

in

"Framing Election Mews Broadcasts: News Context and its
Impact on the 1984 Presidential Election," conducted a
content analysis of television news coverage of the 1984
presidential campaign.M
was framed.

Her focus was upon how the news

She found that there was a ratio of 3 to 1 of

bad over good news for the U.S. during this period.

This

news primarily focused upon foreign policy and economic
concerns.

Graber posited that this overwhelming bad-news

coverage should have derailed Reagan's reelection bid but
did not.

The networks had framed the news so to stress the

bad aspects of American news; they also primed the
population to evaluate President Reagan's performance on
foreign policy and economic considerations.

Taking the

context in which the news is reported as a frame leads us
to consider the probability of frames being potentially
broad in their inclusion of possibilities.
Graber noted:
various media effects are modulated by the
sensitivity of audiences to particular issues,
and that effects vary with background,
demographic characteristics, and experiences of
individual audience members.61
Reagan was able to overcome the negative effects of priming
because there were good stories mixed in with the bad that
had a "leavening" effect.

Graber,

like Iyengar and Simon,
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also noted that priming effects are linked with policy and
not personality.
Day, discussing the first of the requirements of the
press

(providing "a truthful,

comprehensive,

and

intelligent account of the day's events in a context which
gives them meaning”) , suggested that reporters must
"clearly distinguish between fact and opinion."64
Furthermore,

news stories must be put into "perspective" by

providing "relevant background."6'

These journalistic

norms described by Day include social responsibility,
objectivity,

fairness,

and truth.66

Yet agenda-extension

suggests that something other than these idealized norms
are operating.

Instead of a Fourth Estate, the media seem

to be part of a partisan effort at persuading the public to
accept the media's interpretation as truth.
Mitchell Stephens,

According to

objectivity involves both impartiality

and the reflection of the "world as it is, without bias or
distortion of any sort."67
image of the world.
into practice.

A laudable goal,

but difficult to put

Yet by framing an issue the media has a

decision to make: one,
the readers; two,
media; or three,

In short, the news as a true

frame it according to the needs of

frame it according to the needs of the
frame so as to accurately impart the

meaning of those speaking/writing upon it.

The last of

these choices seems to adhere best to the requirements of a
socially responsible press.
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According to Day, media practitioners should "strive
to keep their personal preferences and opinions out of news
stories.

. . .

[They should be] concerned with facts and

impartiality in the presentation of those facts."**
reflective writing should help to assure this.
goal is often ignored for various reasons
political,

institutional).

striving to be objective,

Self-

Yet this

(economic,

Be that as it may, by not
by establishing an agenda,

the

press steps out of its socially mandated role of a
responsible Fourth Estate, and instead assumes its own
political persona in opposition to the elected government
and the will of the people.

In so doing,

it removes itself

from the confines of the norms of social responsibility and
sets itself up as an independent self-advocate.
Implications for the Present Study
This chapter has provided a brief review of the role
of the press in American society and has provided a review
of relevant agenda-setting theory literature.

The

literature in agenda-setting theory has demonstrated the
force of Cohen's statement: the power of the media to
establish the relevance of particular issues and thus
control the width of public discussion and content is
great.

This chapter also highlighted those studies

examining agenda-extension.

This function of the press

primes readers to evaluate Presidents in light of a
specific issue that the press has focused upon.

Agenda-

71

extension also includes framing, the central organizing
principle of continued news coverage;

in short,

how the

press organizes the context through which the public will
view the news.
It is the potential power of framing that concerns the
present study.

This study posits that in the vacuum

created by the ending of the Cold War meta-narrative,

the

press, picking up on Clinton's inability to quickly and
effectively frame the Haiti crisis,
their own manner.

began to frame it in

As Gamson suggested,

by "analyzing news

content in termB of the frames presented,

the manifest-

latent distinction is partially bridged."1*

This is to say

that some facts are emphasized by certain frames and others
are not;
that

it is this

presence

or absence ofcertain facts

may reveal the implicit

aspects of the news coverage.
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CONTRIBUTORY STUDIES AMD METHODOLOGY
Contests over the symbolic construction of events are
waged throughout American society.

The matter of whose

interpretation of the world will prevail is a matter of
great importance,

particularly for individuals and

institutions whose authority to act depends upon consensus.
In a mass mediated world,

consent must be "engineered," and

the creation and nurturing of constituencies of like-minded
persons are viewed as being logically prior to political
action.

From a rhetorical point of view, a constituency

may be little more than an audience with a common view of
particular social events.

Although we have traditionally

viewed constituencies as groups naturally connected around
a base of material interest, our view may be usefully
expanded to include groups formed as the result of
successful symbolic construction either by a political
actor or by the press.

In a pluralistic society such as

the United States, almost no interpretation of events goes
uncontested, yet symbolic victory over competing
interpretations is very important to the American
presidency,

an institution that represents the people as a

whole and depends very heavily upon persuasion to do its
work.
In a heavily mediated society such as ours,

the

President's characterization of events is frequently
contested;

rival symbolic constructions enter the political
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arena,

and this contestation is usual, even expected.

study is about the construction,

contestation,

resolution of a particular contest,
Accordingly,

This

and

the Haitian crisis.

I seek to answer three specific questions:

one, how did the Clinton Administration frame the situation
in Haiti; two, how did the press, responding to President
Clinton,

frame the situation; and three,

at what time,

if

at all, did these frames converge to present a unified
contextual whole?
In order to answer these questions,
proceeds in four stages:
provided

this chapter

first, a definition of terms is

{key concepts are rhetorical situation,

administrative rhetoric, and crisis rhetoric); second,

a

conception of "framing" as a rhetorical process for both
the President and the media is discussed; three,

a

tentative theory of press and presidential roles is
discussed; and four, an exposition of the scope,
procedures,

and materials of this study is provided.

Definition of Terms: Rhetorical Situations,
Administrative Rhetoric, and Crises
Rhetorical Situations
Bitzer's classic definition of a rhetorical situation
entails:
a complex of persons, events, objects, and
relations presenting an actual or potential
exigency which can be completely or partially
removed if discourse, introduced into the
situation, can so constrain human decision or
action as to bring about the significant
modification of the exigency.1
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For Bitzer, an '‘exigence is an imperfection marked by some
degree of urgency;

it is a defect,

an obstacle,

to be corrected.*'2

The audience consists of those

individuals capable of modifying the exigence.
influence both audience and rhetor(s),
"persons,
facts,

events, objects,

laws,

images,

conventions."’

relations,

Constraints

and are composed of
rules, principles,

interests, emotions,

arguments,

The above concepts— exigency,

constraints— are interanimated.

something

and

audience,

and

The three taken together

require some type of discourse to fuel their interaction
and possible modification.
Bitzer's terminology,
situation,

The discourse,

or utterance in

"participates naturally in the

is in many instances necessary to the completion

of situational activity,

and by means of its participation

with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical
character."4
I feel an important distinction in a situational
perspective may be drawn between the concepts of
"situation" and "context."
of human communication,

Context, a necessary component

is both more and less than the

historical facts surrounding a rhetorical situation.
argue for an understanding of context as,

I

in part,

constituted by the various interpretive communities that
will apprehend a text.

In this vein,

of context proves illuminating:

Bateson's definition

"a collective term for all

of those events which tell the organism among what set of

79

alternatives he must make his next choice.*'5

Thus,

contexts have the potential of having broad influences upon
our understanding of any particular text.
contradistinction,

In

rhetorical situations are not to be

understood at a general level, but rather are entered into
through the rhetor/text's interaction with audience,
exigency,

and constraints.

Contexts help shape the general

level of interpretive precision that produces a text

(and

its subsequent interpretation); it is this text that enters
into the rhetorical situation.

Rhetorical situations are a

part of the larger context; they "come into existence,
either mature and decay or mature and persist.

then

. . ,

Situations grow and come to maturity; they evolve to just
the time when a rhetorical discourse would be most
f i t t i n g . C o n t e x t s allow for the general interpretation
of utterances;

rhetorical situations provide moments for a

"fitting" utterance through which modification of an
exigence may be achieved.
Air 655 shootdown in 1986.

For example,

consider the Iran

The larger contexts that could

have influenced texts entering into the rhetorical
situation included the upcoming U.S. presidential race, the
Iran/Iraq war, and the historical/cultural understandings
of Americans concerning our role in the world.
rhetorical situation,

on the other hand,

The

is modified by

utterances that are shaped by these contexts.

The
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utterance,

however,

can have a bearing upon which contexts

subsequently wax or wane in influence.
Administrative Rhetoric: Conflation of Role and Text
Many communication scholars view the modern presidency
as a rhetorical presidency.7

This view of the presidency

is justified on three grounds: one, the President sets
goals and provides solutions for the nation's problems;
two, the mass media dramatize the content of what
Presidents say, thus moving the emphasis away from what
Presidents do to what they s a y : and three,

continual

campaigning* by Presidents encourages an emphasis upon
presidential image and personality,
issue exploration.

while de-emphasizing

As Denton and Woodward stated:

the presidency is an office, a role, a persona,
constructing a position of power, myth, legend,
and persuasion.
Everything a president does or
says has implications and communicates
"something."
Every act, word, or phrase becomes
calculated and measured for a response.4
What a President or his representatives say, then,
a text of sorts.

is

Speech communication scholars have

traditionally associated the term "text" with "rhetor";
prefer to think of rhetor and text in broader terms.

I

A

rhetor can range from a single individual to a collectivity
of individuals speaking on behalf of an organization,
institution,

or presidential administration.111 A text can

consist of several discrete elements/utterances if the set
of such elements was conceived as a unified whole
advertising campaign)

(e.g., an

or if all the set members aim to
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achieve a common purpose.

Such a construct does not deny

the possibility for members of a collectivity to speak as
individuals.

It does, however,

recognize the tendency of

such collectivities to speak with a single voice and
permits the analysis of those voices as a collective whole.
Furthermore, such a conception recognizes that the
discourse situated within rhetorical situations are complex
episodes:

"a conception wherein the entire constellation of

rhetoric surrounding a specific event is treated as the
rhetorical text.'*11

The term "text"

in this study refers

specifically to the discourse produced by the Clinton
Administration concerning the situation in Haiti during
1993.

This "administrative rhetoric" possesses two

interacting dimensions.

One dimension accounts for the

relatively entrenched and stable aspects of administrative
systems everywhere, while the other accounts for the
"personalities" of various presidential administrations.^
A traditional view of presidential roles, based upon
the duties described by the Constitution,
stable form of administrative systems.

highlights the

Edward S. Corwin

described five roles: chief of state, chief executive,
chief diplomate,
legislator.11

commander-in-chief,

and chief

Clinton Rossiter described five additional,

extra-Constitutional roles that have developed since
Corwin's listing: chief of party, protector of peace,
manager of prosperity,

world leader, and voice of the
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people.14

These generally agreed upon roles constitute

"ideas about what people expect to do in certain situations
as well as what others expect them to do in certain
situations,,,li

They combine presidential and public

perception about what a particular role entails.

Yet each

President's administration adopts its own role(s)

to enact.

For instance, the Reagan Administration viewed itself as
working for peace throughout the world,
protector of the peace.

a variation of

This irenic role in international

affairs shaped the manner in which the Administration could
respond to various situations.16

Roles adopted by

Administrations act to constrain and foster presidential
discourse.
Murray Edelman's early work analyzing the
"role-taking" characteristic of Administrations is
illuminating here:
Factual premises alone are certainly not
sufficient to explain administrative decisional
choices; but factual premises in conjunction with
observable role-taking are: for the role both
specifies the value premises operative in a
particular instance of decision-making and
establishes a probability that these same value
premises will be operative in future
decision-making in the same policy area.17
It is the role-taking action that is of importance to this
essay.

The Reagan presidency,

for example,

had

consistently referred to its peacekeeping role in foreign
affairs,

especially during the Iran-Iraq war.

this conflict,

Throughout

the United States had stressed its role as a
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neutral third party acting in the capacity of peace-broker.
This stance in the international arena was a vital one for
the Reagan presidency,

and it had been used repeatedly to

justify various policy decisions.
To be sure, the nature of the threat to the United
States posed by the Iran-Iraq war was never truly clear in
the mind of the American public; nor was it explained
clearly by the Reagan Administration.

Yet this very

ambiguity acted to enhance the image the government hoped
to project.

The rhetorical potency of ambiguity is

explained by Edelman:
Only an intangible threat permits this kind of
administrative role-taking.
In the measure that
a threat is clearly observable and subject to
systematic study, perceptions of its character
and of techniques for dealing with it converge.
Polarization and exaggeration become less
feasible.18
In addition,

the government's political response to events

in the Gulf also highlighted the way that role-taking
affects presidential administrations.

For example,

President Reagan used his Administration's role as defender
of Democracy to justify the United States'
Grenada,

invasion of

and President Bush used his Administration's role

as world peace-keeper to help justify our early involvement
in Kuwait and the Gulf war.
highlighted,

By the roles he has

each President has attempted to "personalize*'

his Administration.
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It is in this sense,

then, that this study uses the

term "administrative rhetoric" to refer to specific
governance styles employed by presidential administrations.
Through rhetorical grounding of particular actions or
policies,

each Administration will of necessity project the

image that it has chosen to highlight and will adopt public
roles that are integral to that image.

Thus,

administrative texts do not necessarily advance procedural
aspects of an Administration;

rather,

such texts may

function to create and to maintain the roles chosen by a
political

leader as part of his or her constituted

identity.
Thus we can begin to see the possible interaction
between administrative text, context,
situations,

and crisis formation.

rhetorical

Kuypers et al

demonstrated that crisis situations may begin with no
stable means for interpreting the discursive surroundings
and that one of the purposes of the administrative text is
the creation of a stable contextual frame.

Its appearance

requires substantial interaction of text and context.
Branham and Pearce highlighted this reflexivity:
Every communicative act is a text that derives
meaning from the context of expectations and
constraints in which it is experienced.
At the
same time, contexts are defined, invoked, and
altered by texts.
Particular communicative acts
simultaneously depend upon and reconstruct
existing contexts.19
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In order for a text to modify an exigency
successfully,

it must "fit" not only the particular

situation into which it enters,

but also the context in

which it is situated.

the creation of a stable

In fact,

context of meaning may be the first step for the successful
modification of an exigency that occurs in a situation
composed of multiple contexts.

Thus an administrative text

(e.g., President Clinton's first utterances about the Haiti
situation upon taking office) will act to set the
interpretive stage in a crisis drama.
utterances will draw upon the role(s)
Administration has adopted as well.

These first
that the
In President Clinton's

case, these first utterances will also be acting to
establish the role(s) his Administration will enact.

This

corresponds well with Theodore Windt's first stage of
crisis formation— the obligatory statement of facts.
Because they involve interanimation of text and
context, are rooted in situations, constrain presidential
utterances,

and draw upon earlier presidential utterances,

international crises may be viewed as rhetorical
constructions.

Crisis rhetoric occurs when a President

chooses to speak on an issue, whether to promote it as a
crisis or downplay its perceived significance as a crisis.
Thus Presidents act to control the definition of
international events.

The exigence that the President

chooses to address— material condition,

the President's
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credibility,

the President's popularity,

the perception of

crisis itself— is part of the crisis itself and is thus
highly unstable and alterable.

The President acts to

define the context through which the event is viewed.
Crises may develop rapidly, as with the KAL 007 and
Airbus shootdowns,
Haiti.

or they may slowly evolve,

as with

Either way, text and context interplay alter the

situation,

eventually providing appropriate moments for

"fitting" utterances that can bring the perception of
crisis to an end.
situations

Utterances in response to crisis

{or the perception thereof)

mandated and culturally based.

are historically

They draw upon public

knowledge; the President's text and the press, however,
as providers of pre-knowledge.

Eventually,

act

portions of

this pre-knowledge will evolve into public knowledge.

Yet

the public's perception of the situation and the initial
presidential utterances are viewed through the public's
initial knowledge held in general;
cultural knowledge.

the historical and

With no Cold War meta-narrative,

however, public knowledge concerning international crisis
situations is in flux.

The absence of this meta-narrative

makes the rhetorical construction of crisis problematic.
The situation in Haiti provides an excellent
opportunity to analyze the interaction of these elements.
The situation was inherited by President Clinton upon
taking office,

and he issued definitive statements early in
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his term that served to define the situation.

The

situation exhibited several key events that acted to
provide opportunities for fitting utterances.

Utterances

might have been crafted that would have modified the
situation.

Yet by the end of 1993, the presidential

discourse was inadequate for the situation,

and the

situation appeared worse than when President Clinton had
taken office.

Therefore,

this particular situation

provides us with an example of a rhetorical situation that
matured and persisted.

To fully understand the rhetorical

dynamics involved with this situation,
initial situation,

I examine the

the President's response,

and the

framing of Clinton's response by the national press.
Framing
Robert M. Entman stated that to frame is to take "some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text,

in such a way as to promote a

particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation,

and/or treatment recommendation for the item

described."20

Frames define problems, diagnose causes,

make moral judgments,

and suggest remedies.

They operate

by making some information more salient than other
information; therefore they "highlight some features of
reality while omitting others."21
the communicator,
at large.

Frames are located in

the text, the receiver,

and the culture
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This power of frames to shape the manner in which the
public interprets certain issues and situations is
highlighted in a study by Paul M. Sniderman,
Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock.

Richard A.

For these researchers,

who

used mandatory testing for HIV as the controlled frame,

the

results were instructive:
[The effect] of framing is to prime values
differentially, establishing the salience of the
one or the other.
[A] majority of the public
supports the rights of persons with AIDS when the
issue is framed to accentuate civil liberties
considerations— and supports . . . mandatory
testing when the issue is framed to accentuate
public health considerations.23
The power of framing is great, especially considering the
pervasiveness of the mass media in the country.

It becomes

even more powerful when concerning international events,
because of the limited,

first hand access Americans have to

foreign affairs information.

For example,

Entman and Page

found that during the prewar stage of the debate about U.S.
policy toward Iraq that the media frame had only two
remedies for the situation: war now or sanctions now and
war later.2' Any "critique transcending the remedies
inside the [media]
discourse,

frame breached the bounds of acceptable

hence was unlikely to influence policy."34

In "Framing Analysis:

An Approach to News Discourse,"

Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki advanced one way of
using frame analysis for the analysis of news stories.”
They suggested that each news story will have a theme that
"functions as the central organizing idea" of the story.”
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Themes provide readers with signifying elements that prompt
them to comprehend a news story in a particular manner.
The signifying elements of themes are "structurally located
lexical choices of codes constructed toy following certain
shared rules and conventions."77

These codes and lexical

choices are the tools that news makers use to construct
news discourse and the psychological stimuli the audience
processes when reading the news.

For Pan and Kosicki,

themes function as frames, and the signifying elements
within themes may be likened to framing devices.

In

examining a single news story about a pro-life rally in
Wichita,

Kansas, Pan and Kosicki advanced four framing

devices that helped to establish the presence of a
particular frame within a news story: syntactical
structure,

script structure,

thematic structure,

and

rhetorical structure.
At the syntactical level of analysis one looks for
stable patterns of arrangement of words and phrases into
sentences; headlines and lead sentences are particularly
important.

At the script level one looks for how news

stories are conceived of as stories.

This involves an

action or event orientation; the five W's and one H of
journalism.

At the thematic level one looks for elements

of causality within the news item.

Often this causality is

implied by presenting "actions in a context in which one
may be seen as an antecedent and another as a
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consequence."2*
the headline,

Thematic structure consists of a summary—

lead, or conclusion— and a main body of

text— the evidence: events and sources.

At the rhetorical

level one looks for any of five rhetorical framing devices:
metaphors, exemplars, catchphrase, depictions,

and visual

im a g e s .
For Pan and Kosicki,

the framing of news stories is

reduced to lexical choices made by the journalists--words
in a vocabulary.

The words chosen by a news reporter

reveal the way that reporter categorizes that which he or
she is reporting upon.

Word choice often "signifies the

presence of a particular frame."w

For example,

Pan and

Kosicki cited the descriptions of Saddam Hussein given by
American reporters during the Gulf war.

Hussein was

described as the "Iraqi dictator," a description that
placed him in the same category,
as Hitler,

in the minds of Americans,

Stalin, and perhaps Manuel Noriega.

If, on the

other hand, one were to describe him as the "Iraqi leader,"
"Iraqi President," or the "Iraqi Commander-in-Chief," the
connotations would be quite different.

The lexical choices

made within the various framing devices--syntactic, script,
thematic,

rhetorical— act to frame the news story to

engender a dominant reading of that story.
Pan and Kosicki conducted an empirical analysis of
news stories that took place on a micro-level of analysis;
i.e.,

they examined each sentence of a news story for the
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lexical choices made at each of the four framing levels.
They sought to "describe the varying functions between the
identified structural and lexical features of news stories
and the predictable mental representations of the story on
the part of audiences."10
single news story,

In their brief analysis of a

Pan and Kosicki found that the story

framed the pro-life rally in confrontational terms.
Sentence by sentence they proceeded through each of the
four levels of analysis and found aggregate evidence that
supported the confrontational theme.

They pointed out that

framing analysis allows researchers to provide information
about how an issue is discussed in the news and "how the
ways of talking about the issue [is] related to the
evolution of the issue in political debates."’1

However,

given the nature of their study— a single news story— it
would appear that making such inferences would be difficult
at best.

Moreover,

if one were to cover numerous stories

over a period of time, attempting to discern the
relationship of the issue and frame relationship,

one would

surely find the micro-level of Pan and Kosicki's analysis
belaboring to the point of impossibility.
To overcome the limitations of a micro-analysis,

and

validly make generalizations concerning a frame's influence
upon political debates, one must find a way of identifying
frames at a more general level of analysis.

In "Framing

U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in

Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents” Robert M.
Entman comparatively analyzed the narratives within news
stories about the KAL and Iran Air shootdowns.13

Entman

chose these particular incidents because they could have
been reported upon in a similar fashion; thus any
differences in the information that comprised the frames
would be easier to detect.

For Entman,

"frames reside in

the specific properties of the news narrative that
encourage those perceiving and thinking about events to
develop particular understandings of them."”

The specific

properties reside in the narrative accounts of events and
are comprised of keywords,
and visual images.

metaphors,

Accordingly,

concepts,

symbols,

frames are fashioned by

particular words and phrases that consistently appear
within a narrative and "convey thematically consonant
meanings across

. . . time."14

Thus,

framing makes some

ideas more salient than others, while making some ideas
virtually invisible to an audience.
For Entman,

the initial framing process is set in

motion by the interaction of sources and journalists.
initiated,

Once

the established frame guides audience and

journalist thinking.

Entman called these type of frames

"event-specific schema."

Once in place, event-specific

schema encourage journalists to "perceive, process, and
report all further information about the event in ways
supporting the basic interpretation encoded in the
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schema."1'’

In his study of the coverage of the two

shootdowns,

Entman used news items appearing in T i m e .

N e w s w e e k . CBS Evening N e w s , the Washington P o s t , and the
New York T i m e s .

The results are instructive.

Entman found

that the KAL shootdown was framed as a moral outrage
whereas the Iran Air shootdown was framed as a technical
problem.
example,

This was accomplished in several ways.

For

during the two week period following the KAL

shootdown the New York Times printed 286 stories and the
Washington Post printed 169 stories.

During the two week

period following the shootdown of Iran Air 655 the New York
Times printed 102 stories and the Washington Post printed
82 stories.

Thus the frame— actual coverage in this case—

helped to determine the importance of the event.
For another example, during the two week period
following the KAL shootdown the New York Times used the
term "attack" 99 times and the Washington Post used the
term "attack" 66 times.

However, during the two week

period following the shootdown of Iran Air 655 the New York
Times used the term "attack" only 30 times and the
Washington Post used the term attack 24 times.

These, and

other findings reported by Entman, demonstrated how frames
represent dominant event-specific schema.

They have the

capacity to obscure contrary information that may be
presented in a particular case.

On this point Entman found

that "for those stories in which a single frame thoroughly
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pervades the text,

stray contrary opinions

. . . are likely

to possess such low salience as to be of little practical
use to most audience members."**

So, although it was

perfectly acceptable for political elites to describe the
KAL shootdown as a brutal attack,

it was far less likely

for them to describe it in terms of a tragedy; the frame
had been set, the Soviets were evil and at fault.

To think

of the shootdown in terms of tragedy runs against the frame
and would mitigate the culpability of the Soviets.
Entman focused upon those frames considered
politically important.

This is to say,

those elements

within frames that would be most likely to "promote a
common, majority response to the news events as measured in
public opinion polls."17

According to Entman, the process

of framing is a reciprocal process between political elites
and journalists.

In established frames political elites

often find it difficult,

if not foolhardy,

frame's pervasive influence; however,

to resist the

in the development of

new event-specific schemata elites have great influence in
establishing the initial frames.

This is particularly true

with breaking foreign affairs items.

This supports the

conclusions of the literature on crisis rhetoric which
point out the "rally-'round-the-president" stance of the
press during times of crisis.
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Role of News Media
Since 1947,

all presidential responses to perceived

crisis events have been uttered under the constraining and
growing influence of the Cold War meta-narrative,
Cold War meta-narrative is seen as a frame.

if the

After so long,

the removal of this frame might lead to confusion about how
to view the role of the U.S.

in international situations.

Presidents throughout this period have also enjoyed some
degree of cooperation from the press during times of
crises.

In The Press.

Presidents,

and C r i s e s . Brigitte

Lebens Nacos analyzed the relationship of the press and
Presidents during six crisis periods.1"
domestic and foreign crises,
"middle-level"

serious

Her study spanned

(Cuban Missile)

to

(Reagan assassination a t t empt), four

different Presidents

(Kennedy, Johnson, Carter,

and a twenty-one year period.

and Reagan,

Nacos argued that during

periods of crisis the media abandoned an adversarial role
with the President and as a result,

"news coverage during

crises periods reflects the tendency of political actors to
support a crisis-managing President or, at least, to
refrain from expressing criticism."1**
The results of Nacos' work are important to the
present study; with the loss of the Cold War meta-narrative
Presidents might now be forced to compete with the press
over how to frame international crisis situations.4(1

Nacos

found "distinctive patterns" in the manner in which the

press covered the various crises.

First,

no fundamental

changes were revealed in the way that newspapers covered
crisis episodes between 1962 and 1983.

Second,

a strong

relationship exists between editorial positions and the
content of political news coverage.

This suggests that

editors exert a greater degree of control over news items
during times of crises.

Nacos highlighted the consistency

of coverage by the national press during the studied
period:
news coverage reflected a rall y - 'round-thepresident reaction by domestic political actors
and/or an unwillingness to criticize the
president's crisis-related policies.
[However,
in] those instances [in] which presidential
policies related to an upcoming crisis were
articulated, the coverage of pre-crisis periods
revealed the conflicting views one would expect
in American politics.41
This same pattern was found during the crises of the
Kennedy administration by Montague Kern,
Levering,

and Ralph B. Levering.

Patricia W.

In The Kennedy Crises:

The P r e s s . the Presidency. and Foreign Poli c y . Kern et al
analyzed six foreign and domestic policy crises,

and

discovered certain limitations upon the President's control
over the facts:
[Despite] the strong impact of presidential
leadership on press treatment of crisis issues,
the overall generalization emerges that the
president dominates press coverage primarily in
situations where competing interpretations of
events are not being espoused bv others whom the
journalists consider important. 7
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Presidents thus have enjoyed some degree of
cooperation from the press during times of crises.

At

least in part this has been a result of the legitimating
influence of presidential authority and the perennial
influence of the Cold War meta-narrative.

During pre

crisis periods of discussion about a particular policy
days and weeks before the Iran Airbus shootdown,
example)

(the

for

there exists a general level of debate over the

Administration's policies.

This discussion period would

end once a given President spoke out definitively in
response to a situation perceived as a crisis.
of the Cold War,

however,

The ending

seems to have changed this.

Cold War meta-narrative and the role(s)

The

it created and

legitimated for the President depended upon the "degree of
anxiety the myth

[of Soviet evil rationalized and],

the

intensity with which the particular expectation that forms
the central premise

[are] held."*-1

The meta-narrative

acted to frame or contextualize a President's utterances in
crisis situations.

With the ending of the Cold War,

the

public no longer automatically co-contextualizes
presidential utterances in response to a perceived crisis.
In this vacuum, then, a space exists available for the
variable framing of presidential utterances in response to
international crisis situations.
study,

Prior to completing this

I entertain an initial expectation that the press

remained in contention with President Clinton over the
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definition of the situation in Haiti, over periods of
relative calm, and even during those times crisis seems
most apparent

(the two ferry incidents; the arrest of the

Haitian soldier granted political asylum in the U . S . ; and
the October Port-Au-Prince incident).
The general hypothesis undergirding this study
suggests that President Clinton's assumed role in Haiti and
his utterances will not coincide with how the press framed
his utterances.

This is to say,

Clinton will provide the

American public with a particular frame through which to
interpret the event

(trying to establish a stable

contextual frame to legitimate his actions)

and the press

will provide a competing frame for the public to evaluate
Clinton's actions.

This leads to a prolonged continuation

of the situation in Haiti because there exists no stable
frame through which to view the utterances and proposed
actions of the President.

I am not implying that the press

is ignoring its norms of objectivity; however,

the media

may be objective but still frame in such a manner that
prevents readers from making a "balanced assessment" of a
particular event.44
Procedures and Materials
The press facilitates public perception of the context
in which a particular situation resides.

In the past,

Cold War meta-narrative has helped to establish this
context in foreign affairs;

it was common,

public

the

knowledge.

Now the way the press frames international

events takes on an even greater importance,
contend against the President's frame.
then,

and may even

For this study,

I perform a comparative analysis of the rival frames

used by the Clinton Administration and the printed press
when discussing Haiti.

Specifically,

I analyze how the

Clinton Administration framed the situation in Haiti and
how the press framed the situation as a response to the
administrative text.

For the administrative text I examine

those comments given by President Clinton and his
Administration officials between 14 January of 1993 and 20
December 199 3, the first and last comments by President
Clinton during 1993.4*

I examine two major daily papers,

the Washington Post and the New York Times during a ten day
period following each of President Clinton's public
statements.46

The analysis proceeds in two sections:

January through June and July through December.

Period one

covers the Clinton Administration's first statements about
Haiti and ends just prior to the July signing of the
Governors Island agreement.

The second period begins with

the July signing of the Governors Island agreement that set
the date for Aristide's return to Haiti,

and ends in the

period following the October incident in Port-Au-Prince.
These times were selected because they reflect those
periods during the crisis in which the majority of
Administrative utterances upon Haiti were made.
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I proceed by analyzing the administrative text for
narratives-47

In this I follow Entman and look for the

various framing devices that may have been used by the
Clinton Administration:
symbols.

keywords,

metaphors,

Having accomplished this,

concepts,

and

I next repeat the

analysis on news stories and editorials contained in the
New York Times and the Washington P o s t .
then answer the following questions:

Having done this I

one, how did the

Clinton Administration frame the situation in Haiti; two,
how did the press, responding to President Clinton,
the situation; and three, at what time,

frame

if at all, did

these frames converge to present a unified contextual
whole?
In summation,

this chapter has reviewed the relevant

concepts of rhetorical situation,

administrative rhetoric,

and their relationship with crises.

Framing as a

rhetorical process was also discussed.

This study posits

that Administrative utterances interact with the rhetorical
situation and affects the manner in which the public
perceives a crisis.

The press plays a role in the

transmission of presidential utterances.
if not all,

Since 1947, most,

international crises have been framed by U.S.

Presidents with the Cold War meta-narrative; once
presidential utterances enacted this frame, dissenting
voices were made virtually unnoticeable.
over,

With the Cold War

it would seem logical that initial presidential
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utterances would have a more difficult time developing new
event-specific schema.

This study, then,

is about the

interaction of the President and the press in framing the
crisis situation in Haiti.
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CLINTON INHERITS A CRISIS: ANALYSIS, PART ONE
This chapter is divided into three sections:

first, a

short synopsis of the Bush Administration's response to the
situation in Haiti is presented; second, the various
responses of the New York T i m e s . Washington P o s t , and of
the Clinton Administration from 14 January 1993 through 3 0
June 1993 are detailed; and third, a discussion of the
framing devices used by the press and the Administration is
pro v i d e d .
Over time the Administration and the press developed
interpretive frames that allowed for very different
assessments of the events in Haiti.

Both the Bush and

Clinton Administrations framed the Haitian situation
essentially as a foreign policy problem.

In their eyes the

primary goal of any expenditure of resource or military
intervention was the stabilization of the democraticallyelected Haitian government as an independent political
entity.

The press,

on the other hand,

ultimately framed

the Haitian situation as a domestic problem.
U.S.

It saw the

role in terms of an obligation to idealized norms of

freedom of immigration and the legalities of the
Administration's policy of direct returns.

Thus this

chapter will provide a chronological exposition of
executive policy, a policy shadowed by the growth of a
press critique.

This critique ultimately became so clearly

105

106

d i v e r g e n t as to c o n s t i t u t e

a fu ll y a r t i c u l a t e d

counter

policy.
S y n o p s i s of P r e s i d e n t
Ea r ly on 4 O c t o b e r
an e x c h a n g e w i t h

1991,

Bush's

Policy

President George

reporters concerning

President Jean Bertrand Aristide

Bush

began

th e o v e r t h r o w of

of Haiti.

The

President

stated that the United States was

"interested

r e s t o r a t i o n of the d e m o c r a t i c a l l y

elected government

Haiti,"

but

scheduled

r ef u s e d

for

conference,

later

he was

that d a y . 1

President

to u s e m i l i t a r y
th a t

to say mo r e un t i l

At t h i s s u b s e q u e n t

Bus h w a s a s k e d

to d o this

if he w o u l d

and

He

that the

w a i t a n d see h o w the O r g a n i z a t i o n of A m e r i c a n
responded

to the coup.

The

d eta che d,

and

not see m to be a n y

there did

believe a crisis
On t h i s
12775
Haiti.
to the

President's

for the U.S.

same d a y

Th e w o r d i n g

be w i l l i n g
replied

U.S.

would

States

(OAS)

r e s p o n s e wa s
r e a s o n to

h a d de v e l o p e d .

President

which declared a United

of

a press conference

fo rc e to r e s t o r e d em o c r a c y .

reluctant

in the

Bush

i ss u ed

Executive order

States trade embargo

of the o r d e r

stands

in st ar k

on

contrast

P r e s i d e n t ' s e a r l i e r s ta t e m e n t s :
I, G e o r g e Bush, P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s of
Am er ic a, find t h a t the g r a v e e v e n t s t h a t ha v e
o c c u r r e d in the R e p u b l i c of Ha it i t o d i s r u p t the
l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e of p o w e r by the
d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d g o v e r n m e n t of th e c o u n t r y
c o n s t i t u t e an u n u s u a l t h r e a t to t h e n a t i o n a l
securi ty, f or ei gn policy, a n d e c o n o m y of the
U n i t e d States, and h e r e b y d e c l a r e a n a t i o n a l
e m e r g e n c y to deal wit h the t h r e a t . ’

107

On 28 October 1991 President Bush issued a second executive
order in regard to Haiti.

Through Order 12779, the

President stated that the events in Haiti continued to
constitute a threat to the United States,

and he further

tightened the economic embargo imposed upon Haiti.

This

remained the status quo until 13 April 1992, when President
Bush sent a message to Congress.

This missive provided

detailed reasons for the continued economic sanctions
against Haiti.

Furthermore,

the connection between the

Bush policy and the OAS efforts to restore democracy were
strengthened; and,

for the first time, the situation was

called a crisis by the Administration.

President Bush had

made it clear that during this declared state of "national
emergency" for the United States his policy was to wait and
see what the OAS and the United Nations

(U.N.) would

accomplish.
On 24 May 1992 President Bush issued executive order
12324 which authorized U.S. Coast Guard vessels to
repatriate Haitians,

bound for the United States, who had

not been granted asylum through our embassy in Haiti.

The

President justified this action, citing the large number of
Haitians, over 34,000 since 30 September 1991, who had
attempted to leave the island nation for the United States;
Bush called it "a dangerous and unmanageable situation."*
This policy of direct return was designed to keep Haitians
safe;

indeed,

according to President Bush,

"the safety of
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the Haitians is best assured by remaining in their country.
We urge any Haitians who fear persecution to avail
themselves of our service at our Embassy in Port-auPrince. 1,4
During a press conference three days later on 27 May
1992 the President was asked about the recent influx of
Haitian immigrants and his policy of repatriation:
[This] policy seems to run contrary to what
America has stood for over the past couple
hundred years, in that Americans opened their
arms to all ethnic groups and different classes
who sought to free themselves . . . from
oppression in their homelands.'
President Bush uses this question to set up an important
component in his policy: Haitian refugees are primarily
economic refugees,
stated,

not political.

Indeed,

the President

"I am convinced that the people in Haiti are not

being physically oppressed.,,ft

President Bush stated quite

clearly that the U.S. government had every legal right to
screen people coming into the country,

and that the country

was not bound to "have an open policy where everybody in
economic deprivation around the world can come to the
United States."7

The next day, on 28 May 1992, the

President issued a statement that denied vessels trading
with Haiti the use of United States ports.

President Bush

also clarified his policy, stating that the sanctions were
directed at coup leaders, not the Haitian poor; and he
announced that the embassy at Port-au-Prince had expanded
operations for processing political refugees.
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President Bush made no other formal statements
concerning Haiti until 30 September 1992, when he sent a
message to Congress about the current state of affairs in
Haiti."

In this communique the President continued the

state of emergency sanctions;

it is noted as well that

these sanctions were made in conjunction with the OAS.
Further,

President Bush noted, the OAS had "repudiated" and

"vigorously condemned" Aristide's overthrow.
continued,

The President

stating that "the crisis between the United

States and Haiti

. . . has not been resolved."*'

During a press conference on 23 October 1992,
President Bush was confronted by a member of the press who
insisted that over 40% of those seeking asylum at Port-auPrince were found by state department officials to be
politically oppressed.
reporter,

The President challenged the

and stated that he would "like to see that

documentation" because political refugees would not be
turned back.

President Bush put an end to future

ungrounded speculations when he drew upon his authority as
President and stated:
I must have different information than you, but
I've got pretty good information as President of
the United States that these people are not being
persecuted when they go to file their claims for
asylum.1(1
The situation with Haiti remained static during the
remainder of President Bush's term.

The Bush

Administration had initiated a Haitian policy that would

act to set the frame through which President Clinton would
initially have to address the situation.

Clearly this was

a foreign policy issue, and one in which the United States
was a partner,

not the leader.

Furthermore,

the policy of

direct returns was framed as a humanitarian act, thereby
foregoing legal definitions for moral ones.

As frames,

President Bush's utterances about Haiti would act as a
constraint upon President Clinton's utterances about the
same situation.

The Bush Administration did accomplish

several important policy steps.
emergency for the U.S.,

By declaring a national

President Bush enacted Emergency

Presidential Powers which would legally enable him to take
extreme measures against the Haitian coup leaders.

Bush

initiated a policy of direct repatriation on the high seas
This policy was justified in part as a measure to save
unwanted loss of human life, and by stating that the vast
majority of Haitian refugees were economic,
refugees.

not political

This implied that the current in-Haiti

processing was adequate.

The President also initiated a

trade embargo with Haiti; this included a ban on vessels
trading with Haiti from using U.S. ports.

President Bush

also made it quite clear that the sanctions were directed
at the coup leaders, not the Haitian poor
petroleum products,

(for example,

food stuffs, humanitarian aid, and the

like were excluded in the b a n ) .

For pro-active measures

the Bush Administration had expanded the Port-au-Prince

Ill
embassy refugee processing facilities.

Finally,

President

Bush had made an important component of his policy the
continuing U.S. cooperation with the U.N. and OAS.
President Clinton Inherits A Crisis
When Bill Clinton assumed the Presidency he inherited
Bush's Haitian policy and the emerging press questions
about the repatriation of refugees.

Candidate Clinton had

promised a policy different from that of President Bush,
but throughout the many months following his ascension to
the presidency it became increasingly clear that the Bush
policy remained in force."

The Clinton Administration

issued its first statements on the Haitian situation on 14
January 1995.

One is directed to the people of Haiti and

the other to the people of the United States.
similar statements,

In these

President-elect Clinton made clear how

his Administration would view the situation in Haiti,

and

he made his first utterances upon what had become an
important on-going situation for the United States.

In

short, he was beginning the process of framing the event in
terms which his Administration wished it to be seen.

The

President made clear what his goals in this situation would
be: **My major goals are the restoration of democracy in
Haiti, the saving of human lives and the establishment of a
system for fair treatment of refugees."12

These goals were

to be accomplished through a "political settlement" of the
crisis.

Moreover,

the political means would involve
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"intensive negotiations," with various parties— U.N., OAS,
President Aristide,

and the coup leaders— "working

together," engaging in "important negotiations" to bring
about the political settlement that would change the "human
rights" conditions in Haiti, ultimately leading to
President Aristide's return.

President-elect Clinton made

it clear that his Administration would be a team player
with the U.N. and OAS.
Despite these announced changes,

President Clinton

would remain strongly influenced by the policy he had
inherited from the Bush Administration.

Although candidate

Clinton had promised to end the Bush policy of direct
repatriations,

President-elect Clinton announced that the

practice would temporarily continue:

"the practice of

direct return of those

who depart Haiti by boat will be

continued.

the practice of

I will end

direct return when I

am fully confident I can do so in a way that does not
contribute to a humanitarian tragedy."11

Along with the

continuation of direct return President-elect Clinton
announced four concrete actions that he would initiate as
an extension to the Bush policy,
policy his own:

in effect, making the

first, the rapidity with which refugee

processing within Haiti occurs would be increased;

two,

processing centers would be created outside of Port-auPrince; three, more Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) officers would be posted to Haiti; and four,

the U.S.
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would encourage expanded U.N. and OAS human rights
monitoring inside of Haiti.

Clinton closed his statement

by saying that these new actions would "maintain [U.S.]
humanitarian obligations to refugees while taking all
practical steps necessary to protect against tragic loss of
life. "I4
With this statement President-elect Clinton had
initiated his Administration's frame for viewing the
crisis.

The President-elect announced the situation as a

"crisis" in his announcement's title, but then made clear
that the action to bring the crisis to closure would be a
"process" of "collaborative effort" aimed at restoring
democracy.

The initial frame that President-elect Clinton

tried to set was one of calm, deliberate negotiations being
carried out by rational parties on both sides.
the practice of direct returns would continue,
linked with humanitarian concerns:

Although
it was

prevention of

unwarranted loss of life that the dangerous sea voyage
could bring about.

Further, the humanitarian actions of

the Administration were highlighted by its efforts to
ensure fair and safe refugee processing within Haiti,

and

other "measures" that would be "actively explored."
This position was reiterated by George Stephanopoulos
during a 1 February 1993 press briefing.

When told by a

reporter that the Haiti situation had "hit a new roadblock
in negotiated solutions . . ."n due to 300 HIV infected
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Haitians on Guantanamo Bay going on a hunger strike to gain
entry into the U . S . , Stephanopoulos replied:
President's position remains the same.

"The

He wants to make

sure that we continue to do everything we can to reach a
negotiated settlement,

to bring democracy back to Haiti."16

The Initial Press Response
The press response to administrative utterances did
relate the information conveyed by the Administration,
it also showed the beginnings of a contending frame.
example,

For

the Clinton Administration had highlighted its

sense of urgency and quickened pace of negotiations;
short,

but

in

they seemed to be attempting to instill new energy

into the negotiation process.

During the week following

President-elect Clinton's initial statements,
Times did reinforce this impression.

the New York

The paper stated that

there had been signs of "energetic work" and that the
Clinton Administration had "strenuously promoted a plan" to
bring in U.N./OAS observers.17

Additionally,

the paper

related that the "pace of diplomacy to find a political
settlement appears to be quickening."l*
Beginnings of an Oppositional Frame: Direct Returns
Questioned
Although the sense of optimism was relayed,

both the

New York Times and the Washington Post highlighted
Clinton's apparent about-face from his previous stance on
ending the Bush Administration's policy of direct returns.
Although the press did relate the Clinton Administration's
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reasons for continuing the policy,
oppositional assessment.

it also offered its own,

For example,

the New York Times

stated:
His official explanation for reversing himself is
to avoid the humanitarian catastrophe of capsized
boats and overcrowded camps.
But Mr. Clinton's
real worry appears to be political fallout in
Florida in reaction to a flood of poor, black
Haitian refugees.19
The Washington Post reported President Clinton's official
explanation for keeping the policy of direct returns in
place— to avert a humanitarian tragedy— yet it, too,

made

it into a political as opposed to humanitarian decision:
political settlement of the crisis

[in Haiti]

...

"A

is

viewed as essential by the Clinton administration to halt
the threat of a mass exodus of boat people to Florida.

. .

."'?l1 This same position, highlighting the imagined concern
with South Florida politicians is again conveyed:
The specter of hordes of Haitian boat people
wading ashore in South Florida has driven
President Clinton to reverse campaign promises
and erect a virtual Coast Guard blockade of
Haiti, leading to charges that his approach, like
that of his predecessor, is racist and
inhumane.21
This same motive is argued by the editorial writers at the
Washington P o s t .

Their assessment of the major

breakthrough in negotiations which allowed for human rights
monitors into Haiti was not generous.

At bottom the

Washington Post saw base political motives:
lower the level of general bullying,

"The aim is to

warm the atmosphere in

which negotiations could restore normal politics and,

not
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least,

reduce the number of Haitians driven to seek refuge

in Florida."22

This line of reasoning was further apparent

in the Washington Post report which stressed that "since
the election,

Clinton has bowed to 'political pressure'

to

stop a deluge of Haitians from reaching Florida."23
Whether true or not,

neither the Washington Post or the New

York Times ever discussed the ramifications of accelerated
mass migration into already burdened South Florida;
furthermore,

the danger of tens-of-thousands of Haitians at

sea in shoddy boats was virtually ignored.
introducing its own frame.

The press was

The restoration of democracy in

Haiti was not the primary issue;

instead,

direct returns was focused upon.

the policy of

The frame was asserting a

domestic focused interpretation of President Clinton's
policy; direct returns was being forced into a legal,
opposed to humanitarian frame.

as

The continuation of direct

returns was framed as a domestic,

political campaign

promise that has been broken.
The press opposition to direct returns took for
granted the right of all departing Haitians to asylum in
the U.S.; thus President Clinton's decision to continue
direct returns was called an "unconscionable about face"
and "repellent"; or,

in the case of the Washington P o s t ,

"racist and inhumane."

Moreover,

the press rarely

differentiated between economic and political refugees as
both the Bush and Clinton Administration had made a point
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of doing.

For example,

the New York Times reported that

Clinton had announced that "he would return the boat people
without giving them a chance to apply for asylum."24

And

they also implied that all Haitians fleeing did so for
political reasons.

For instance:

"an atmosphere of harsh

repression that has contributed to an exodus of refugees
and posed a potential immigration crisis.

. . .”2S

Despite

Haiti's status as the poorest country in the Western
hemisphere,

the press consistently advanced political

oppression as the primary motive for immigration.
example,

For

"critics of the plan charged that Clinton is

acting exactly as President Bush has in denying Haitians
who fear for their lives a way to escape political
oppression."2"
implication:

And another example,

this strong editorial

"The outpouring of refugees from Haiti will

continue as long as the country remains in the grip of
anarchy and violence, with no public authority other than
undisciplined soldiers."27

By so doing,

the press

undermined President Clinton's claim of humanitarian
motives undergirding his policy of direct returns.
When economic conditions are mentioned,

they appear

less salient than the political repression within the
country;

for we have already learned the real cause of the

fleeing boat people: political repression.

Thus, the

traditional and patriotic view of immigrating to the United
States dominates even when economic concerns are included
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with political oppression:
nation in the hemisphere,

"Haiti, already the poorest
has seen its economy crumble and

political repression grow since Aristide's overthrow."3*1
The economy is only secondary or perhaps a symptom of
political repression.
The primacy of the theme of political oppression is
perhaps most stridently presented in the Washington Post
which described conditions of violence and then failed to
provide sources or direct quotes;

in short, hearsay is

provided for establishing the validity of political
conditions:
Soldiers and police arrested at least 10
protesters in breaking up Thursday's
demonstration [in support of Aristide by
students] at the medical school, and troops
clubbed students and teachers about the head in
dispersing protesters at the high school.
Journalists and newspaper vendors have been
threatened, beaten and arrested in the past two
weeks, and radio stations were warned that news
must be presented in ways that will 'nothave
a
harmful effect.'"31'
The Administration Restates its Position
President Clinton received his first formal question
about Haiti on 5 February 1993:
pressure on Haiti?
action.

"— is it time to strengthen

Do you think we should have stronger

. . .",l1 His response echoes those of George Bush:

"I am committed to restoring democracy to Haiti.
doing my best to work through the U.N.
.",l

At this same time,

I am

and the OAS.

. .

President Clinton used such terms

as "determination" and "push ahead" to characterize his
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Administration's diplomatic efforts.

The President also

refined his argument for diplomatic efforts by highlighting
the underlying reasoning for his initiatives:

"We have to

be able to restore democracy in a way that convinces
everybody that their human rights will be respected and . .
. protected.1,52

If this route were to fail, the President

promised to embark upon an even "more vigorous course"
toward the restoration of democracy.

On 10 February 1993

President Clinton was asked about his "naval blockade" of
Haiti, and about his criticism of the Bush policy in light
of its similarity to his own.

The President's response is

an instructive one:
My policy is not the same as President Bush's
policy because I'm trying to bring democracy
back, because I am committed to putting more
resources there to process people who want to be
political refugees. . . ."
Although a reporter asserted that the embargo would hurt
"the people at the bottom" instead of the coup leaders, the
President consistently justified his actions,

and called

them a necessary measure to secure the safety of the
Haitian people who attempted the dangerous sea crossing.
The President declared the likely inundation a potential
"human tragedy of monumental proportions."14
challenged the reporter,
lifted,

The President

and asked if the embargo were

"then what incentives does the government have to

change?"-'-'

For the first time, too, the President made
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mention of broken past promises of the Federal government
to help South Florida.
Press Opposition to the Blockade and Direct Returns
This exchange about a "naval blockade" provides a good
example of specific naming of actions used by the press.
In actuality,
Navy boats.

there were only 17 Coast Guard vessels and 5
They were stationed outside of Haitian waters

and only intercepted boats filled with Haitians heading for
the U.S.

This action hardly constitutes a blockade,

which

is internationally considered an act of war restricting all
commerce and people from entering or leaving a particular
area.

Yet the press referred to ships' presence as a

blockade.

For example, the Washington P o s t , reporting on

the deployment of U.S.
fleeing Haitians,

ships to intercept and return

began the news story this way:

"the

United States plans to surround Haiti with Navy and Coast
Guard vessels and planes, mounting a virtual blockade to
stop a potential surge of refugees fleeing the island, Adm.
J. William Kime, commandant of the Coast Guard said today."
After this statement, an Administration official,

Admiral

J. William Kime, was quoted as saying that the
"interdiction policy is not a blockade.

..."

However,

after Kime's comments on the interdiction have been
relayed,

advocates for Haitian refugees are cited:

should have the freedom to flee repression.
putting a barricade around Haiti.

. . .'

"'People

They're
'Whether it's an
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encirclement: or a white picket fence,
blockade

a blockade is a

. . . Blockades are acts of war. ,,,3A

Administration's position is reported,

Although the

clearly other

descriptions dominate and have their saliency increased by
the placement and consistency of use.
is consistently advanced,

too.

This interpretation

The Rev. Antoine Adrien,

Aristide's highest ranking in-Haiti representative,

is

reported by the Washington Post as having called the
interdiction policy a “floating Berlin wall."17

In a later

story the Washington Post reported Harold H. Koh,
Law School professor

the "Yale

. . . representing Haitians who claim

they are political refugees" as saying the Administration
had established a "floating Berlin Wall."1* Although the
Clinton Administration consistently referred to the policy
as one of interdiction and direct returns,

the press

consistently reported it, except when quoting
Administration officials,

as "forced repatriation," "forced

return," and "blockade."
The Clinton Administration is also accused by the
press of harming the poor in Haiti through the continuation
of the embargo,
country.

and not the "people at the top" of the

For example,

the Washington Post made what might

be considered an indictment against the Administration:
"The embargo imposed by the OAS in October 1991,
initiative,

a U.S.

added to impoverishment but did little to

weaken the resolve of the current rulers to remain in
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power. "1<* The Admin istrat ion contended that if the
sanctions are lifted there would be no incentive for the
present rulers to restore democracy.

However,

reasoning was virtually ignored by the press.

this
By 16

February 1993, a Washington Post editorial called for the
lifting of the embargo:

"It is also time to start trimming

back an economic embargo whose principal impact has been
not on the elements of power and privilege in Haiti but on
an already-impoverished mass population."4"
Throughout the first eight weeks after President
Clinton assumed office,

the press maintained that the

policy of direct returns was illegal.

This case was still

under review with the United States Supreme Court,
press consistently reported it as being illegal.

but the
Their

basis for reporting this rests primarily upon candidate
Clinton's statements during the 1992 presidential race that
Bush's policy of direct returns was illegal.

For example,

on 15 January 199 3 the Washington Post reported that "The
Bush policy is 'no less legal now that it has been endorsed
by Clinton than it was when it was announced by Bush'"41
An editorial states:

"To discourage Haitian refugees.

President-elect Clinton has embraced a Bush Administration
policy that,
illegal."42

among its other defects,

appears to be grossly

The New York Times presented this general

interpretation as well,

and characterized "the forcible

return of potential refugees as illegal.

. . .”4’
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Candidate Clinton's utterances of calling Bush's policy
"illegal" and "immoral" were frequently reported.
on this same issue,

Indeed,

in early March the Washington Post

highlighted candidate Clinton's campaign pledge to end
Bush's policy;

it seems that the constant assertion of the

illegality of the policy rested upon two earlier events.
One,

candidate Clinton called it illegal during the 1992

presidential race:

"After Assailing Interdiction Program as

Illegal During Campaign,
U.S.

Clinton Has Adopted It."44

Court of Appeals had said it was illegal.

Two,

a

It seemed

not to matter that the order to revise the policy was
granted a stay by the U.S. Supreme Court until it could be
reviewed there.

A New York Times editorial stated that

forcing "desperate refugees back into the face of danger
betrays American values and mocks U.S. and international
law."4'

Against these assertions,

the positive steps taken

by the Administration to provide asylum hearings in Haiti
were seldom detailed.

The Administration's humanitarian

commitment and arguments were seldom discussed,

nor was the

fact that the U.S. government is not compelled by any law
to grant asylum hearings outside of the United States.

The

latter was mentioned once by the Washington P o s t .4*
In the span of many months,

the press had advanced a

legal conception of Clinton's policy of direct returns.
a 4 March 1993 editorial,

In

the New York Times stated the

President Clinton had "asked the Supreme Court to find that

124

[Bush's] policy legal or, better still, to rule that courts
can't order the President to obey a treaty and immigration
law."47

The editorial continues,

"the U.S.

stating that at present

is legally bound not to return a fleeing Haitian

without deciding

eligibility for asylum."4*

Consolidation o f

the Press Frame

Despite steady criticism of the Administration's
policies on Haiti,

the sinking of the ferry Neptune on 18

February 1993 prompted little criticism from the press.
The ship was a regularly scheduled mode of transportation
used between Haitian ports, and was not carrying a cargo
load of America bound immigrants.

However,

the New York

Times did publish several full length feature stories on
the sinking and these stories did contain framing elements
that implied ultimate responsibility for the sinking on
Clinton and Bush

Administration policies.

For example,

19 February 1993

it was reported that the Neptune

on

had not

sailed for several weeks "largely because the owners feared
Haitians trying to reach the United States would hijack the
vessel."4'' Hijacking was of real concern of the owners,
however,

because boats "seized on the seas by the Coast

Guard are routinely destroyed and their passengers returned
to land."'"

The press had also implied that the ferry was

overcrowded because road conditions were intolerable and
there was no fuel for small aircraft; thus Haitians,
necessity,

must use the ferry.

of

The bad conditions and
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shortages of fuel were a direct result of the U.S.
embargo.

led

This connection was forcefully argued in a 20

February 199 3 New York Times report:
The roads connecting Jeremie and Port-au-Prince
are in terrible condition, and few busses run
because of fuel shortages caused by an embargo
imposed after the overthrow of the Rev. JeanBertrand Aristide.51
Contrary to this report, however,
products existed at that time.52

no embargo on petroleum
By 21 February 1993 this

ferry sinking grew from being reported as "one of the
world's worst ferry disasters.

. ."V1 to being reported as

wone of the world's worst maritime disasters.”54
By this time,
Administration,

four weeks into the Clinton

the press had consolidated its frame.

What

follows is a characteristic example of this description:
Since a military coup in September of 1991
overthrew the nation's President, the Rev. JeanBertrand Aristide, more than 40,000 Haitians have
attempted to flee to the United States, almost
all of them attempting the 600-mile journey in
rickety boats.
In recent weeks, the Coast Guard has
maintained a blockade off Haiti to prevent a
greater sea-borne exodus that was first inspired
by the hope that the Clinton administration might
ease limits on claims for political asylum.5'
The framing elements emphasize the domestic nature of the
situation.

The internal situation in Haiti is political,

not economic; therefore,

all Haitians wishing to flee are

political refugees that must be granted asylum in the U.S.
The policy of direct returns is thus illegal; the motives
for the policy are not humanitarian,

but political.

The
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Administration reneged on its promise of eliminating the
policy and caved in to the political pressure from South
Florida officials.
On 2 March 1993 the spectre of a continuity with the
Bush policy was again raised when a reporter asked
President Clinton if he had any "second thoughts about
[his] criticism of George Bush's Haiti policy," especially
given the Clinton Administration's Supreme Court appeal to
keep the policy of direct returns operational.56
President's reply was standard,

The

"I still think there's a

big difference between what we're doing in Haiti and what
they

[the Bush Administration] were doing in Haiti."5' Of

note here,

however,

is that the President assigned what he

believed to be a new dimension to the Haitian situation,
but which is in fact what we have already seen to be the
very justification that George Bush used for his policy:
Something that was never brought up before but is
now painfully apparent is that if we did what the
plaintiffs in the court case want [ending of the
repatriation policy], we would be consigning a
very large number of Haitians . . . to some sort
of death warrant. . . .
I mean, if you look at .
. . the number of people who did not even try to
come to the United States in a much shorter trip
recently [the Neptune sinking]. . . .5*
On 2 March 1993, the day the Administration went to
court over the legality of direct returns,

the

Administration also detailed the exact progress made with
the Haiti situation.
press,

In a formal statement issued to the

George Stephanopoulos reiterated the
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Administration's belief that the policy of direct returns
was directly linked with President Clinton's belief that it
will avert a "humanitarian tragedy."

This statement also

related the forward moving progress of the negotiations,
and the Administration's "series of initiatives to promote
human rights and democratization in Haiti.

. . .

The

quickened pace of negotiations and the improvements made
upon the Bush policy were again highlighted that same day
by Stephanopoulos during a press briefing.

Although the

press did raise the issue of Clinton's campaign pledge to
end the direct return policy of Bush, Stephanopoulos
consistently presented items that flow from the
Administration's earliest utterances upon Haiti:
[The] President has significantly changed U.S.
policy toward Haiti in the last several months.
He has reinvigorated the process toward peace and
democracy.
He has supported the efforts of the
U.N. and the OAS to negotiate, and a U.N. and an
OAS civilian monitoring team has been deployed in
Haiti.
And we hope that this will create an
atmosphere that's conducive to respect for human
rights and political dialogue.
At the same time, he's moving the negotiating
process forward.
He's invited President Aristide
for a meeting . . . .
He's directed U.S.
officials to significantly increase the capacity
to review asylum cases.
He sent a monitoring
team to Haiti and he's directed the State
Department to send a technical mission. . .
He's made it easier for Haitians outside of Portau-Prince to apply for refugee status and U.S.
resettlement and to enhance the safety of the
repatriation process for the returnees.
We've
made the capacity for asylum cases— we've reduced
it from about two months to about a week in
Haiti.60
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As the Administration contended,

this represented a

"significant change in policy."

The Administration

consistently stressed that it was "moving the negotiating
process forward."

The policy of direct returns was linked

with the President's ability to conduct foreign policy and
with the averting of a "humanitarian disaster."
By this time the contrasting frames of the press and
the Administration were fully operational.

The New York

Times was characterizing those being returned without
asylum hearings as "political refugees" in the thousands.61
Moreover,

around this time we see the implied rights of

boat people to enter this country being asserted.

A 2

March 1993 New York Times article relays a blatant
description:

"'What Haiti needs is an underground railroad.

For many people that railroad was the boats,
shut that o ff.'1,62

and we have

Along these same lines the press once

again brought up the issue of the HIV infected Haitians
being detained at Guantanamo Bay.

Having brought up the

current court case on this issue, the New York Times
reported a contrast of pictures of the refugee camp.
Beginning with Haitian advocates' descriptions,

the paper

defined the camp as a "pen for pigs," a "prison camp,
surrounded by razor wire and guarded by the military."
Although the New York Times reported that the
Administration described the camp as a "humanitarian
mission camp with a church,

beauty salon,

television set
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and weight-lifting room," it undermined the humanitarian
claims with a sarcastic quote:
exercise."63

"People with problems cannot

These amenities were made to seem sinister

through another gratuitous quote that "likened the
Government's emphasis on the camp's perquisites to
'bragging about the orchestra at Buchenwald. '1,64

This

human interest aspect to the situation in Haiti was begun
by the Washington Post as early as 11 February 1993.

The

camp was then described as "a grim barbed-wire encampment"
and "prison-like conditions."
that those "detained
barracks,

Too, the story suggested

. . . lived in flimsy,

among rodents and scorpions,

leaky

in part because of a

legal battle over their fate that is wending [sic]
through the U.S. courts."65

its way

The Washington Post does not

make specific mention about what constitutes the other
"part" of the reason for the Haitians' detention.

However,

the paper does report a quote from an INS official that
makes the point for them:

"Asked what would keep the

Haitians at Guantanamo even after the ban [on HIV infected
immigrants]

is lifted, Austin [the INS official]

said,

'Maybe because as a policy matter you don't want to bring
them h e r e . '1,66
Although the press had reported the changes that
President Clinton had made in the Haiti policy since taking
office,

it was still President Bush's policy as this

headline suggests:

"White House Again Defends Bush's Policy
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on Haitians."*7
Illegal."

Another,

"Same Haiti Policy,

Still

Indeed, the focus upon only two aspects of the

Clinton Administration's policy acted to minimize the
positive changes that the new Administration had made.
press had already developed,

intentionally or not,

standardized version of events.

The

a

Reporting that President

Clinton met with only a limited numbers of reporters
instead of having a large press conference during President
Aristide's visit, the Washington Post reported:
That had the effect of shielding Clinton from
questions about his Haiti policy, in which he has
continued the Bush administration policy of
forcibly returning refugees on the high seas and
kept the HIV-positive Haitians confined at
Guantanamo Bay despite a campaign pledge to lift
the ban.6*
Moreover,

the press was beginning to assert its own

opinion as to the pace with which the Clinton
Administration was moving.

Although the Administration had

been consistent and up front in highlighting the changes
and rapidity with which it had been engaging in a political
settlement,

the press was beginning to feature elements

that suggested a slowing of the pace.

For instance,

on 2

March 1993 the New York Times ran a story entitled,
"Despite Plans, U.S. Refugee Processing in Haiti Is Said to
Lag.,,<w

In March 1993 the Haitian military arrested a man

who had been granted political asylum by the United States.
Asked what action he would take,

the President replied that

he was "upset," and that it was a "serious" matter,

and
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that he believed "very strongly" that the Haitian
Government should release the man.

This incident was

minor, and the Haitian soldier was released after only
three days.

But it was used by the press to make a

statement against Clinton's policy of direct returns.

The

New York Times reported on 14 March 1993 that critics of
President Clinton's policy "see the arrest as a test of
President Clinton's willingness to revise a Haitian refugee
policy that he attacked as cruel in the Presidential
campaign but then continued after taking office.
forcibly returning all fleeing Haitians,

By

critics say, the

Clinton Administration puts those in real danger at
risk."7"

Too,

the press belittled the Administration's

concern of a mass boat departure by including a quote from
a expert on asylum:

"'As it stands now, our policy makers

are immobilized by a theoretical fear that any form of
generosity will result in a large-scale departure of
Haitian boat people.'"71
Aristide's Visit and the Continuation of the Press Frame
On 13 March 1993 the President once again reiterated
his commitment to restoring Aristide to power.

He also

reiterated the Administration's conception of Haiti's
problems:
in Haiti.

"I am committed to the restoration of democracy
It is the only thing that will fully resolve the

economic problems and the enormous social dislocation and
the enormous numbers of people who are willing to risk
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their lives to leave the island.

. . .1,72

The President

also touched upon the pace with which the negotiations were
moving saying that the Administration would take a "more
active role" and that the U.S. was committed to working
with the U.N. and OAS, and that the United States would not
be "dictating policy."
Presidents Clinton and Aristide met at the White House
on 16 March 1993.

During this visit, the President and

State department officials were united in presenting a
platform upon which to view the situation in Haiti and
future U.S.

action.

The President reiterated his personal

commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

The

President also issued a strong statement to the leaders of
Haiti which was designed to "make it clear in the strongest
possible terms" that the illegal government would not be
tolerated indefinitely.

Moreover,

President Clinton

stressed that he wanted to "push forward" and "step up
dramatically the pace of negotiation.

. . ."”

These

comments were in keeping with prior administrative
utterances upon Haiti.

The President also restated his

concern with a date certain:

"It is a very grave thing for

the United States alone to be setting a date certain in an
endeavor that involves the United Nations and the
Organization of the American States."74
with reporters,

In an exchange

both Presidents were provided the

opportunity to answer questions about policy designed to
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return President Aristide to power.

During this time,

President Clinton announced that "stronger measures" would
be taken by the Administration if democracy was not
restored.

Further, he implied that he would not rule out

tougher sanctions,

but that the diplomatic initiatives

being undertaken by the U.N. and OAS should be allowed to
take effect first.

It is at this time also that President

Aristide made a public call for a non-violent return to
power,

thereby formally eliminating at this time any

opportunity for U.S. military intervention.7'
During this period the Administration reemphasized its
concern with the economic,
situation in Haiti.

as opposed to political,

The President linked the restoration

of democracy in Haiti with "a program of genuine economic
progress."76

On this same day, during a background

briefing with senior Administration officials, the concern
with pace and the restoration of democracy in Haiti was
again stressed:

"it was an excellent meeting in the sense

that both presidents saw this as a partnership,

that we're

beginning a process here of pushing the negotiation much
more seriously, much more vigorously within the context of
a U.N.-OAS international approach.

. . .',77

Definitive

statements were also made by the Administration concerning
the request by the press for a "date-certain" being set for
President Aristide's return:

"President Clinton indicated

to President Aristide that he did not think it was
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advisable for the United States to be setting any
particular date-certain.
negotiation,

This is a U.N.-OAS-led

the timing of a new government in Haiti and

President Aristide's return will be set by that
negotiation.*’7*

That the Administration's plan had

President Aristide's public and formal approval was
demonstrated when President Aristide was asked if the
Administration's plan was satisfactory to him.
simply:

He replied

"Totally."71*

However,

news items during this period continued the

framing of events in the same manner as before.

The arrest

of the soldier granted asylum was used to highlight the
press perceived problems with the policy of direct returns.
Although both the Clinton Administration and President
Aristide were in agreement about U.S.-Aristide roles in the
restoration of democracy in Haiti,

the press advanced a

different frame through which to view the various events.
On the day of the meeting between Presidents Clinton and
Aristide,

the Hew York Times ran a story that highlighted a

conception that ran oppositional to the "vigorous pace"
maintained by the Administration: Aristide was reported as
being "perhaps" and "maybe" disappointed "with the pace of
diplomatic activity intended to return him to the
presidency of Haiti."*0 Along these same lines,

the New

York Times headline and by-line read: "Haitian is Offered
Clinton's Support on an End to Exile: But No Deadline is
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Cited:

In Pledging to Restore Aristide,

Steps, Fearing New Violence."®1

U.S. Avoids Strong

Yet a thorough search of

White house documents and the WCPD revealed no
administrative utterances suggesting a fear of provoking
violence by coup-leaders;

in fact, senior level

administrative officials were remarkably candid in
describing the potential of a "win-win" situation for all
parties.

Moreover, we see the media obsession with a

"date-certain" for Aristide's return:

"But Mr. Clinton

refused to set a deadline by which Washington would demand
Father Aristide's return to power as President."82
reason for not setting a "date-certain"

Yet the

is not provided.

During this period of time the New York Times also made it
clear that it still viewed all refugees coming from Haiti
as political refugees:

"The administration angered many

Haitians when Mr. Clinton reversed his campaign pledge to
allow political refugees asylum."83
From the Aristide visit forward, the Administration
moved through a period of relative calm with respect to the
situation in Haiti.

Throughout April 1993, the President

and his Administration continued the framing devices they
had used during the previous months.

The situation in

Haiti was a foreign policy issue; direct returns was a
humanitarian policy; the Haitian refugees were primarily
economic,

not political; and the restoration of democracy

was predicated upon President Aristide's return.
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On 13 April 1993, George Stephanopoulos was asked
about the possibility of sending U.S. troops into Haiti.84
Stephanopoulos replied that the U.S. was not considering
sending U.S. troops,
earlier,

but as President Clinton had stated

the U.S. would participate in a limited way in the

professionalization of Haiti's military and police force
once the U.N. and OAS had worked out an agreement for
Aristide's return.

Stephanopoulos concludes his remarks on

Haiti by reaffirming the Administration's commitment to a
negotiated settlement and the belief that the negotiations
would be successful.8'

Just six days later Stephanopoulos

was again asked about the possibility of sending U.S.
troops into Haiti.

He reiterated the Administration's

position that U.S. troops would not be sent; however,

the

Administration was still "prepared to help assist the
professionalization of the Haitian military after an
agreement

[had been reached to return Aristide}."86

By late April 1993 the press was still questioning the
efficacy of the Administration's policy.

Indeed, during

one press conference the President was told that his
diplomatic initiative was "on the verge of collapse" and
perhaps nothing short of miliary intervention could help.87
However,

the President disagreed,

stating that this is not

what he has been told, and that the diplomatic process was
working.
29 April

This position was echoed by Dee Dee Myers in an
1993 press briefing;

"On Haiti,

I think we're
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still committed toward restoring democracy in Haiti, to
restoring President Aristide.

I think that process is

ongoing and I think we are making progress there."®*

This

articulation of optimism and progress was continued
throughout the month of May as well.*9
Progress, however,

is often made by prompting others

to move, and on 3 June 1993 President Clinton found it
necessary to adjust his policy by issuing proclamation 6569
which bans from entry into the United States any Haitian
National felt to be actively working to impede the progress
of the negotiations.

Moreover,

on 4 June 1993 the

President hinted at the "possibility of creating a
worldwide sanctions program against Haiti. ,,9°

This is also

the first time that the President had explicitly linked the
restoration of democracy to a larger United States concern:
One of the cornerstones of our foreign policy is
to support the global march toward democracy and
to stand by the world's new democracies.
The
promotion of democracy, which not only reflects
our values but also increases our security, is
especially important in our own hemisphere.91
The President's statement stressed once again the
Administration's view of the negotiation process.
Sanctions did not indicate a setback,

but were viewed as

strong messages in the ongoing political dialogue.

For

Clinton, while progress was still being made on some
fronts,

those parties in Haiti who were not willing to

negotiate must now suffer specific sanctions.
sanctions were surgical

These

in nature; they were designed to
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target specifically the top Haitian leaders.
senior Administration official stated:

As an unnamed

"we've gone after

the top leadership in the de facto regime and in the top of
the Army."92

Furthermore, the sanctions were a specific

tool used to keep the progress moving in the negotiations
to return President Aristide to power: the "sanctions are a
tactic.

They're a tool to try to accomplish a goal.

our goal here is a negotiated solution.,,,J

And

The importance

of the perception of a continuation of progress is imparted
by the Administration later in this background briefing.
After stating that the sanctions are just a tactic to keep
the pace of negotiations moving,

the senior Administration

official makes it clear what is meant:
I think we feel very, very comfortable that we've
moved this thing very rapidly, and when we hit a
snag you're seeing the determination not to allow
it to stall out.
This is a sign that the
administration intends to keep this thing moving.
We're talking moving as rapidly as we possibly
can.
And I don't mean that— I don't want to see
some story saying, therefore I was evasive and
it's going to be slow.*4
The press response to these increased sanctions was
ambivalent at first.

On the one hand,

the surgical nature

of the new sanctions pleased the press; on the other hand,
the possibility of imposing further sanctions,
oil, was not acceptable.

including

After detailing that U.S.

Administration officials had made the announcement about
increased sanctions and the possibility of a U.N./OAS oil
embargo,

the Washington Post reported the following:

"But
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yesterday's announcement was aimed at punishing
individuals,

not the general Haitian population widely seen

as paying the highest price since the OAS imposed sanctions
after Aristide's ouster."9*

Indeed, the press seemed bent

toward proclaiming the harmful effects of the sanctions
upon Haiti's poor, and the inconsequential effects upon the
leaders:

"The OAS sanctions were widely criticized as

punishing the poorest Haitians--many of whom are supporters
of Aristide--while being ineffectual in swaying the
m i l i t a r y ."96
The press response to the Administration's continuing
negotiation is reflected in little but passing coverage.
However,

on 3 June 1993, the New York Times reported that

the President in May had acknowledged that his policy in
Haiti had failed:
Referring to the Haitian military's rejection
last month of an America-backed United Nations
plan to deploy an international peace force
there, Mr. Clinton acknowledged that his policy
had failed. . . .
Mr. Clinton's Haitian policy is still unclear.
Mr. Clinton has continued the Bush administration
policy of forceable [sic] repatriation of
Haitians seeking political asylum.97
This new line of reasoning--a failed policy evidenced only
by a single failure/event— surfaced again in the New York
Times on 5 June 1993:

"In a tacit acknowledgement that its

diplomacy has failed to restore Haiti's democratically
elected government,
imposed sanctions.

the Clinton Administration today
. . .,,w

Yet nowhere in the
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administrative responses is this angle taken.
quite clear by administrative officials,
Clinton,

It was made

and President

that the tactic of increased sanctions was only

that, a tactic to keep the negotiation process moving
forward.
In early June the Administration was ordered by a
Federal Court to release the Haitians held in Guantanamo.
In a 9 June 1993 press briefing.

Dee Dee Myers stated that

the Administration would comply with the judge's order.

On

17 June 1993, Clinton publicly commented upon the
possibility of a multinational peace-keeping force in
Haiti; he stressed that "President Aristide rejected it and
the de facto government rejected it.

. . .,,w

The

President also stressed that he personally believed it
would be necessary due to the amount of distrust between
the parties.

President Clinton also mentioned the

possibility of an oil embargo to help force the pace of
negotiations.
On 30 June 1993, the President issued Executive Order
No.

12775 which effectively blocked Haitian Nationals from

using U.S.

based funds and materials to aid the de facto

regime in Haiti;

it also prohibited:

"the sale or supply,

by United States persons, of from the United States,
using U .S .-registered vessel or aircraft,

or

of petroleum or

petroleum products or arms and related materials of all
types.

. . ."111,1

The President stressed that the measures
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were taken in response to the United Nation's Security
Council's call,

and that they were representative of the

United States' commitment to the restoration of President
that Aristide and Democracy to Haiti.

On 3 July 1993,

an

accord was signed by the military leaders of Haiti and
President Aristide setting a date for his return to Haiti.
Summary
Two very different narratives emerged during the first
half of 1993.

The Clinton Administration narrative about

Haiti had its genesis in the Bush Administration policy.
The Bush policy had set the stage in several important
respects.

First,

it stressed cooperation with the U.N.

OAS; the United States would work with,

and

but not lead the

negotiations for President Aristide's return.

Second,

President Bush began the policy of direct returns.
policy was founded upon a humanitarian component.

This
Returns

were made to prevent massive loss of Haitian lives through
a mass relocation via unseaworthy boats.

Third,

the Bush

Administration had maintained that the Haitian refugees
were primarily economic,

not political in nature.

Finally,

the Bush Administration began the expansion of asylum
screening in Port-au-Prince.
The Clinton Administration's Changes
When Bill Clinton took office, he inherited the Bush
Administration policy on Haiti.

The President quickly

announced his own policy on the matter;

in effect.
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President Clinton adopted the previous Administration's
policy, modified it, and made it his own.

In his first

formal utterance concerning Haiti, made as President-elect,
Bill Clinton outlined three broad goals of his Haitian
policy.

First, he was committed to the restoration of

democracy.

Throughout the first half of 1993 it became

apparent that this was a complex goal.

The restoration of

democracy was predicated upon a working partnership with
the U.N. and O A S .

The Administration was committed to a

negotiated solution to the problems facing Haiti.
was a team player, not the leader here.

The U.S.

Negotiations were

to be carried out in such a manner that everyone— President
Aristide and the coup leaders— would be convinced that
human rights would be respected.

This aspect of policy

hinged upon the deployment of a U.N./OAS human rights
monitoring team in Haiti.

The Clinton Administration

relayed the impression that negotiations were "moving
forward" and that the "pace" was "quickening" through
"heightened negotiations."

The impression of movement was

important to maintain because negotiated settlements take
time.
Second, the Clinton Administration seemed to have a
sincere commitment to saving human lives.

This reasoning

directly underpinned the continuation of the original Bush
policy of direct returns.
his own.

The President made this policy

He was committed to avoiding a "humanitarian
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tragedy" and the "tragic loss of life" that was sure to
follow if there were a massive flotilla of refugees leaving
Haiti.

It was apparent that such a flotilla would leave

once Bill Clinton took office , thus he made Bush's policy
his own in an effort to stem the tide.
Third, the Clinton Administration was committed to
fair treatment for political refugees.

In-Haiti refugee

processing was accelerated; application processing time
went from eight weeks to one.

The President opened

processing centers outside of Port-au-Prince,

thereby

making it easier for potential refugees to apply for
asylum.

The President also increased the number of INS

officers in Haiti.

The placement of the U.N./OAS human

rights monitoring team helped to provide an atmosphere in
which potential refugees would not fear for their safety
when applying for asylum.
The Press Framing of Administrative Utterances
The narrative of the press was quite different.

The

papers combined seven elements that acted to underpin their
narrative of the situation.

First, they continually

highlighted alleged "roadblocks" in the Administration's
push for a negotiated settlement in Haiti.

For example,

the Haitians in Guantanamo were continually referred to in
such a manner as to imply that all political refugees were
denied entry into the U.S.;

in fact, they were only
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excluded due to the legal restriction barring HIV infected
person from immigrating into the United States.
Second, the press continually made President Clinton's
apparent campaign pledge reversal an icon for refugee
mistreatment.

This was always used to report upon the

humanitarian aspect of the situation in Haiti.

Ultimately

the reversal was ascribed to potential political fallout
from South Florida.

The humanitarian considerations

advanced by the Administration were not valid options for
the press.

It was inhumane to keep them out because they

were being politically oppressed and because candidateClinton had promised to let them in.
Third, the press constantly asserted that the Haitian
refugees were political.

Any consideration given to their

economic status was always secondary in importance and
prominence.

This assumption was in part relayed through

the use of the terms "forced reparation" and forced
returns."

The Administration referred to the returns as

"direct returns."

Too, the press referred to the

deployment of U.S. ships to interdict fleeing Haitians as a
"blockade" even when Administration officials continually
stressed that a blockade was not in effect.
Fourth, the press continually assumed U.S.
in the negotiation process.

leadership

This acted to belittle the

role and legitimacy of the U.N. and OAS.

It also acted to

belittle the role that President Aristide played in the
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negotiation process.
President Aristide,
Administration,

The key players in the drama were
the Haitian coup leaders, the Clinton

the U.N. and the OAS.

The United States is

a member state in the OAS and was only facilitating the
negotiations.

Yet the press continued to blame delays in

action on the lack of resolve of the Clinton
Administration.

This U.S.

focus is perhaps best

illustrated with the media prompting to use U.S. troops to
restore Aristide every time there was a slowdown in the
pace of negotiations.
Fifth, the press consistently reported that the OAS
sponsored embargo was only hurting Haiti's poor.
Sixth, the press consistently maintained that the
policy of direct returns was illegal.
upon two points.

This was predicated

One, candidate-Clinton had denounced the

policy as illegal while he was running for office.

Two, a

Federal Appeals Court had ruled the policy as illegal.
Minimized was the important fact that the Administration
had been granted a stay of the lower court's ruling and
that the policy was to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Seventh,

the press maintained a point of view that

upheld the right of any immigrant,
this country.

for any reason,

to enter

The underlying assumption is that anyone

wishing to enter the country must be fleeing from political
oppression.

In Haiti, however,

the descriptions of

political oppression are not well documented by the press,
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and two presidential administrations state plainly that
there is a minimal amount of political oppression.
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CRISIS ERUPTS: ANALYSIS, PART TWO
The Governors Island Agreement:

Initial Success

On 1 July 1993 the White House issued a statement that
contained details of a $37.5 million economic aid package
for Haiti that would begin once an agreement returning
President Aristide to power had been reached.
Haiti Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund,

Called the
it was

developed to support continued negotiations and a "phased
political solution" to the restoration of democracy in
Haiti.1

Furthermore,

the aid package was designed to

"respond to concrete progress toward restoring democracy."'1
The signing of the Governors Island agreement by President
Aristide and General Cedras,

the military high commander of

Haiti, who represented the de facto regime occurred on 3
July 1993.

This agreement set the date for restoring

President Aristide to power:

30 October 1993.

The press

lauded this event and coverage during the early part of
July focused upon the details of implementation,
unusual problems facing Haiti,
Aristide.

the

and the successful return of

The Clinton Administration was

uncharacteristically laconic concerning the signing of the
accord.
Throughout the period after the signing,

the

Administration stressed its cooperation with the
international community.

On 30 August 1993, a senior

Administration official reported that the U.S. was working
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with other Caribbean states to insure the proper
implementation of the Governors Island agreement, and once
again reiterated the economic rebuilding plan.1

on 30

September 1993, progress seemed apparent on implementation
of the accord, so the United Nations, with the cooperation
of the Clinton Administration,
not terminate them.

suspended sanctions--but did

On 12 October 1993, President Clinton

sent a letter to Congressional leaders that detailed the
chain of events leading to the signing of the agreement.
This letter stressed that the United States was continuing
to work in conjunction with the U.N. and OAS,

and that the

United States government was continuing the state of
National Emergency until President Aristide was returned
safely to power.

In short, the Administration announced

its continuing role as a partner within the international
community.

It did not seek recognition as the driving

force behind the successful signing of the accord.
Administration did, however,

stress its "leadership role

with the international community."4

The state of National

Emergency for the United States was continued,
President,

The

said the

until all conditions of the agreement were met.'1

Economic Aspects
Following the signing of the Governors Island
agreement,

the New York Times coverage focused increasingly

upon the economic situation within Haiti; these reports
contained many specific references to the economic
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component of the agreement.

Of course,

the paper also

elaborated upon the other components of the agreement,

but

the focus upon the economic was in strong contrast to the
near absence of coverage of the Haitian economy prior to
the signing of the agreement.
the signing,

For example,

on the day of

3 July 1993, Haiti was described by the New

York Times as the "hemisphere's poorest country."6
Following the signing of the Governors Island Agreement,
the New York Times described Haiti as a "desperately
impoverished country" with an "economy near collapse."7
Haiti,

in short, was now described as a "desperately poor

country."*

Or,

description,

in the Washington P o s t 's characteristic

an "impoverished Caribbean nation."*'

The New York Times offered an interesting explanation
for Haiti's economic situation:
The most immediate explanation for Haiti's
current suffering is an international oil embargo
imposed only last month by the United Nations.
Although it forced the army to accept a political
accord providing for Father Aristide's return, it
has also had a crushing effect on almost
e v e r y o n e .111
The Washington Post stressed Haiti's impoverished
conditions,

but did so in a manner that strongly linked it

to the 1991 military coup:

"21 months of military-backed

rule and economic hardship in the hemisphere's poorest
nation."11

The Washington P o s t 's description contains

narrative linkages similar to those of the New York T i m e s 's
account:
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The Haitian economy, poverty-stricken in the best
of times, has been devastated by the embargo and
the pariah status of de facto governments since
the coup.
I might add that even as the Haitian
economy improves, most Haitians are still going
to aspire to emigrate to the United States and
C a n a d a .13
Military Training and the Administration's Motives
Following the signing of the accord,

the press also

reported upon those components of the Governors Island
Agreement which addressed the professionalization of
Haiti's military and the establishment of a civilian police
force.

Reports about the number and type of U.S. military

personnel to be involved were misleading,
instance,

however.

For

it was initially reported that the U.S. did not

want to "have a large military or police force in Haiti
because any American military presence in the region is
politically sensitive."1*

Yet as details of the exact

numbers and types of American military personnel were
reported,

the Hew York Times implied a larger presence of

military troops as opposed to train e r s .

For example,

it

was reported that the contingent would consist of U.N.
forces comprised primarily of "hundreds of experts with
expertise in police work and military affairs . . . most of
them drawn from French-speaking countries."14
once the exact number of troops were known,
composition of the force became ambiguous,
matter for speculation.
New York Times stated:

For instance,

However,

the exact
and even a

on 22 July 1993, the

"The United States has offered to
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send about 350 troops and military engineers to Haiti as
part of an international force to help retrain Haiti's army
and work on military constructions projects.
However,

. . .",s

in the same story, the U.S. was said to be sending

”50 to 60 military trainers" to help professionalize the
army.

It was also reported that the U.S. was "also

prepared to send a separate contingent of about 3 00 Army
engineers as part of a larger team to work on a number of
military construction projects.

..."

On 23 July 1993,

the New York Times reported that the United States had
"offered about 350 United States military personal,
including engineers,
forces of Haiti.

to assist in 'modernizing the armed

. . ,'"16

The Washington P o s t , however,

more accurately described the American contingent:

"Army

engineers or Navy Seabees— perhaps as many as 3 00.

. .

Further,

it was "understood that the U.S. military team

'won't be combat troops or peace keepers.
During this time, too,

. . .'",7

the New York Times ascribes

motives to President Clinton for having worked so
diligently for the restoration of democracy in Haiti:
Embarrassed by his own inaugural about-face on a
campaign promise to change the way Haitian
refugees were treated after being intercepted on
the high seas, Hr. Clinton set out to press for
the restoration of Haitian democracy and return
the country's leftist young leader [Aristide] to
power. ’*
on the question of refugees the Washington Post suggested,
as of the signing of the agreement,

that the U.S. was the
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guarantor of the Governors Island agreement and thus
“implicitly attests to the fact that life under the present
regime is unlivable.

If that deal collapses,

there would

be no question about Haitians being genuine candidates for
political asylum.
Crisis Erupts
On 11 October 1993, the U.S.S. Harlan C o u n t v . carrying
U.S. and Canadian military trainers,

was not able to dock

in Port-au-Prince due to mob activity.

The military

personnel carried within the vessel were military trainers
and engineers that both President Aristide and the de facto
regime had requested per the Governors Island agreement.
On 12 October 1993 a senior Administration official
provided a background briefing to the press on this
interruption to the Governors Island agreement.
this briefing,

During

the Administration official reiterated

President Clinton's commitment to a negotiated solution and
the use of sanctions in conjunction with the U.N. and OAS.
Also stressed was the progress made to this point:

a new

government had begun to be installed and a new Prime
Minister— Malval— had been sworn into office.

Furthermore,

President Aristide had granted top coup leaders amnesty for
political crimes.
The Nature of the Mission
The Administration official also explained the nature
of the U .S .S Harlan Countv's mission.

It was a "technical
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assistance mission" to retrain police and military
personnel,

and to rebuild Haiti's crumbled infrastructure.

The United States had planned to send approximately 600
military trainers and Seabees to start the retraining and
rebuilding process.

The entire affair rested upon the

cooperation of the Haitian authorities; as the
Administration official stressed,
mission."

this was a "cooperative

According to the Administration,

the mission was important to consider:
has never been a peacekeeping,

"This

the nature of
...

is not,

peacemaking mission.

It is

a technical assistance mission which depends upon an
environment in which that can go forward."71’ During this
briefing the press mentioned the possibility of sending in
U.S. marines to create a stable environment.

The senior

Administration official responded in a manner that should
have stopped further speculation:
That [the sending in of U.S. troops] is not
something that is constitutional within the
Haitian constitution.
It is not something that
Aristide has ever wanted to happen.
For Aristide to return on the backs of the
United States, or any other army, is to undermine
his legitimacy as President.
It is not something
we have d i s c u ssed .n
Immediately following this briefing,

Dee Dee Myers

held a press briefing about the Haitian situation.
this time,

During

she reiterated the Administration's commitment

to the Governors Island agreement.

She pointed out that 5

of the 10 steps in the agreement had already been
implemented and that the U.S. was concerned about the
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possibility of another "humanitarian crisis" due to the
present situation.
several issues.

During this briefing the press raised

The first of these revolved around the

issue of a blockade around Haiti.

Myers replied that the

U.S. was looking to reimpose sanctions only.

Myers also

restated that the President would "not send U.S.

forces in

there unless they're able to protect themselves in the
environment.
environment,
pride:

But he won't send them into an unsecured
either."”

The press asked about national

"doesn't it look as though we cut an ran [sic] when

a couple of thugs made noise on a pier in Haiti?"

Myers

replied with same theme expressed earlier by the senior
Administration official:
peacekeeping mission.

"Absolutely not.

This was not a

This is part of an ongoing process.

Our objective now is to get that process . . . back on
track."”
In a statement issued by the Press Secretary this same
day,

a continuation of the Administration's previous

utterances was given.

In this statement the mission of the

U.S. the troops was stressed:
The American military's part in this effort is
to help in the task of professionalizing the
Haitian military through non-lethal training in
basic military skills and through humanitarian
assistance, by means of civic action construction
programs.
The only U.S. military role is in the
military professionalization and humanitarian
assistance effort, a non-confrontational role.
The mission of U.S. military personnel is not to
maintain security in Haiti.
This is a technical
assistance— not a peace-making or peace-keeping-mission.24
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On this same day,

12 October 1993,

President Clinton

made a brief statement as he was leaving the White House.
The President reasserted that the troops were not peace
keepers or peace-makers.

Moreover, the President stressed

that the U.S. had been invited to play this role by
President Aristide and the de facto government.
Nevertheless,

once the U.S. tried to fulfil its commitment,

it was was not allowed to do so; thus the ship left.

The

press asserted that the Governors Island agreement might
now be "dead" or "abrogated."

The President responded:

(I] do not think it is dead.
I still think it
will come back to life.
But right now it has
been abrogated by people who have decided to
cling to power for a little bit longer apparently
once the pressure of the sanctions has been off.
I want the Haitians to know that I am dead
serious about seeing them honor the agreement
that they made.2-'
On 13 October 1993, Dee Dee Myers held another press
briefing.

At this time she refuted press claims that the

Administration was unprepared for the events on the dock:
It was our expectation and it's still our
expectation that the [Haitian] military will work
to secure the environment.
Instead they stood by
and allowed the demonstrators to demonstrate and
kept the embassy personnel from reaching the
d o c k s .26
The point was,

the Haitian military was expected to secure

the area and provide a secure environment for U.S. and
international trainers to work in; that was not the role
U.S. troops were expected to play.

The Clinton

Administration contended that whether or not they suspected
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trouble or knew about the mob, they still had to try to
honor the agreement.

Myers ended her discussion about

Haiti by noting the "direct action" that the Administration
was taking in response to the breaking of the agreement:
sanctions would be reimposed as soon as possible.
In summary, the Administration's position was that the
leaders of the de

facto government had failed to live up

their part of the

Governors Island agreement.

to

The de facto

leaders had broken their promise to maintain order and
provide a secure environment for U.S. and Canadian military
personnel.

The Administration stressed the non-

confrontational role of the military engineers and
trainers; thus the withdrawal of the ship was not a
retreat,

or a policy crisis,

the agreement was

but a

prudent decision. If

not soon honored, then the Clinton

Administration would call for the immediate reimposition of
sanctions.
Initial Press Responses
By 14 October 1993, the press was beginning to raise
the issue of President Clinton's Somalia policy in
conjunction with events in Haiti.

Demonstrators were

reported in Port-au-Prince as chanting "we will turn this
into another Somalia."

It is true that the President had

inherited the Bush Administration's policy on Somalia as
well as Haiti; however,

President Clinton refused to accept

the analogy and thus was quick to point out that Somalia
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was a very different situation:
a peace-keeping mission,

he argued that Somalia was

Haiti was not.

During a brief

exchange with reporters the President stated that he "was
not about to put 200 American Seabees into a potentially
dangerous situation for which they were neither trained nor
armed to deal with at that moment."17

For the President,

it did not matter if the mob on the dock was encouraged by
events in Somalia,

because all they had to do was look at

how the U.S. and U.N.

bolstered their forces there;

i.e.,

the sanctions would be reimposed and perhaps strengthened.
The day the U.S.S. Harlan Countv was scheduled to
reach Port-au-Prince,

the Washington Post reported upon

recent criticism surrounding President Clinton's foreign
policy.

The criticism, according to the Washington P o s t ,

was due in large part to the recent

(early October)

fire-

fight in Somalia in which 18 American soldiers were killed
and 75 were wounded.

These casualties acted as a catalyst

for Congressional criticism about U.S. military involvement
in all U.N. missions:
general,

it was asked,

Somalia,

Bosnia, and Haiti.

"to what extent should U.S.

in
troop

deployment be guided by U.N. decisions?"2*

In addition to

raising the issue of national sovereignty,

Congress was

also concerned that it was not being fully briefed about
deployment of U.S. troops in U.N. missions.
The explanation for the motivation behind the port-auPrince demonstration and defiance of the U.N. mission was
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ascribed,

by the New York T i m e s , to remarks made by

anonymous diplomats and Haitian analysts:

one, the Haitians

were emboldened by the knowledge that the U.N.
lightly armed and ordered not to intervene;

force was

and two, a

"flurry of opposition in Washington to international
peacekeeping engagements" left them feeling secure that the
U.S. would not intervene.29
reported:

As the Washington Post

"U.S. officials acknowledge that the opponents of

Aristide clearly were encouraged by reaction in this
country to the killing of Americans in Somalia."10

Again,

no sources or quotes were given to validate this assertion.
The concern with Somalia was a common theme running
through the explanations of the press.
Post stated,

"Congress,

As the Washington

already wary of U.S.

the U.N. peace-keeping mission in Somalia,
concerns" about Haiti and future U.S.

involvement in

[is] raising

involvement.11

The

New York Times reported that Congress was concerned because
the Administration was not briefing them fully about U.S.
troop involvement in Haiti.
reported,

anonymously,

Indeed,

the Administration was

as saying that the "decision to

remove the ship was also influenced by the public and
Congressional reaction to the death of American soldiers
serving

...

in Somalia."12

Although the Administration

had been extremely clear in stating that the U.S. and
Canadian forces were not peace-makers or peace-keepers,

the

concern over the safety of the U.S. troops loomed large in
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the press.

The New York Times even went so far as to quote

an anonymous senior Administration official as stating that
if it were not for the recent event in Somalia that the
demonstration would not have taken on the importance that
it did.
The removal of the ship itself caused some concern as
well.

The New York Times reported that "the lack of a

prompt response to the defiance of the Haitian military has
brought a mood of despondency to many of the diplomats
Haiti].11

The dateline read "Haiti, Oct.

Therefore,

[in

12— ."

less than 24 hours after the U.S.S. Harlan

County turned back, the New York Times implied that there
was not a speedy response from the Administration to the
demonstration.

Moreover, the removal of the ship was

characterized as an American retreat by the press.

The New

York Times reported that the "American troopship was forced
to retreat in the face of a small mob on a Port-au-Prince
dock.

..."

Even though the Administration was reported

as saying that the demonstration had not caused a threat to
the safety of U.S. personnel,

the image of the "American

troopship retreat[ing] over the horizon" was given for
readers to ponder.14

Moreover,

it was reported that

Western diplomats in Haiti "expressed outrage that the
United States had . . . capitulated in the face of
opposition by the Haitian military.

. . ."11

Too,

this

"abrupt withdrawal" would hurt efforts at restoring
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democracy and could imperil foreigners living or sojourning
in Haiti.

The Washington Post conveyed similar views.

removal of the ship was reported as "infuriating U.N.

The
and

Haitian officials," but no sources were provided.
The New York Times editorial of 13 October 1993 called
for a get tough attitude.

The Administration was

importuned to reimpose immediately the sanctions that had
been lifted in August in accordance with the Governors
Island agreement.

The editorial stated:

"It was those

sanctions— fully supported by Haiti's poor majority,
despite the pain it caused them— that finally forced the
recalcitrant military to the bargaining table.
Accordingly,

the editorial advised the Administration to

strengthen the sanctions,
blockade,

even to the point of a naval

"in other words,

complete isolation from the

international community."17

In contrast,

the Washington

Post continued its negative comments about sanctions.
Indeed,

the paper still decried the initial sanctions as a

"crippling embargo on Haiti,
poorest nation."1H

already the hemisphere's

Despite this criticism,

the Washington

Post seemed to acknowledge their effectiveness for "with
oil supplies exhausted and the economy grinding to a halt"
the de facto regime had signed the Governors Island
agreement.

On this same day, however,

the Washington Post

editorially stated that U.S. troops should not fight their

168

way into Port-au-Prince,

but foreclosed other forms of

intervention as well:
Nor are the alternatives very promising.
Economic sanctions have already destroyed many of
the legitimate businesses in Haiti, and the
burden of a renewed blockade would fall most
heavily on the poor, who strongly support
President Aristide. 9
The theme was dilemmatic.

While the Washington Post did

credit the sanctions with helping to pressure the de facto
regime into signing the accord,

it reported horrors that

made the sanctions appear a morally Pyrrhic victory for the
Administration:

the "oil embargo caused crippling gasoline

shortages and threatened to bring the economy to a halt."41'
Rarely was it mentioned that the Clinton Administration fed
over 680,000 Haitians a week and provided free basic
medical care to alleviate the impact of the embargo.

A

Washington Post "news analysis" story summed up the paper's
position well:

"the embargo, while having relatively little

effect on Haiti's military rulers, wrecked what was left of
the island's economy and launched the phenomenon of tens of
thousands of boat people trying to reach the United
States. "41
Press Descriptions
Prom the time of the 11 October 1993 dockside
demonstrations the press was not consistent in its
descriptions of the group of Haitians whose demonstrations
prevented the U.S.S Harlan Countv from to docking.

The New

York Times called them "a small gang of toughs," "angry
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mob,"

"armed demonstrators,"

civilians,"

"demonstrators,"

d o c k s i d e d e m o n s t r a t [o r s ],"
demonstrators,"
"t h u g s . "
"angry,

"a rm e d mob, 11 " a r m e d

"small

"several

but u n r u l y

The Washington
a r m e d mo b, "

" H a i t i a n s on sh o r e , "

"raucous

hundred heavily armed

crowd,"

Po st c a l l e d t h e m

"a rm ed c i v i l i a n s , "

"small

mob,"

"a n g r y m o b , "

"c ha n ti ng ,

armed

civilians,"

"gang of g u n - t o t i n g

civilians,"

"Haitians,"

" m o b of a r m e d d e m o n s t r a t o r s , "

"small

of

and

gang

Nor w a s

toughs,"

th u g s , "

the si z e and c o m p o s i t i o n of the

f or ce s c o n s i s t e n t l y re po r te d.

reported

several

four days:

force";

conflicting

and

th e W a s h i n g t o n
" 1, 300 m e m b e r

"194
Post

f or ce, "

an d

25 C a n a d i a n s , "

Americans

U.S.

an d

T h e N e w Yor k T i m e s

numbers during

" 1, 30 0 m e m b e r

"175 A m e r i c a n s and

Canadians,"

"gun-waving

"the cr o w d . "

Canadian

the

a nd

the course

"1 ,6 00

of

member

"218 A m e r i c a n

and 25 C a n a d i a n s . "

an d

However,

r e p o r t e d c o n s i s t e n t l y on t h i s point:

force"

and

"193 A m e r i c a n s a n d

25 C a n a d i a n s . "

P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n ' s Fo rmal A d d r e s s
and Its I m m e d i a t e R e s p o n s e
On

15 O c t o b e r

conference
situation
suffered

1993

and ma de his
in Haiti.

the

President

first

fo rmal

He s t r e s s e d

that

hel d a p r e s s
a d d r e s s on the
the U n i t e d

states

had

extreme provocation:
[The U.S.] w i t n e s s e d a b ru ta l a t t e m p t by H a i t i ' s
m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i e s to t h w a r t the
e x p r e s s e d d e s i r e of the H a i t i a n p e o p l e for
democracy.
[U ]nruly el e m e n t s , u n r e s t r a i n e d by
the H a i t i a n m ili ta ry, [had] v i o l e n t l y p r e v e n t e d
A m e r i c a n and U n i t e d N a t i o n s p e r s o n n e l from
c a r r y i n g out the st e ps t o w a r d that g o a l . 1.
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This address accomplished three goals.
President stated that U.S.

First, the

interests were vested in the

recent Port-au-Prince incident; two, he outlined action
taken in response to the event; and three, he reiterated
the purpose of the United States in Haiti.
explained that U.S.

The President

interests were most directly involved

due to the presence of approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens in
Haiti.

There were also the embassy personnel to consider.

The hemispheric march toward democracy must be continued.
Finally, a secure environment must be achieved in order to
prevent Haitians from risking their lives in a risky
emigration to the U.S.

The President stressed that the

actions taken by his Administration were a continuation of
actions initiated by the Bush Administration.
to be taken included reimposition of sanctions,

New actions
the

deployment of six United states navy vessels off the coast
of Haiti to enforce the sanctions,

and the placement of a

company of marines stationed on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
full alert.

The explanation of U.S.

on

interests and new

actions combined to form the Administration's purpose:

"to

ensure the safety of the Americans in Haiti and to press
for the restoration of democracy there through the
strongest possible enforcement of the sanctions."41
The press response to the President's statement
expressed both continuity and change from its previous
positions on the situation in Haiti.

The emphasis shifted
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to the internal situation within Haiti and the growing
Congressional struggle with the President.

The withdrawal

of the U.S.S. Harlan Countv received minor attention after
the President's statement.

The issue of the "blockade”

around Haiti also received minor attention,

although on 16

October 1993, the New York Times reported that aides to
President Clinton had "encouraged comparisons to the naval
blockade imposed by John F. Kennedy during the Cuban
Missile crisis in 1962.”44

No quotes nor sources were

provided to substantiate this stunning comparison.

And on

18 October 1993 a Washington Post editorial stated:
The ships and the blockade are a necessary
response to the wave of political murders that
culminated in the shooting of the democratic
government's minister of justice, Guy Malary.
But economic sanctions alone won't suffice.
They
are a highly indiscriminate instrument and will
put the heaviest burdens on the poorest and least
culpable Haitians.4'
The solution to this difficulty is provided by the
Washington Post as well:

"Haiti's soldiers must now be

invited— under the duress of these stiff sanctions— to try
again. "4ft
Although the withdrawal of the U.S.S. Harlan County
slowly faded from concern,

prior to making its

disappearance it was highlighted as a symbol of the
betrayal of international human rights.

The Washington

Post reported that the "evacuation . . . left the human
rights monitors and many Haitians who collaborated with
them feeling angry and abandoned."47

The withdrawal of the
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ship was thus reported as disappointing the human rights
monitors in Haiti, who had "decided that the dangers

[were]

suddenly too great" so they were leaving as well.4*
Internal Haitian Affairs and the Effects of the Embargo
Most notable following the President's statement was
the rise in the number of reports that stressed the
internal situation in Haiti.
with the sanctions/embargo.

These reports were linked
For example,

the Washington

P o s t . on 16 October printed a story that reported that
Duvalierists were supporting the military to keep President
Aristide out of Haiti; these actions coincided with the Ton
Ton Macoutes joining forces with the political attaches who
were promoting political violence to terrorize poor
Haitians.

Indeed, the Washington Post reported that the

situation in Haiti was now near anarchy,

and that the

"Haitian rulers" were scrambling to forestall the impending
U.N. embargo that would further rack the country.4"

The

New York Times reported the new military-backed political
organizations had "mounted a campaign of intimidation and
terror,

exemplified by the shooting of Justice Minister Guy

Malary.

. . .

This deteriorating political situation

was described by the New York Times when it paraphrased
Haiti's newly appointed Prime Minister,

Malval.

The Prime

Minister reportedly had "expressed the fear that Haiti
would soon fall into total anarchy if there was not a quick
and peaceful resolution.""1
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The shaky political situation was bolstered by reports
of the effects of the sanctions/embargo.

The New York

Times reported that the "embargo set to take effect on
Monday

[18 October 1993] will hit a nation so poor that

more than 850,000 of Haiti's 6.5 million people already
depend on foreign aid to survive.

. . ."s?

In addition,

the restorative effects of the sanctions/embargo were
questioned:

"People familiar with Haiti's economy say that

the international naval blockade that began today may cause
severe damage but that it is uncertain whether the
hardships will force the military leaders to restore
democracy.",1

No sources or quotations were provided for

this assessment.

Later,

in the same story,

it was reported

that the effects of the sanctions/embargo would be
catastrophic,

in part because in Haiti's poorest regions

had women and children "barely holding on to life."
The Washington Post was especially concerned with the
effects of the sanctions/embargo.

It was reported that the

"military rulers said they would rather fight to the death
than hand power back to exiled president Jean-Bertrand
Aristide."M
statement,

No quotes or sources were provided for this
however.

Additionally,

it was asserted that

during the original sanction period "many of the wealthy
were able to afford contraband goods, while the poor found
it difficult to afford even basic foods or cooking fuel.
Many businesses were forced into bankruptcy, pushing up

174

unemployment, which had been above 50 percent."55

On 21

October 1993, the Washington Post reported upon "growing
depression and dashed dreams," and the growing resentment
about "sanctions that are going to make an already
difficult economic situation impossible for many
[Haitians]."56

. . .

This particular article stated, too,

that

many Haitians would suffer from growing food prices and
lack of money.

Indeed,

it was reported that workers "said

almost no one was building boats now, because they had no
money to pay for the passage,

and because there was so

little hope of getting through the multinational naval
b l o c k a d e .",7
The President's Restatement and the Press Response
On 18 October 1993 during a radio interview President
Clinton reiterated his stated course of action toward
Haiti.

During this time, too, the President made his first

formal remarks about the new defense appropriations bill
that would change the way that the military operated when
working with NATO and other military allies.

Specifically,

this was a reaction to the concern voiced by members of
Congress,

most notably Senate minority leader, Bob Dole,

that the President not send in U.S. troops into Bosnia or
Haiti without Congressional approval.

The President

stated:
[That there] should be no restrictions that would
undermine the ability of the President to protect
the Americans on Haiti, that would aggravate the
likelihood of another mass exodus of Haitians, or
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that would send a green light to the people . . .
[who] broke their word on the Governors Island
Agreement.58
The President was again asked about the possible use
of American troops to restore Aristide to power.

He

replied that the Navy ships were to be used to reimpose the
sanctions only, and that the sanctions would be used
because they were what produced the original agreement.
However,

the President left open the option of using troops

in the future if the situation warranted it.
would not "rule in or rule out options."

In short, he

The President was

concerned, however, about the potential for a bill that
would require him or future Presidents to obtain the
permission of Congress prior to using troops in either
Haiti or Bosnia.
and . . .

The President replied:

"I want to resist

I urge the Senate not to vote for things which

unduly infringe on the President's power,

and certainly not

things that are of questionable constitutionality."5''

In

terms of the reports of rising criticism about his foreign
policy decisions the President stressed that his
Administration had focused upon the future and was not
"trying to spend a lot of time establishing partisan blame
for the past."60

For the President,

the "past is past."

On 18 October 1993 the Administration issued a
statement to the press that basically reiterated the points
made earlier by the President and his Administration
officials.

On this same date,

Dee Dee Myers held a press
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briefing during which she, too, reiterated the
Administration's position.

The President's personal

statement given on 15 October was now the touch stone from
which Administration officials conducted affairs.

Thus,

Myers relayed that the President was still concerned,
restated American interests and recent American actions,
she also restated that the present course was one of
reimposition of sanctions,

but that the Administration had

not ruled in or out any other measures,

including the use

of U.S. troops.
The concern over the possible attempt to restrict
Presidential prerogatives was again raised by the press
during a 19 October 1993 press conference.

Dee Dee Myers

once again stated that any restriction upon the President's
power would send the signal that the President could not
enforce the sanctions imposed upon Haiti.

The obvious

concern was with the arbitrary sending of troops into
battle situations without clear reasons being given to
Congress for their deployment.

Also, with the increasing

need for police actions since the demise of the Cold War,
Congress was worried about committing U.S. troops to combat
roles without proper Congressional consultation.

Myers

addressed these issues:
I think the President can proactively decide he
wants to ask Congress's authorization before he
sends troops, as President Bush did before Desert
Storm.
That is a far cry from restricting the
President's ability to make that decision.
What
the President objects to is an altering of the

relationship between the Executive and
Legislative branches and an impingement on his
constitutional ability to make foreign policy.
[We are] looking for a way to establish a
working relationship between Congress and the
President in this post-Cold War world that
recognizes Congress's concerns but protects the
President's prerogative to act.ftl
Perhaps to assuage the growing concern in the press
about the possible involvement of U.S. troo p s , or because
of the growing concern in Congress that could lead to a
showdown over the President's authority to commit U.S.
troops, the President submitted a Letter to Congressional
Leaders on 20 October 1993.

In this letter he detailed the

recent actions that his Administration had taken in regard
to Haiti and he ended with a promissory note:
close cooperation between the President and the
Congress is imperative for effective U.S. foreign
policy and especially when the United States
commits our Armed Forces abroad.
I remain
committed to consulting closely with Congress on
our foreign policy, and I will continue to keep
Congress fully informed about significant
deployments of our Nation's Armed Forces.ft2
Haiti.

Somalia,

and Bosnia

One of the major shifts in the framing of the press
reports involved the linking of the events in Haiti with
those occurring in Somalia and Bosnia.

Although the

Washington Post began writing about this prior to the
President's statement,

both papers increased their coverage

of this aspect after the address.

The New York Times

focused upon Somalia and Bosnia as they relate to the
struggle between Congress and the President over
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Constitutional authority to use U.S. troops.

The

Washington Post did this as well, but took the argument one
step further by relating it to U.S.
post-Cold war world.

foreign policy in a

Either way, the issue of the

President's Haitian policy was subsumed within a larger
n a r r ative.
For example, the Hew York Times on 18 October reported
upon an initiative led by Senator Bob Dole to restrict the
use of U.S.

forces in Haiti.

The New York Times wrote that

this move by Senator Dole "underscores the political price
that the Clinton Administration is beginning to pay for
policy stumbles in Somalia and Haiti.

They have touched

off a flood of efforts by a previously passive Congress to
assert itself on foreign policy."61

The New York Times

briefly touched upon the larger world concern when it
reported a quote by an unnamed Senior Administration
official:

"'What is at issue

President's powers,

...

is not only the

but a more fundamental question of how

we will remain engaged in the world.

The initial

Congressional reaction on Somalia would have put us in a
position of hastily retreating from the world.'"64

Reports

of the next several days focused on a power struggle
between Congress and the President.

President Clinton was

reported as saying that he would strongly oppose any
"efforts by members of Congress to restrict his authority
to commit troops.

. . .,|6'

Further, doing so would send a
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"green light" to the Haitian leaders to defy the U.N./OAS
sponsored Governors Island agreement.
Again,
interests.

some linkage is made with larger than U.S.
The New York Times stated that Somalia and

Haiti were "nothing like the Communist threat the country
grew used to reacting to."66

The new measuring stick

proposed by the New York T i m e s : "The easiest way to connect
the dots and draw a coherent foreign policy is to say that
none of these problems is important enough to risk American
lives."67

However,

these few, and vague,

references to a

larger picture than Congressional/Presidential battling
over foreign policy is neither exploited nor pursued.
Indeed,

the New York Times virtually ignored this aspect

and instead embraced a partisan political interpretation of
events.

The paper stated editorially that many of the

Clinton Administration's foreign policy difficulties were
"inherited by the new Administration" and that the "socalled experts"

(the Republican Congressional leaders)

"left him a full plate of problems.

The least they can do

now is avoid gratuitous partisan sniping while he wrestles
with their legacy."611

After only a few days the furor over

committing U.S. troops died when the Senate forwarded to
the White House a non-binding resolution that asked the
President to ask Congress to authorize any troops that the
President wished to have deployed to Haiti.
resolution did not, however,

This

impinge upon the President's
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"broad foreign policy prerogatives as Commander in Chief to
send in American troops if he deems that it justified

[sic]

by national security interests or that the safety of
Americans living in Haiti is at stake.,,w
The Washington Post reported this schism between
Congress and the President in a more cosmic manner.

The

focus was upon a post-Cold War world and the role U.S.
foreign policy within this brave new world.
October 1993,

As early as 14

the Washington Post wrote that the Governors

Island agreement's collapse "dealt a new blow to President
Clinton's attempts to demonstrate that he has "a coherent
foreign policy capable of leading the world community
toward a post-Cold War era of democracy and stability."7"
Another article on the same day suggested that in the postCold War world the U.S. cannot just send the troops in any
more.71

However,

it was maintained that Haiti was not the

same situation as Somalia; there were U.S.
well defined policy parameters:

interests and

the prevention of a new

flood of boat people to "Florida" and to prevent a
"humiliating defeat for U.S. commitments."72
On 16 October 1993, the day after the President's
statement on Haiti, the Washington Post ran a story
entitled,

"Law Makers Seek New Methods to Handle Post-Cold

War Crises."7’

In this article it was advanced that

Congress was battling with the President to "change the
tattered Vietnam-era War Powers Resolution in favor of new
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procedures to deal with post-Cold War foreign policy
crises."74

The key to what was occurring was the growing

controversy "over possible or likely military operations in
Haiti, Bosnia and other trouble spots.

. . .

[Thus] many

in Congress are concerned that there are not workable
procedures for prompt and orderly exercise of its warauthorizing p o w e r s .1,15

The original War Powers Resolution

required that the President consult with Congress before
introducing troops into hostile situations and to set a
deadline for withdrawal if Congress authorized the
deployment.

But with the growing need for multi-national

deployment of forces for peace-keeping or peace-making
missions,

the Congressional prerogatives of declaring war

have often been overlooked.
These arguments appear repeatedly in the Washington
P o s t 's coverage of this issue.

In a later story it was

reported that the trouble in areas such as Bosnia,

Somalia,

and Haiti were actually signs of trouble in the
Administration's "foreign policy ability and the strength
of [Clinton's]

national security t eam.,,7ft

This article

faithfully reported the Administration's contentions that
it had been successful in the larger areas of concern—
Russia,

nuclear arms proliferation,

Bosnia,

Somalia,

China— but that in

and Haiti, where discernable U.S.

interests were not at stake, there were problems.

In

short, the Washington Post asked, what is America's post-

182

Cold War role in the world?

The paper even suggested that

there existed a "nostalgia shared by policy makers for the
anti-Soviet framework within which much of the West
operated for four decades."77

The Washington Post

suggested at one point that the Clinton Administration's
foreign policy goal was "the 'enlargement'

of democracy

around the world":7*
Despite the sound of things and a vocabulary of
confrontation that unfailingly recalls the
intensity of the country's Vietnam agony, we see
no great crisis unfolding in Washington.
There
is simply a noisy tactical disagreement over what
is the best mix of economic, political and
military levers to deal with the rash of postCold War conflicts, mostly inside particular
countries, which touch American interests but do
not touch what people usually mean by vital
national interests.7’
In short, the problem was a concern with the direction,
coherence,

and execution of the Administration's foreign

policy.Hfl This concern with the events in Haiti as
metonymy for the post-Cold War world was continued in the
Washington Post until late October.

After the Senate

failed to pass a resolution limiting the President's powers
to wage war,

the Washington Post stated:

Democratic [Senate] leaders . . . were preparing
a proposal aimed at coming up with procedures for
engaging Congress early and often in major
foreign policy decisions to avoid the kind of
sudden uproars that arose over Somalia and Haiti.
They are looking at overhauling the Vietnam-era
1973 War Powers Resolution to accommodate postCold War peace-keeping operations.*1
By 26 October 1993 the Washington Post stated that the
concern in Congress was President Clinton's failure to
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"develop a coherent foreign policy,

especially for

multinational peace-keeping missions."81
Aristide's Psychological Profile
Around 2 2 October 1993 the press began to make the
contents of a CIA report to Congressional leaders public.
In this report President Aristide was said to have mental
instabilities.

The Administration was quick to assert that

the reports may be substantiated or not, but that it did
not really matter.

Dee Dee Myers explained the U.S.

position unequivocally:
we have had a lot of dealings with President
Aristide.
He's always appeared in our dealings
with him responsible [sic]; he's lived up to the
terms of his commitment; he was elected by the
people of Haiti.
Our interest is in restoring a
democratically-elected government to that
country.
It is not for us to tell the people of
Haiti who to elect.83
This issue, however,

received thorough coverage from

22 October 1993 through 29 October 1993, particularly from
the Washington P o s t .

Initial reports from the Washington

Post highlighted the Administration's support of President
Aristide:

"despite allegations the ousted Haitian leader is

mentally unstable

[the Administration said] Aristide's

conduct demonstrated he is fit to govern."M

Further,

the

Administration was reported as having a stake in the
believability of the CIA reports for it had "expended great
effort trying to restore Aristide to power since the
democratically elected leader was ousted.
However,

. . .',8,i

the issue soon began to be viewed as a partisan
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concern with the Republicans on one side and the Democratic
administration on the other.

The Washington Post reported

Vice-President Albert Gore as saying that the "charges are
'uncorroborated'
have dealt with
been reliable,

and are denied by Aristide.
[Aristide]

. . .

for nine months now.

he has been very thoughtful,

'We

He has

he has been

persistent in his efforts in behalf on the Haitian p e o p l e . '
The charges originated with Aristide's opponents.

. . ."**

Later in the same article the Washington Post reported that
"two prominent Republicans appearing earlier on the same
program as Gore

[had made his statements on] questioned

Aristide's fitness."*7

By 27 October 1993 the Washington

Post had solidified its interpretation of the accusations:
"you can dismiss the CIA's foolish psychologizing

[sic].

.

."
The New York Times reached the same conclusion as the
Washington P o s t : "It's heartening that Mr. Clinton is
standing behind Mr. Aristide and has not taken seriously
that attempt at character assassination by psychobable
[sic]

initiated by some Republican senators during the past

w e e k ."H'1 The New York Times ran fewer,

but similar items

about Aristide's CIA psychological profile.

The Clinton

Administration was described as at war with itself over its
Haitian policy, with President Aristide at center stage.
Congress was described as working with the CIA against the
State Department and the National Security Council.

The
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CIA reports were described as having "spread alarm over
Administration policy on Capital Hill."90

The aspect of

"them vs. us" was further conveyed:
Hr Clinton said the views of Administration
officials who have worked with Father Aristide to
help restore him to power carried more weight
than allegations that officials of the agency
[CIA] made to members of Congress this week. 1
Imitating the Administration's position that
Aristide's condition is irrelevant because the Haitian
people elected him, the New York Times stated:

In Haiti,

"the debate in the United States about the mental health of
their President seems cruelly sterile.

After two years of

hardship and violence under military rule,

no hope rings

more fervently than for the return of the Rev. JeanBertrand Aristide."92

These reports concerning Aristide's

condition continued sporadically through early November.
On l November 1993 the New York Times reported that
supporters "of Mr. Aristide said that the
[to Haitian military informants]

[CIA] payments

proved that the C.I.A.'s

primary sources of information in Haiti were Mr. Aristide's
political enemies. "9J

Both papers frequently reported the

Administration's defense that President Aristide was
elected by the people of Haiti,
essence,

insignificant.

so the CIA reports were in

By 3 November 1993 the question

was not so much about President Aristide's mental health,
as it was about the CIA's link with Haitian officials:
House and Senate intelligence committees have
begun probing the CIA's past ties to key Haitian
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political figures, including covert payments to
Haitian officials for information on local
politics. . . .
The probes arise from allegations by
Aristide's congressional supporters that the
recent unflattering CIA profile of him may have
been tainted by the CIA's past associations with
his opponents.
The Internal Situation and the Effects of Sanctions:
The Convergence of Press Framing
Following the President's 15 October 1993 statement,
the press claimed again that sanctions were hurting poor
Haitians,

and not the de facto government's leaders.

The

President admitted that these types of sanctions always
hurt the people first,

but it was what got the Governors

Island Agreement in the first place; he also asserted that
once the "blockade finally hit the regime and the elites
. . they suffered,

too."

.

He also reminded the press that

the embargo was asked for by the Government of Haiti.

Yet

the press had developed its own frame through which it
advanced its view of the embargo/sanctions.

On 22 October

1993 the Hew York Times reported that Haitians were
building boats again due to "increasing economic hardship
and political repression.’*”

It was also reported that

what "is also driving ordinary Haitians to flee is a sense
that the United Nations embargo against Haiti will hurt
them the most.

In the past,

Haitians used to say they were

fleeing for fear of their lives; now many readily admit
they will be leaving because of economic hardship.
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On 2 7 October 1993 the New York Times reported on
possible Administration backing of a French proposal to
enlarge the sanctions to include all commercial goods.
These sanctions were to be directed, according to the New
York T i m e s , at "the poor Caribbean nation." Further,

the

"French proposal calls for a blockade against Haiti that
would prevent virtually all commerce from flowing into and
out of what is already the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere."97

The New York Times called these measures

"draconian economic measures

[that] would further

impoverish an already desperately poor country."9*
On this same issue the Washington Post reported that
Prime Minister Malval had said that Aristide's government
was "'not responsible for the sanctions,'

...

in an

attempt to shift responsibility for the hardship to the
military.

'We have respected all our commitments under the

agreement,

and even gone beyond them.'"99

On this same day

the U.S. Navy was reported as having interdicted a shipment
of soy milk and baby cribs.

The sanctions are no longer

credited with having brought the military to the bargaining
table.

Instead,

the Washington Post describes

sanctions/embargoes as "extremely sensitive affairs,

since

they disproportionately hurt the poor, who must get to work
in order to eat."liw
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power.

. . ."l(*

The New York Times reported that the

Clinton Administration's "biggest problem now is that
Haiti's military leaders . . . apparently think that they
can simply wait the Clinton Administration out until it
losses interest in Haiti, or until it agrees to renegotiate
a new power-sharing accord. "Itn
The Washington Post described Prime Minister Malval's
position in Haiti as "waging war against a de facto regime
in a country he is supposed to be governing."11*

The

internal situation with regard to the settlement process
was also highlighted through stories that stressed the
legislative struggle between Aristide's government and the
"military rulers."

The Washington Post concluded that a

"political impasse"HW existed.

By 26 October 1993, the

Washington Post had developed a standardized version of the
events leading up to the internal struggle:
Aristide, Haiti's first democratically elected
president, was overthrown in a bloody military
coup on Sept. 30 1991.
Cedras and other military
officials, under growing international pressure
and a crippling U.N. oil and arms embargo, agreed
in July to Aristide's return.
Under an agreement signed July 3 by Aristide
and Cedras on Governors Island, N.Y., Cedras was
to resign by Oct. 15, and Aristide was to return
to Haiti on Oct. 30. . . .
However, Cedras and others refused to resign
as promised.
When the military balked at key
points in the accord, the United Nations
reimposed an oil embargo that has virtually
paralyzed commercial activity and brought the
already depressed economy to its knees.
A
multinational naval force is enforcing the
embargo.110
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U.S. Military Involvement
Reports concerning the possible use of United States
troops had undergone an interesting transformation.

On 2 2

October 1993 the Washington Post reported Senator Jesse
Helms as "urging the Clinton administration to abandon its
plan to send U.S. troops

[into Haiti]"; thus implying that

there were such plans."1

On 2 7 October 199 3 the

Washington Post suggested that the Clinton Administration
had only two options:

"choose between destroying the

[Haitian] economy to reimpose democracy or abandoning Haiti
to its military rulers."111

In the Hew York Times it was

reported that "American officials have made it clear to
Father

Aristide that there is no possibility of sending

United

States troops to Haiti to guarantee his safety in

the event he should return home before a new deal

is

reached. "m
The question of the possibility of using U.S. troops
to restore President Aristide to power is rarely raised
after the end of October.
mentioned,

Furthermore,

it is dismissed as an option.

when force is
This is true

despite the fact that President Clinton clearly stated that
he had not ruled out any option.

For example,

on 6

November 1993 the New York Times mused on the possible
options that the United Nations and the Clinton
Administration possessed to resolve the situation:
[Options] available to the United Nations are
also unattractive.
It can strengthen the oil

and
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arms embargo imposed on Haiti last month in an
effort to force the military leaders to leave
power, or it can explore military actions.
But the embargo has caused more hardship for
the Haitian people than for its intended victims,
the military leaders and their supporters.
And
the United States and other key United Nations
members have shown no inclination to use military
force."4
On 11 November 1993 the Washington Post reported similar
Administrative inclinations:
The administration, smarting from public and
congressional criticism of U.S. military
casualties in Somalia, has said several times it
has no intention of exposing U.S. soldiers to
danger in Haiti.
Last month, when armed Haitian
thugs supporting the military threatened to
attack U.S. military advisors en route to Haiti,
Clinton ordered the advisor's ship to turn
a r o u n d .115
On 25 October 1993 the President responded to a
reporter's question about Bob Dole believing it not worth
one American life to restore Aristide to Haiti.

The

President's response is instructive:
[Our] policy is to attempt to restore democracy
in Haiti, that we are doing it in the way that we
think is best and that is supported by Aristide
and Prime Minister Malval.
We have ships there,
and you know what we're doing.
And they've never
asked us to run the country for them.116
Four days later on 29 October 1993,
statement on the situation in Haiti.

the President issued a
This statement

reiterated the Administration's earlier utterances about
U.S.

interests,

actions,

and purposes in Haiti.

It also

stated that President Clinton was firmly committed to
restoration of democracy in Haiti.

The New York Times at
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this time reported that the Administration no longer
possessed realistic options:
Administration officials acknowledge that they
have no good options.
They are not prepared to
use American troops to forcibly reinstall Father
Aristide.
They also have no interest in simply
turning their backs on the Governors Island
accord.
This leaves them with little choice but
to step up their rhetorical attacks on the
Haitian military, tighten economic sanctions and
wait for the military leaders to cave in.117
By 7 November 1993 the Administration's position
regarding the situation in Haiti had crystallized.

When

asked if the embargo on goods entering Haiti should be
strengthened the President agreed.

He even suggested that

it could proceed in one of two ways:
Further,

complete or surgical.

he was again quick to point out that nothing had

been ruled in or out.

Even invasion was not ruled out.

A

reporter reminded President Clinton that President Bush had
invaded Panama to remove Noriega,
to restore Aristide?

so why not invade Haiti

The President replied that he did not

want to rule anything in or out,

but that both Aristide and

Malval did not want to have U.S.

troops invade Haiti.

Sanctions:

The Internal Situation in Detail

The end of October saw a continuation of the same
narrative elements that had been used since the President's
15 October 1993 statement.

Almost all of the stories

contained in the two papers now focused upon the internal
situation in Haiti and the effects upon Haiti caused by the
embargo/sanctions; in the vast majority of news items the
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stories would combine the two elements.

For example,

on 30

October 1993 the New York T i m e s , focusing upon a story
about U.N. proposed talks,

stated that "tensions are rising

in Haiti, but the military hasn't budged."11*
story stated:

This same

"The effects of the fuel squeeze can be felt

throughout the country,

as electricity has begun to be

tightly rationed and traffic has fallen off sharply.

In

addition . . . dead bodies have begun to turn up with
frequency each night in the streets of the capital."1111'
This mixing of focus was now common practice and the effect
was to portray the Haitian military leaders as villains.
Commonly,

when negotiations were discussed,

the conditions

in Haiti brought on by the sanctions/embargo were related
as well.
of genres.

The Washington Post rarely used this same mixing
For example, on 6 November 1993,

the paper drew

a dismal conclusion:
In a clear show of defiance, the Haitian military
today boycotted high-level talks designed to
revive the flagging international effort to get
exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide back into
o f f i c e .12(1
The most that is mentioned about the effects of the
sanctions/embargo is this 6 November 1993 example:
The current embargo, enforced by U.S and other
foreign warships, has ended all sales of gasoline
and diesel fuel from gas stations here [Port-auPrince, Haiti]. The availability of black-market
fuel is limited and traffic has slumped to onefifth of its normal l evel.121
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The New York T i m e s , however, was mixing genres well into
November,

and in many instances the reporting of facts and

observations crossed the line into interpretation:
In the three weeks that Haiti has been cut off
from
foreign oil deliveries, this country's
economy has come to a near halt.
In provincial towns and rural areas, the
situation is far worse.
According to radio
reports here, Port de Paix, a small city in
Haiti's grindingly poor northwest, has gone
without electricity for three weeks.
In the small town of Gantheir . . . suffering
is evident everywhere.
At the town's small medical clinic, the only
health care center within miles, a white
ambulance sits idle for lack of gasoline.
The
clinic's pharmacy is almost bare.
[Broadening] the current embargo, which
President Clinton says he is loath to do, would
threaten even more Haitians with severe
malnutrition and disease.
On the other hand, easing up on sanctions
which now cover oil and arms, would send a signal
to Haiti's de facto military rulers that after
two years of diplomacy on Father Aristide's
behalf, the United Nations and Washington are
backing away from the goal of restoring him to
p o w e r .122
On 9 November 1993 the questions of the effects of the
sanctions upon the poor of Haiti were once again raised by
the press.

The Administration responded with its now

standard response:
The situation in Haiti is . . . quite serious.
The economy there is stalled.
But the fault for
the situation lies with the people there who have
thwarted the will of the majority, who have
refused to allow the restoration of democracy,
who continue to keep that society locked up and
the economy there disintegrating.121
Furthermore,

the Administration acknowledged the hardship

that sanctions placed upon the people of Haiti.

It was
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clearly stated that "sanctions Impose a hardship."

But the

Administration also asserted that it provided "massive
humanitarian assistance" in the form of feeding over
680,000 people a day, and that it provided medical
services.

Even with this knowledge,

the press still asked,

does the end justify the means?1”
This issue concerning the harm that the sanctions were
causing,

especially to the children in Haiti was

continually raised by the press.
conference,

During one news

the President stated that "the people of Haiti

need to know that the reason this embargo occurred is
because of the police chief, Mr. Francois; and because of
General Cedras; and because they welshed on the Governors
Island agreement."1”
To answer the attack upon his foreign policy team
President Clinton asserted the his Administration had been
"dealing with the central,

large,

strategic issues of this

time, dealing with the former Soviet Union, working on
bringing down the nuclear threat, working on stemming
nuclear proliferation, working on peace in the Middle East,
working on putting economics at the forefront of . . .
foreign policy."12*1 On 4 November 1993, Secretary of
State, Warren Christopher announced the Clinton
Administration's new six priorities in its foreign policy.
Notably absent were Bosnia, Somalia,

and Haiti.

Instead,

the Administration choose to focus upon the conditions of
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the post-Cold War world in general:
reform in Russia,

economic security,

new framework for NATO, trade relations

with the Far East, Middle Eastern affairs,

and nuclear

nonproli ferat ion.
The issue of foreign policy was continually stressed
by both papers,

although it was relegated to a position of

secondary importance after the effects of the
embargo/sanctions and Haitian internal affairs.

The news

items continued the trend toward analyzing the Clinton
Administration's foreign policy approach,

but also began to

examine individual players within the Administration's
foreign policy team.

For example,

on 31 October 1993 the

New York Times printed a story on W. Anthony Lake,
Clinton's national security advisor.

In this story Lake

was described as having attempted to explain Clinton's
foreign policy:
The Clinton administration . . . is the first
since the Truman administration era that in
foreign policy 'has not had a single defining
issue against which it could define itself.'
All
every other Administration had to do, and it was
not always easy, he said, "was to answer the
central question: what form will containment of
the Soviet Union and Communism take?'"127
The same story ends with the New York Times speculating on
the Clinton Administration's role in the world:
The Clintonites do not want to rely on a
merciless balance-of-power view of the world
because it is too cynical for Mr. Clinton, but
they also do not want a foreign policy of rampant
moralism because they know it can lead to
crusades they cannot win.
So often in places
like Bosnia or Somalia or Haiti they seem to be
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searching for some third wa y — between sending
American troops and doing nothing at all.
But
often there is not third w a y . 15*
A New York Times editorial remarked that "everyone is
groping for a new framework" because no one had "yet
devised a set of guiding principles to guide American
conduct in a radically transformed world.

. . .

Since

early October 1993 the Washington Post had made the link
with the post-Cold War foreign policy and maintained this
connection; however,

increasingly their stories focused

upon key players in the Administration's foreign policy
team:

5 November 1993, Secretary of State Warren

Christopher was reported describing the Administration's
new foreign policy goals; 9 November 1993, Clifton R.
Wharton was profiled after he resigned his post as Deputy
Secretary of State;

10 November 1993, another story which

highlighted Wharton's reason for resigning his post;

10

November 1993, an editorial focused upon Wharton's
resignation;

14 November 1993, a story highlighted

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's style as "hesitant by
design."

By the middle of November the situation in Haiti

was not a major foreign policy concern,

but part of a

larger foreign policy picture painted by the
Administration:
Taking Haiti off the policy front burner is
consistent with the administration's recent
efforts to back off from the troublesome highvisibility issues that have brought so much grief
and to emphasize instead the long-term objectives
on which senior officials believe their record is
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stronger, such as strengthening democracy in
R u s s i a .110
Official fault for the failure of the Governors Island
agreement was given in a 13 November 1993 Letter to
Congressional Leaders on Haiti.

In this letter, President

Clinton presented a brief history of U.S.

involvement with

Haiti since the 1991 coup and then detailed U.S.
involvement since the U.S.S. Harlan Countv was turned back
on 11 October 1993.
facto regime:

Fault was laid at the feet of the de

"the Haitian military and police failed to

maintain order necessary for the deployment of U.S.
other forces participating.

and

. . ."ni

As the crisis entered it seventh week in early
December,

the Administration was once again echoing its

statements of support for Aristide's return.

In press

conferences Administration officials were relating that the
President was optimistic about possible outcomes to the
situation and was dedicated to the continuation of work to
restore Aristide.

Further,

it was stated that those most

hurt by the sanctions— Haitian poor— were receiving the
most help.

By the middle of December 1993 the crisis

situation with Haiti was almost a non-issue,

and prompted

an almost jocular tone from the President:
So we're going to take another run at it and see
if we can do something on it.
And it's going to
require some flexibility on all sides.
It just
is.
And we'll just have to see if we can get
there.
We're going to try, hard.1’2
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Summary
The period after the signing of the Governors island
agreement was a successful one for the Clinton
Administration.

The press lauded the agreement,

and the

international community awaited its implementation.

On 11

October 1993, however, the de facto government failed to
provide a safe environment for the military trainers and
engineers to disembark,

ultimately forcing the U . 5.S .

Harlan County to withdraw.

The mob activity that forced

the ship back was a serious blow to the integrity and
credibility of the Clinton Administration.
policy crisis had erupted,

A foreign

and the Administration acted

quickly to manage the situation.
The initial utterances of the Administration were of
an explanatory nature.

The cooperative nature of the U.S.

led, U.N./OAS mission was stressed.

It was stated clearly

and repeatedly by Administration officials that the Haitian
authorities did not do what they had said they would do;
i.e.,

provide a secure environment for the deployment of

U.S. and Canadian military engineers and trainers.

At this

early stage the Administration stressed the "nonconfrontational" role of the mission; these troops were not
on a peacekeeping or peacemaking mission.

Thus it was

within the mission's parameters to leave due to the lack of
a secure environment.

At this time as well the

Administration reiterated its commitment to the Governors
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Island agreement;

it stated that it expected the de facto

government to honor the agreement.

Furthermore,

the

Administration would seek to reimpose sanctions upon the de
facto government as soon as possible.
On 15 October 1993 President Clinton read a short
statement concerning the situation in Haiti.

This

statement and subsequent press question and answer session
served as his first and only public and formal reply to the
incident.

Through this address the President sought to

accomplish three broad goals:
public the U.S.

one, convey to the American

interests in Haiti; two,

explain the new

actions the Administration had ordered as a response to the
incident; and three, explain American's purpose for being
in Haiti.

The primary U.S.

interest in Haiti was

approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens.

Their protection and

safety was paramount in the President's mind.

Too,

there

was the hemispheric march toward democracy and the
humanitarian considerations inside of Haiti to consider.
The President had taken certain actions in response to the
incident and these were explained as well.

New actions to

be taken included reimposition of sanctions,

the deployment

of six United States Naval vessels off the coast of Haiti
to enforce the sanctions,

and the placement of a company of

marines stationed on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
The explanation of U.S.

on full alert.

interests and new actions combined

to form the Administration's purpose:

"to ensure the safety
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of the Americans in Haiti and to press for the restoration
of democracy there through the strongest possible
enforcement of the sanctions.1,133
Shortly after this statement, the Clinton
Administration found itself embroiled in a battle with
Congress over management of foreign policy.

At stake was

the manner in which the President could command U.S.
troops.

President Clinton stressed that his Administration

was looking for ways to work more closely with Congress in
the new post-Cold War world.

The new relationship must

recognize Congress's concerns but also protect the
President's prerogative to act.

The President further

stressed that better cooperation between the executive
branch and Congress was critical for effective U.S.
policy.

foreign

The President reiterated his commitment to

consulting with Congress on foreign policy, and pledged to
continue to keep Congress fully informed about significant
deployments of the Nation's Armed Forces.

The President

had stressed as well that any restrictions placed upon him
could send the wrong signal to the de facto government in
Haiti,

and could also hinder his effectiveness in enforcing

sanctions and protecting American lives.
The question of sanctions was also continually
stressed throughout the aftermath of the incident.

The

Clinton Administration emphasized that it only planned to
use sanctions to begin with; however, publicly it never
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ruled out the use of U.S. troops.

As the President stated,

he was not going to rule anything in or out.

And on this

point he and his officials were consistent throughout the
incident.
Another issue that received considerable attention
from the press and Congress during this period concerned
President Aristide's CIA generated psychological profile.
Again,

the Clinton Administration spoke with a unified

voice:

President Aristide's competence is not at issue; he

was the legally elected President of Haiti.

It was not for

the United states to judge who the Haitian people could or
could not have as their President.
On the questions of sanctions the Administration was
consistent as well.

The President and his officials

continually stressed that the sanctions achieved the
initial Governors Island agreement; thus,

they were an

effective tool to employ to force the de facto government
to the bargaining table.

The Administration frankly

admitted that they did hurt the poor,
they force the leaders to talk.

but that eventually

Stressed during these

types of comments were the Administration's humanitarian
assistance to the Haitian poor:

food and medical supplies

to over 680,000 Haitian a day.
The response of the press may be broadly divided into
two framing devices:
affairs;

one, sanctions and internal Haitian

and two, the battle between Congress and the
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President over foreign affairs.

With regard to sanctions

the press generally framed its coverage in such a manner as
to suggest that they hurt only the Haitian poor; were an
ineffective weapon against the county's rich leaders; and
that,

in conjunction with the political impasse,

effects of sanctions,

and the

had thrown the country into near

anarchy.
After the initial success of the Governors Island
agreement,

the press maintained that the abysmal Haitian

economy was a direct result of the sanctions imposed in
1991,

but especially as a result of the additional

sanctions imposed by President Clinton in June 1993.

Once

the crisis erupted in Haiti, both the New York Times and
the Washington Post called for the return of sanctions.
Even though calling for the reimposition of sanctions,

the

Washington Post stressed that they would only hurt the poor
while having negligible effects upon the country's leaders.
The answer was to invite the leaders to negotiate once
again.

After the President's 15 October 1993 address,

press still supported the reimposition,

the

but stressed even

more strongly the effects such sanctions have upon the
poor.

The internal situation was described as near

anarchy,

with the sanctions having a crippling effect.

Both papers reported that the sanctions might not return
the de facto government to the bargaining table.

Both

papers reported that the wealthy could afford to wait out

2 04

the sanctions and that the poor were the real sufferers.
As the weeks passed,

both papers increased coverage on the

effects of the sanctions.

The Haitian people were reported

as beginning to resent the sanctions,
situation was depicted as grim.
sides were talking,

and the internal

The press stated that both

but that the army leaders were stalling

as the economy crumbled.

The situation was,

in short,

economic collapse and political stalemate.
The broad framing device I call Congress vs. the
President contains three general elements:
troops; two,
three,

one,

use of U.S.

the President's foreign policy in general;

Aristide's CIA psychological profile.

and

Although the

press reported that President Clinton had not ruled in or
ruled out any options for responding to the incident,

they

continuously reported that the Administration did not
intend to use U.S. troops to restore order and reimpose
Aristide.

Moreover,

the Hew York Times reported misleading

numbers concerning the initial deployment of military
engineers and trainers; these misrepresentation continued,
with the paper reporting varied numbers and composition of
U.S. troops initially sailing to Port-au-Prince.

The

withdrawal of the U.S.S Harlan Countv was described as a
retreat,

and was later used to symbolize the

Administrations'

broken promise to the Haitian people.

The President's foreign policy received mixed
emphasis.

At one point the New York Times described
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President Clinton's motivation for being in Haiti as
embarrassment over his broken campaign promise to stop
direct returns.

Once the crisis erupted,

evolved differently for each paper.

foreign policy

The New York Times

described foreign policy as a partisan battle between
Congress and the President.

At issue were U.S.

involvement in foreign trouble spots:
Haiti.

Somalia,

troop
Bosnia,

and

A partisan interpretation was given to this issue.

The New York Times described the discussions as "gratuitous
partisan sniping" and suggested that the Republicans left
the President with all of the problems.

The Washington

Post also described the battle between the President and
Congress,

but although it, too, described this battle as

partisan "sniping," it also raised it to a question of U.S.
policy in a post-Cold War world.

The paper was actively

exploring America's role in the post-cold War world,

and

the running Presidential/Congressional battle was reported
in a manner that attempted to explore this role.
The battle between Congress and the President died
when the Senate passed a non-binding resolution that
requested the President to keep Congress informed about the
use of U.S.

troops in U.N. missions.

The concern with

foreign policy did not die out, however.

Instead,

there

was a shift in emphasis from the Presidential/Congressional
partisan struggle to the composition of the President's
foreign policy team.

In short, the issue of the
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A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s foreign policy evolved into personality
sketches.

This was particularly true of the New York

T i m e s , which reported on this issue at a 2:1 ratio over the
Washington Post after the compromise resolution was
forwarded to the President.
Although not of major importance in terms of space
provided,

the issue of Aristide's competence does merit

mention as a framing device due to the consistency of press
coverage.

Both papers described the question of the CIA's

psychological profile as partisan bickering and an attempt
at character assassination.

Both papers advanced the

Clinton Administration's claim that it did not matter what
the CIA said,

that the people of Haiti had elected him and

he was their best hope for the restoration of democracy.
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CONCLUSION
This study was conceived as a beginning in previously
unexamined territory.

The task of analyzing presidential

crisis rhetoric within a post-Cold War world has begun.
Specifically,

this study examined the Clinton

Administration's discursive response to the situation in
Haiti during 1993.

in addition,

this study has examined

the Administration's discourse as part of a larger
discourse presented by the national press to the American
people.

The central concern has been with presidential and

press framing of the situation in Haiti.

Accordingly,

study sought to answer three specific questions:

this

one, how

did the Clinton Administration frame the situation in
Haiti; two,
Clinton,

how did the press, responding to President

frame the situation; and three,

at what time,

if

at all, did these frames converge to present a unified
contextual whole?

In this chapter I provide an overview of

the framing analysis performed in this study;

in addition,

I answer the three specific research questions asked by
this study.

Finally,

I provide an overview of the

implications and theoretical contributions of this study.
Overview of Framing Analysis
The formal statements made by President Clinton and
his officials have been called the administrative text in
this study.
Moreover,

This text was subjected to a frame analysis.

the news items printed in the Washington Post and
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the New York Times concerning Haiti were also subjected to
a frame analysis.

These two frames were then compared.

Framing acts to make some elements of a situation or text
more salient than others.
diagnose causes,
remedies.

Frames

(1) define problems,

(3) make moral judgments,

and

(2)

(4) suggest

Pan and Kosicki suggested that news stories have

a unifying frame and that this frame determines how a given
news story will be interpreted.
corroborates this assertion,

The work by Entman

and has demonstrated that

frames reside within news narratives and encourage certain
ways of thinking about them.
concepts,

Keywords,

and symbols take on especial

metaphors,
importance as

components of a frame.
Entman called the elements that comprise a frame
"event-specific schema."

Once established,

event-specific

schema make it difficult to modify or replace a particular
frame.

As Entman stated:

"for those stories in which a

single f rame thoroughly pervades the text,
opinions

stray contrary

. . . are likely to possess such low salience as

to be of little practical use to most audience members."1
When developing new event-specific schema, however,
political elites and the President have great influence in
establishing the frames used.
then,

During a crisis situation,

the President should have enormous potential

influence over how the event is to be framed.

This study

examined a crisis situation over a period of one year:
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January 1993 to December 1993.

During this year the

Clinton Administration worked within an already established
frame— event-specific schema— and worked within a crisis
atmosphere— new event-specific schema.

Thus this study

analyzed both the President's ability to affect already
established frames, and his ability to enact frames in
order to structure action and belief in a post-Cold War
setting.
Research Questions
One: How did the Clinton Administration Frame the Situation
in Haiti?
Period One: January 1993 through June 1993
The Clinton Administration inherited a situation that
had already developed a well articulated frame.

That is to

say, the event-specific schema was already entrenched.

The

Bush Administration had framed the situation in several
important ways.

First,

it had stressed the United States

as a cooperative partner,

with the U.N./OAS as the leaders,

in restoring democracy to Haiti.

Second,

the Bush

Administration had stressed that the policy of direct
returns was a humanitarian policy aimed at preventing the
deaths of thousands of Haitian boat-people.

Finally,

the

Bush Administration had repeatedly stressed that the
Haitian refugees were primarily economic,
Just prior to taking office.
announced his policy toward Haiti.
consistent throughout 1993.

not political.

President-elect Clinton
This policy remained

The policy was constrained by
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the prior Bush Administration frames, but also announced
new changes aimed at making the policy Clinton's own.
this respect,

In

the Clinton Administration was constrained by

the initial event-specific schema.

The situation— Haiti—

was itself not new, although Clinton was a new President.
Even though candidate-Clinton had promised sweeping changes
in the Bush Administration policy,

once elected,

himself constrained by both material conditions
possibility of 100,000 or more Haitian refugees)
Bush Administration's prior frame.

he found
{the
and the

Thus President-elect

Clinton's early announcement is a combination of prior Bush
policy and Clinton's own attempt at change.
In his first formal statement as President-elect,
Clinton announced three broad goals.

First, his

Administration was committed to restoring democracy to
Haiti.

This included the return of President Aristide.

The restoration of democracy was to be accomplished through
cooperation with the U.N./OAS.

Furthermore,

it was to be

accomplished through negotiation and the early deployment
of human rights monitors to ensure some sort of political
stability within Haiti.

Second, the President was

committed to saving human lives.

In this case,

of direct returns was to be continued.

the policy

This action was

clearly announced as humanitarian in motive.
President announced his own policy changes.

Finally,

the

He was

committed to fair treatment for asylum seekers in Haiti.
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The President ordered accelerated refugee processing and
expanded facilities in Haiti.

This was especially

important for maintaining the humanitarian aspect of the
Administration's policy.2
The problem defined by the Administration was simple.
President Aristide was Haiti's first democratically elected
President.

A coup d'6tat in September of 1991 forced him

to flee the country.

Since that time the de facto regime

had exploited the country and severe economic depression
had ensued causing tens-of-thousands to seek better
conditions in the United States.

The international

community could not sit idly by, because this would send a
message to other leaders in the Western hemisphere that
such thwarting of democratic will would go unpunished.
Therefore the solution to these problems was the return of
President Aristide and the restoration of democracy.
the President this was a foreign policy issue,

For

one in which

his authority as President should not be questioned nor
debated.
Period Two: July through December
After the signing of the Governors Island agreement on
3 July 1993, the Clinton Administration commented
relatively little on the situation in Haiti.
1993, however,

On 11 October

the U.S.S. Harlan Countv was prevented from

docking in Port-au-Prince by demonstrators.

On 12 October

1993 the Administration began to respond to this crisis.
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The initial administrative text was explanatory in nature.
Administration officials explained that the leaders of the
de facto government had failed to live up to their part of
the Governors Island agreement;

in short,

they had broken

their promise to maintain order and provide a secure
environment for U.S. and Canadian military personnel.

The

Administration stressed the non-confrontational role of the
military engineers and trainers; thus the withdrawal of the
ship was not a retreat, or a policy crisis,

but a prudent

decision.
President Clinton formally responded to the situation
on 15 October 1993.

His statement obtained three goals.

First, he announced U.S.

interests:

the safety of 1,000

American citizens living in Haiti; the maintenance of the
hemispheric march toward democracy; and the continuing
humanitarian concerns.
actions:

Second,

he explained new U.S.

the reimposition of sanctions; the deployment of

six navy vessels to enforce sanctions; and the placement of
a marine company in Guantanamo Bay Naval base on full
alert.
actions:

Finally,

he explained the U.S. purpose of these

to ensure the safety of American lives,

and to

press for the restoration of President Aristide and
democracy.
Following the Port-au-Prince incident, a battle
between the President and Congress erupted over the
possible use of U.S. troops in several U.N. missions:
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Haiti, Bosnia,

and Somalia.

During this time the

Administration focused upon its major foreign policy
accomplishments— Russia and nuclear containment--and
stressed the difference between vital U.S.
those areas where U.S.
Bosnia,

and Somalia.

interests and

interests were less obvious:

Haiti,

The Clinton Administration stressed

that there should be more cooperation between Congress and
the President in this new era of post-Cold War relations.
Two other policy considerations were part of the
Administration's overall frame for this period:

the

questions of sanctions and Aristide's CIA psychological
profile.

On the question of sanctions the Administration

maintained the same framing elements as it had before the
Port-au-Prince incident.

They were what forced the de

facto government to the bargaining table in the first
place.

The Administration was committed,

however,

to

maintaining humanitarian assistance programs in the form of
food and medical supplies to over 680,000 Haitians a day.
On the question of President Aristide's mental stability
the Administration presented a simple argument.
of Haiti elected him,

The people

and the U.S. had no business telling

the people of Haiti who they may have as President.
During this period the Administration framed its
response in such a manner as to define the problem as one
of foreign policy.

Thus, blame for the situation in Haiti

was laid squarely at the feet of the leaders of the de
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facto government.
perception.

Further, the problem was one of

Haiti was only a small event that would not

have risen to such importance if there had not recently
been the fire fight in Somalia that resulted in 18 American
dead.

The larger foreign policy issues were being well

managed; notwithstanding,
were less well defined,

those issues where U.S.

but more dramatic,

the largest share of the attention.

interests

were receiving

The remedies suggested

by the Administration were simple and a continuation of the
earliest Administrative utterances on the Haitian
situation.

The U.N./OAS should continue sanctions until

the leaders of the de facto government restore President
Aristide and democracy.
Two: How did the Press.
Frame the Situation?

Responding to President Clinton,

Period One: January 1993 through June 1993
The press did report what the Clinton Administration
said about Haiti.

However,

as this study progressed,

it

became increasingly clear that what was being reported was
framed in such a manner as to indicate the presence of a
fully articulated counter policy.
seven distinct components.

The press frame had

One, difficulties in reaching a

settlement were continually stressed.

Two,

President

Clinton's campaign pledge reversal was highlighted as an
icon for the callous denial of refugee rights.
refugees were assumed to be political,

Three,

not economic.

it was assumed that the U.S. was the leader in the

Four,
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international negotiations.

Five, the embargo/sanctions

were reported as only hurting Haiti's poor.

Six,

the

policy of direct returns was stressed as illegal.

Seven,

it was assumed by the press that any immigrant had a right
to enter this country.
The press frame was essentially a domestic one, with
all seven elements rooted in a domestic focus.

The

problems highlighted by this domestic frame were different
than those highlighted by the Administration's frame.

The

root causes of the problems can be ascribed to one major
issue:

the continuation of the Bush policy toward Haiti.

Direct returns was touted by the press as being illegal and
immoral.

The inherent immorality is linked to three

general ethical violations.

One,

Clinton broke his word

about abolishing the policy of direct returns.
policy of direct returns violates Haitians'
this country to settle.
hurts the poor in Haiti.

Two,

the

rights to enter

Three, the embargo/sanctions only
Although the press did not openly

suggest any remedies to the problems associated with Haiti,
the frame itself suggests that all would be well if
President Clinton followed through with his campaign
pledge.

The frame also suggested that the

embargo/sanctions were responsible for the continuation of
abysmal economic conditions in Haiti; therefore,
were removed,

the conditions would improve.

if they

The press

focus is clearly upon those aspects of Administrative
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policy that are of a domestic nature:

the legality of the

policy and the President's character as it pertains to a
reversal of a campaign pledge.
Period Two: July 1993 through December 1993
After the signing of the Governors Island agreement
the press,

like the Clinton Administration,

about Haiti.
plan.

reported little

All was assumed to be going according to

Once the Port-au-Prince incident occurred,

however,

reporting upon the situation began again in earnest.

The

press frame during this time evolved into two distinct
frames.
Haiti;

The first focused upon the internal workings of
it was a foreign affairs frame.

In this frame were

details of the effects of the newly imposed sanctions,
the near anarchic state of the country.

and

It was reported

that the Clinton Administration's imposition of sanctions
was the primary culprit for this.

Although the press urged

the Administration to reimpose sanctions,

it was strongly

assertive that they would only hurt the poor.

The issue of

direct returns was almost ignored during the aftermath of
the demonstration in Port-au-Prince.
The second frame focused upon the domestic affairs of
America.

The Port-au-Prince incident prompted a

Congressional battle with the Clinton Administration over
the use of U.S. troops in U.N. missions.
issue had to do with foreign policy,

Although this

it was eventually

reduced to a partisan political battle.

Even after the
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congressional concern abated,

the press continued to report

issues of Clinton's foreign policy and America's post-Cold
War role as domestic concerns revolving around the
composition of Clinton's foreign policy team.
The CIA psychological profile of President Aristide
was also a major concern in the press.

However,

this issue

was also filtered through a domestic lens, ultimately being
interpreted as part of a larger partisan political battle
between Republicans and the President.
Three: Did These Frames Converge to Present a Unified
Contextual Whole?
During the period of January through June the press
operated from a very different frame from that of the
Clinton Administration.

Simply put, the press presented

the situation as a domestic issue, and the Administration
presented it as a foreign policy issue.

Although the press

did report what the Administration said,

the substance of

the Administrative text was challenged by the presence of
the press frame.

This is to say, the context surrounding

the administrative text was modified by the frame of the
press.

This changed the meaning of the Administration's

comments; the Administration was seen as responding to
press challenges of its own policies.
As time progressed,

the disparities between the press

frame and the Administration's frame grew.

By the end of

June,

The Clinton

each was a fully articulated policy.

Administration stressed a foreign policy that had as its
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focus the return of democracy and the aversion of a massive
humanitarian tragedy.

The press frame stressed a domestic

focus that highlighted its perception of an inhumane
Administrative policy of direct returns.
democracy was not the focus,

Restoration of

but the domestic,

of the Administration's policy.

legal issue

In such a setting the

Administration was presented, not as a source of news,
as one side of a partisan battle.

but

When the Clinton

Administration would make a statement on the situation in
Haiti, the press would bring in critics of the
Administration's position.

These so-called critics

invariably articulated the very counter-policy that the
press was advancing.
After the Port-au-Prince incident the frames of the
Clinton Administration and the press still did not
converge.

Only on two issues did the two touch,

question of Aristide's CIA psychological profile,
reimposition of sanctions.

However,

the
and the

reimposing sanctions

was still presented as hurting only the Haitian poor.
the press did back the President in several ways.

Yet

First,

they virtually stopped reporting on the policy of direct
returns,
U.S.

even though the policy was continually enforced by

Coast Guard and Navy vessels.

Second,

the effect of

the sanctions were now framed as a foreign policy issue.
The stories on this issue were linked with the internal
political discussion in Haiti.

However,

the effects of the
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sanctions were ascribed to the original sanctions and
especially the oil embargo President Clinton enacted in
June 1993.

Thus, while the press supported the

Administration's reimposition of sanctions,

it also

reported that the effects of sanctions were horrible.

The

press consistently maintained that sanctions would do
little good, even though the same sanctions initially
compelled the de facto government to sign the Governors
Island agreement.
Implications and Theoretical Discussion
This section is composed of three parts:

first,

I

discuss the theoretical assumptions of agendasetting/extension literature as it relates to the results
of this study; two,

I discuss the theoretical assumptions

of crisis rhetoric literature as it relates to the results
of this study;

finally,

I discuss implication for future

studies in the area of presidential crisis rhetoric.
Agenda-Setting and Agenda-Extension
Agenda-setting theory in essence postulates that the
press tells us what to think about,
Furthermore,

but not what to think.

we learn about an issue in direct proportion

to press coverage of that issue.

The research reviewed in

this study have concluded that the relationship between
press and President is a reciprocal one.
affects press content,

The President

and the press affects Presidential

message content as well.

This study did not find press
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coverage of particular issues pertaining to Haiti reflected
in subsequent Administrative utterances.

However,

this

study did find that while the content of presidential
messages was being reported,

the context in which the

message was originally uttered was not always conveyed.
Agenda-extension moves beyond agenda-setting theory by
postulating an evaluative component to media coverage of
issues and events.

In short, the press not only tells us

what to think about

(agenda-setting), but it also tells us

how to think about it (agenda-extension).

This evaluative

component has been called priming and framing by various
communication and political science researchers.
however,

Priming,

refers specifically to the contextual cues

embedded within a news story that would be used by the
public to evaluate the subject matter at hand.

For

presidential studies this would imply that the public would
be primed to evaluate that President by how well he handled
certain issues in relation to the evaluative cues provided
by the media.

This study focused upon the different frames

used by the Administration and the press,

not upon the

public's evaluation of the President based upon media
coverage.

Thus,

this study makes no attempt at

ascertaining the effects of priming upon the public.
This study did, however,

focus upon contending frames

used to describe the situation in Haiti during 1993.
Frames are central organizing ideas within a narrative
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account of an issue or event.

Frames provide the

interpretive cues for neutral facts.

This study has

demonstrated that the press constructed a frame in
opposition to that which the Administration used in
describing the Haiti situation.

This acted to enervate the

Clinton Administration's attempt at explaining the
situation to the American public.

Unless the reader had

first hand access to transcripts of the Clinton
Administration's utterances,

all information was filtered

through the frame of the p r e s s .

Thus the context through

which the Administration's utterances were understood
changed,

thereby changing the meaning of the message.

In this manner the Administration was not treated as a
news source, providing informative utterances about the
situation,

but rather it was forced into an oppositional

role to that of the press.

The President and his officials

were presented as one side, articulating one definition of
the situation.

The press introduced so-called critics of

the Administration who took an oppositional view which
almost always duplicated that of the press.

Thus this

study found evidence that supports recent research into the
effects of framing.
Crisis Rhetoric
With the loss of the Cold War meta-narrative,
President Clinton was unable to draw upon the inventional
resources used by Presidents since 1947 to define crises
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situations.

The cold War was,

in a very significant sense,

a contest of words in which a prevailing image of the enemy
was conveyed to Americans.

These common images were an

inventional resource that a President might use when
advancing a particular foreign policy action.

The enemy

was often characterized as a "moral threat to freedom," "a
barbarian," or part of "an evil empire."

Precedent and

tradition strongly constrained a President's utterances
about foreign affairs.

Formally descriptions of the enemy

often called upon Americans' public knowledge about the
enemy, thereby justifying action.

However,

President

Clinton was unable to call upon such knowledge to justify
action in Haiti.

For example, the names used by both the

Administration and the press to describe the de facto
government in Haiti suggest no prevailing image of the
enemy.

Those thwarting the restoration of President

Aristide and democracy are vague, mostly neutral entities.
Tables 1 through 6 illustrate the use of descriptive terms
employed by the Administration and the press.
Table 1
White House Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De Facto
Government (January-June 1993)
9
7
4
4
4
2
2
1

junta
de facto regime
all sides
de facto government
Haitian parties
coup leaders
government
appropriate people
{Table C o n 'd .)
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1
1
1
1
1
1
l
l

gentlemen who are in the command of the military
illegal regime
illegal government
military leaders
people who have power
rump government
the Haitians
unelected officials

Table 2
New York Times Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De
Facto Government (January-June 1993)
8
6
5
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
l
1

officials
authorities
military backed Haitian government
military government
military leaders
the military
coup leaders
government of Haiti
military rulers
Haitian rulers
Haitian leadership
military regime
people at the top

Table 3
Washington Post Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De
Facto Government (January-June 1993)
7
5
4
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

the military
de facto government
Haitian authorities
military backed government
army leaders
Haitian military leaders
military leaders
military regime
coup leaders
current rulers
de
facto civilian government
de
facto army backed government
de
facto authorities
de
facto rulers
Haiti's present rulers
Haiti's political leaders
Haiti's military backed leaders
Haitian military
(Table C o n 'd .)
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1
1
l
1
1
l
1
1
1
1

military rulers
military and civilian leaders
military authorities
military-backed, de facto government
military-installed regime
new regime
political and military leaders
regime
the government
those in power

Table 4
White House Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De Facto
Government (July-December 1993)
21
8
7
5
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
l
1

de facto regime
government of Haiti
military and police authorities
Haitian military
Haitian government
Haitian authorities
Haitian leaders
Haitian military authorities
leaders in Haiti
elites
Haitian officials
illegal regime
military and police leaders
military rulers
old regime

Table 5
Hew York Times Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De
Facto Government (July-21 October 1993)
16
11
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1

Haitian military
military leaders
military leadership
Haitian political parties
Haitian army
military rulers
army leaders
junta
military government
the army
authorities
army and police leaders
army officials
economic elite
Haitian high command
(Table C o n 'd .)
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1
l
1
1
1
1

military coup leaders
military elite
military and police commanders
military authorities
military-backed government
ruling elite

Table 6
Washinaton Post Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De
Facto Government (July-21 October 1993)
12
8
8
4
1
1
1
l
1
1
1

military leaders
military rulers
the military
Haitian military
de facto leaders
de facto military rulers
de facto government
Haiti's rulers
Haitian commanders
military commanders
military government
As these tables indicate, there were no "barbaric" or

"irrational" descriptions employed.

Indeed,

even after the

11 October 1993 Port-au-Prince incident no significant
change in terminology was undertaken.

The results indicate

that the only centralized descriptive label used involved
the term "military."

The Clinton Administration's most

often employed the following three descriptions:
regime"
Haiti"

(28 times),
(8 times).

"junta"

(9 times),

and "government of

These terms are, at worst,

may even imply legitimacy.

"de facto

neutral,

and

Given the Clinton

Administration's notable attempts at diplomacy,

it seems

reasonable not to negatively name those with whom you are
negotiating.

The New York Times most often used the

following three descriptions:
times),

"military leaders"

"Haitian military"

(14 times),

(16

and "authorities"

(8
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times).

The Washinaton Post most often employed the

following three descriptions:

"the military” (15 t i m e s ) ,

"military leaders” (14 t i m e s ) , and "military rulers"
times).

As with the Administration's descriptions,

is a notable lack of negative labels used.

(9
there

Considering

that the United States maintains relations with many
military ruled countries across the world,

this label does

not necessarily represent a villainization of the "enemy."
Theodore Windt advanced a conception of crisis
rhetoric which contends that a President making a crisis
speech will ask support for, and not discussion about,
particular plan of action.1

As mentioned earlier,

a

Windt

has convincingly argued that a presidential crisis speech
will consist of an obligatory statement of facts,

an

establishment of a melodrama between good and evil, and
that the policy enacted will be framed as a moral act.
This study initially suggested that this model for
Presidential crisis speeches would not hold true for
President Clinton due to the loss of the Cold War meta
narrative.

This assumption proved to be correct.

Throughout 1993,

President Clinton spoke many times on

the situation in Haiti,

but only one brief speech, that

given of 15 October 1993 may be considered a speech
responding to a perception of crisis.

In this speech,

the

President did make a statement of the facts surrounding the
new situation for the United States.

This included a

discussion of the action taken by the President in response
to the new situation.

However,

there was no establishment
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of a melodrama between good and evil.

No attempt to

establish the actions in Haiti to a larger world picture
was made.

The possible exception came when President

Clinton asserted that part of the U.S.

interest in the area

was to maintain the hemispheric march toward democracy.
Furthermore,

the President did not frame his newly

announced actions as a moral act.

Instead it was simply

announced as a continuation of the same policy that had
been in place prior to the Port-au-Prince incident.
Although this policy did contain specific humanitarian
underpinnings,

the overall focus was upon the breaking of

the Governors Island agreement itself.

This is to say, the

U.N./OAS and the United States were partners in a signed
agreement that had been abrogated.

The U.S. was simply

calling for the honoring of the contract.
Although the Administration had called the incident at
Port-au-Prince "a brutal attempt by Haiti's military and
police authorities to thwart the expressed desire of the
Haitian people for democracy,M it was the only such
exhortative statement.4

Moreover,

the overall frame of the

Administration vitiated the potential injurious effect such
a comment could have.

In short,

the frame used by the

Administration for the past ten months reduced the saliency
of the comment.

For the past 10 months the Administration

had been stressing diplomacy and a negotiated solution.
Terms used to describe the de facto government were
generally neutral.

Even in the crisis atmosphere the one

demonizing comment by the Administration seemed oddly out
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of place, almost a flair of temper instead of a consistent
manner of conduct.

The Administration had no previous

negative characterizations to draw upon.

The Cold War

meta-narrative was inoperative; the Administration's own
utterances in the past acted to impair any effective use of
inflammatory discourse.
Crisis rhetoric is about the creation of stable
contextual frames through which to view the event and
justify any action taken in response to the event.

As an

interanimation of text and context occur, the situational
elements combine to either effect a stable frame,
modify the frame in some way.

or to

As a frame stabilizes the

President will find increased freedom to pursue his present
course of action and increased limits upon choices for new
action.

President Clinton had a stable frame through which

to view the event, this was his initial foreign policy
frame.

Indeed, when President Clinton took office in

January 1993, he initially responded to what many perceived
to be a pre-existing crisis.

In this manner he acted in

the role of manager of that crisis.

He had a well

developed and articulated frame through which to understand
the situation in Haiti.

Unfortunately for the President,

the press frame did not match his own.

Instead the press

developed a fully articulated counter-policy.

In the

opinion of this author, the mixing of frames acts to
exacerbate the perception of crisis because there is no
stable frame through which to view the event.
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The President's 15 October 199 3 speech has provided us
with the opportunity to examine the effects of a
presidential crisis speech upon already established frames.
Blair and Houck have suggested that many crisis rhetoric
scholars differentiate between a President constructing the
perception of a crisis and a President's response to an
event already perceived as a crisis.

Blair and Houck state

that such a distinction is unprovable and unimportant.
President Clinton's reply to the Port-au-Prince situation
provides insight that belies these scholars'
however.

First,

assertions,

President Clinton responded after several

days of news coverage.
array of coverage.

This coverage reflected a wide

The only consistent response to the

incident was that of the Administration.

When President

Clinton spoke, he was speaking within a situation
possessing an unstable context.

His comments might have

precipitated the situation into a full-blown crisis
situation; however,

drawing upon his Administration's

already established frame, the President maintained a
course of action commensurate with his prior utterances.
The Administrative text had now interacted with the
context.
Bonnie Dow argued that if the President is responding
to an event already perceived as a crisis situation,

then

he will enact an epideictic response which will function to
prevent disparate interpretations of the situation and to
"promote continuity,

restore communal feeling,

reconcile the audience to a new situation."''

and

. . .

In short,

the
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President's response is designed to manage and stabilize
the already existing perception of crisis.

However,

President Clinton's speech did act to modify the perception
of crisis.

While the press was initially raising the

question of U.S. troop involvement,

the President spoke so

as to retain a sense of control over the situation.

He

recast the terms of the debate to stress a negotiated
solution.

In this manner the President was arguing that

his policy was reasonable and that there was no immediate
danger to U.S.
phraseology,

interests.

In short, to use Dow's

he was using a deliberative approach.

Deliberative strategies are those used to demonstrate that
the policy being enacted in response to a crisis is
"expedient,

reasoned and prudent.’*6

Thus we have an

example of a crisis speech that is an example of the
blurring of, according to Dow, two distinct Presidential
crisis speeches.
Although this study has been a comparative framing
analysis,

it has made a significant contribution in the

area of post-Cold War crisis rhetoric theory.
Specifically,

this study allows us to begin to answer what

inventional resources a President has today to use when
framing a crisis.

The Cold War meta-narrative was a part

of this country's collective consciousness;
knowledge.

it was public

The public and its knowledge serve to authorize

discourse emanating from rhetors acting as spokespersons
for the public;

in our case, the President.

Presidents

must build certain images of the enemy when speaking about
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crises, and these images must make links to values and
images embedded in American culture.

However,

it is now

difficult for Presidents to do this.

Public knowledge for

the past forty-five years has privileged those images
drawing upon the Cold War meta-narrative.

National values

and interests were relatively easy to determine.
However,

today it is difficult to know what National

interests are at any given time; this weakens the
parameters of the rhetorical situation because the context
is more dubious and there exists conflicting public
perception over what should be done.

This leaves a

President with few inventional resources from which to draw
upon when creating/responding to crises.

For President

Clinton this problem was particularly acute since any
utterance he or his officials made were cast into a counter
frame advanced by the press.

However,

this study

demonstrated that the President may draw upon his own
frame,

as President Clinton did in responding to the crisis

situation in Haiti.

Moreover,

a President might draw upon

other values embedded in American culture:
Play, Honor,

and the like.

Patriotism,

Fair

Other options were available,

but were not used by President Clinton.
Martin Medhurst has argued that a President's crisis
response should be considered part of his rhetorical
biography.

That is to say, a President's personal style

may have a significant impact upon how he handles a crisis
situation.

This study supports this assertion.

By

examining the Clinton Administration's responses over time-
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-one year--this study was able to note the consistent
aspects of the proffered discourse.

Most studies of crisis

rhetoric focus upon one speech, or upon several different
Presidents giving one speech on similar crises.

This study

found that the style employed by the Clinton Administration
was remarkably consistent over time.
cooperation,

negotiation,

The style stressed

and dignity for all parties.

The

strength of this frame established by the Clinton
Administration was so strong that it pervaded President
Clinton's formal reply to the Port-au-Prince incident.
Thus the President's strategy for dealing with a crisis
appears to be remarkably similar to his day to day style of
operation:

slow deliberation stressing a negotiated,

compromised,

and non-confrontational solution.

President Clinton used those resources that were
available from his Administration's initial
framing of the Haitian situation.
was constrained by this frame.
coup leaders,

(January)

Thus his crisis speech

He could not villainize the

at least not immediately.

To do so would be

to undermine ten months of his own framing.

He could not

immediately justify extreme action in the form of military
intervention,

for to do so would also counter act ten

months of his own framing.
previous utterances:
solution.

He was constrained by his

cooperation,

and a negotiated

President Clinton could not even draw upon the

inventional resources that the press frame offered,

for it

was oppositional to his own and had stressed a counter
policy.

In my opinion,

a President today must fund his own
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inventional resources.

Until this country finds a new role

for itself in the post-cold War world, there will be
conflicting frames presented for any international crisis
situation.
Indeed,

it seems that contending frames were

suppressed by the enacting of the Cold War meta-narrative.
The "rally- *round-the-president" phenomenon found by Nacos
did not materialize for Clinton,
evolved to closure.7

and the situation never

The press did stop criticizing the

policy of direct returns,

however,

and this lends some

support to previous studies that suggest that during times
of crises the benefit of the doubt is given to the
President.

But the press also focused increasingly upon

the effects sanctions had on the Haitian poor.
Consequently,

the one policy option available to the

President besides direct military intervention was openly
deplored by the press.
Furthermore,

as the situation progressed,

the press

began to assert that military action was not an option;
this was in direct conflict with the P r e s i d e n t s comments.
Moreover, while the President was attempting to articulate
his Administration's post-cold War foreign policy,
including Haiti, the press reported administrative policy
as part of an on-going partisan political battle.
short,

In

even during a time of crisis the press continued to

advance its own oppositional frame.
As of this writing,

public knowledge about America's

foreign policy role in the world remains in flux,

and no
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single frame has come to dominate public consciousness.

In

the past the press may not have agreed with what the
President was doing,

but executive actions could be

consistently framed drawing upon public knowledge held in
common,

the Cold War meta-narrative for example.

common knowledge exists today,

No such

so it is very likely that

other crisis situations will exhibit contending
President/press frames.
Future Studies
This study suggests several possible areas for future
studies.

In the area of priming researchers might explore

the relationship between public opinion polls and frame
content.

For example,

one might compare public opinion

polls on a specific crisis issue with the frames used by
the President and the press.

It would be important to

consider which criteria emerge to evaluate the President's
performance.
One might also explore the bibliographic thesis put
forth by James W. Pratt and also by Martin J. Medhurst.
For instance, a future study might employ a comparative
frame analysis between the President and the press that
focused upon one of several foreign policy crises
experienced by the Clinton Administration:
Korea,

for example.

In so doing,

Somalia or North

researchers might provide

further insights into post-Cold War crisis rhetoric,

and by

this means better explore Clinton's particular rhetorical
signature.

Such studies would further help future
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researchers to discriminate better between situational
dynamics and the particular style of a single President.
This study has shed light upon the development of
crises in the post-Cold War world.

Future studies may

benefit from employing a comparative frame analysis upon
classic examples of foreign policy crises;

for example,

shootdown of KAL 007, the invasion of Grenada,
affair,
studies,

or the Cuban missile crisis.

the

the Kavaauez

With such comparative

researchers might begin to better understand the

similarities and differences in the nature of
President/press interaction during Cold War and post-Cold
War crisis situations.
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